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The theme of this thesis occurred to me while reading Luria's 
Basic Problems 
manifest forms 
of Neurolinguistics. Many of Luria's patients 
of a disintegration of speech and of the 
understanding of speech, which resemble the disintegration of 
movement in space and perception of space of Goldstein's 
patient, Schneider, the case Merleau-Ponty described in so many 
of his arguments, particularly those in the chapter of the 
Phenomenology of Perception entitled "The spatiality of one's 
own Body and Motility". It seemed to me that I could analyse the 
speech syndromes Luria reveals, and Luria's explanations, in 
much the same way that Herleau-Ponty analysed Schneider's 
syndrome and the explanations offered by Goldstein and others. I 
felt that in this way I would be able to exhibit certain 
features of the speaking subject and its relations with others, 
in the same way that Merleau-Ponty revealed the spatiality of 
the body and its relations with the world. 
This seemed to me to be a useful project, firstly because of the 
central role that the problem of language plays in 
Herleau-Ponty's later philosophy and because the later 
reflections on language seem to presuppose such an analysis of 
pathological forms of speech. 
The change from 
phenomenology of the 
transcendental phenomenology to the 
'incarnate subject' makes language the 
fundamental problem of philosophy. Once we have accepted the 
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impossibility of a complete reduction, given up the dream of 
returning to the pure consciousness as the source of all meaning 
and being, and accepted that the mind is in a relationship of 
reciprocal exchange with the instruments it uses, it is clear 
that language is no longer just a 'regional problem', not just 
one of the phenomena on which we can reflect. "Philosophy" says 
Merleau-Ponty, "is language itself". "It is the most valuable 
witness to Being" 1 (1969:126). "It is by considering language 
that we would best see how we are to and how we are not to 
return to the things themselves" 2 (1968:125). Consequently, as 
Merleau-Ponty refined his position and "fixed the philosophical 
significance" of his earlier works he concerned himself 
increasingly with the problem of language. Much of these later 
writings on language are still set against the background of his 
theory of speech which emerges in the Phenomenology of 
Perception particularly in the chapter "The body as Expression, 
and Speech." 3 
Nevertheless this chapter is in an important sense only 
programmatic. Instead of the finely worked out analyses and 
arguments which we find in The Structure of Behaviour and in 
the chapter "The Spatiality of one's own Body and Hotili ty", 
of the Phenomenology of Perception we are simply given 
assurances that we can deal with the speaking body in the same 
way that we have dealt with the moving body. 
"Vhat we have said earlier about the representation of 
movement must be repeated concerning the verbal image. 
I do not need to visualise external space and my own 
body in order to move one within the other ... In the 
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same way I do not need to visualise the word in order 
to pronounce it I reach back for the word as my 
hand reaches back towards the part of my body which is 
being pricked." (1962:180) 
"Thought and expression, then, are simultaneously 
constituted, when our cultural store is put at the 
service of this unknown law, as our body suddenly lends 
itself to some new gesture in the formation of habit. 
The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains 
its meaning in the same way as the gesture contains 
its." (1962:181) 
This way of arguing reappears in all of Merleau-Ponty's later 
writings. 
"Speech is comparable to a gesture because what it is 
charged with expressing will be in the same relation to 
it as the goal is to the gesture which intends it ... " 
(1974:86) 
"Vhen I am actually speaking I do not first figure the 
movements involved. My whole bodily system concentrates 
on finding and saying the word, in the same way that my 
hand moves toward what is offered to me." (1973:19) 
"Speaking subject: it is the subject of a praxis. It 
does not hold before itself the words said and 
understood as objects of thought or ideates. It 
possesses them only by a Vorhabe which is of the same 
type as the Vorhabe of place by my body that betakes 
itself unto that place." (1968:201) 
"Start from here in order to understand language as the 
foundation of the I think: it is to the I think what 
movement is to perception." (1968:257) 
Even in his general theory of intersubjectivity, into which his 
theory of linguistic behaviour must be integrated, Merleau-Ponty 
repeatedly recalls the analogy of the binocular perception of 
objects in space. Two perceiving subjects are said to be able to 
find themselves in the same world, just as two monocular images 
merge in binocular perception, into one indivisible object. 
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"But we have learned in individual perception not to 
conceive our perspective views as independent of each 
other; we know that they slip into each other and are 
brought together finally in the thing. In the same way 
we must learn to find the communication between one 
consciousness and another in one and the same world." 
(1962:353) 
"The communication makes us witnesses of one sole 
world, as the synergy of our eyes suspends then on one 
unique thing." (1968:11) 
Yithin the context of Merleau-Ponty's approach these analogies 
can serve only to indicate the direction in which research 
should proceed. Merleau-Ponty always attempts to demonstrate the 
inseparability of the essence and the phenomenon through which 
it is revealed. To put essences back into existence (1962:vii) 
means that the phenomenologist can never see linguistic 
behaviour as a possible actualization or as "another 
manifestation" of the body subject, the essence of which has 
been revealed in the phenomenon of motility and the perception 
of space. Just as the musical meaning of a sonata is inseparable 
from the sounds4 so the essence of linguistic behaviour is 
inseparable from the phenomenon of speech. In all our 
intellectual analyses of language we will be unable to do 
anything but carry ourselves back to an encounter with the 
phenomenon of speech itself. The intelligibility of linguistic 
behaviour and the essence of speech must be revealed embedded 
in, and ultimately inseparable from the phenomenon, even if our 
revelations are inspired or guided by those of motility and the 
perception of space. 
Merleau-Ponty's later reflections on language and philosophy 
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presuppose therefore, that the analogies made with body motility 
are taken up and demonstrated, so that for example, if it is 
true that the spoken word contains its meaning in the same way 
that the gesture contains its, this can be revealed, as the 
gesture was revealed, in a comparison of normal and aphasic 
forms of linguistic behaviour. 5 
The project of this thesis also seemed to be useful on the 
otherhand, because it could bring about a confrontation between 
existential phenomenology and modern Neurolinguistics. It was 
clear to me for example, that in his discussion of Schneider, 
Merleau-Ponty had gone beyond Goldstein's explanation of 
abstract or categorial attitude. I felt that while Luria had 
seen the problems in Goldstein's theory, he was himself unable 
to produce a satisfactory explanation of conduction aphasia. 6 
Perhaps an adaptation of Merleau-Ponty's analyses could make a 
valuable contribution to the current debate in Neurolinguistics. 
Yhile all the authors in this field seem to be aware of 
Goldstein's account of conduction aphasia in terms of a loss of 
categorial attitude, none seem to be aware of Merleau-Ponty's 
arguments. Furthermore Merleau-Ponty claimed that 
aphasiologists, whether they were aware of it or not, were 
trying to formulate "an existential theory of aphasia" 
(1962:190). Can we show that this is true of Luria? If it is not 
true, and if Luria can make sense of the distinction between 
abstract and concrete speech without adopting an existentialist 
theory, would this not undermine the arguments in favour of 
Merleau-Ponty's theory of speech and in turn the arguments in 
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favour of his theory of the body and motility? 
Finally, if we are able to link modern Neurolinguistics and 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology in this way, we will no longer be 
tied to Merleau-Ponty's actual arguments and descriptions. Ve 
will be able to extend his method to reveal other facets of 
language and intersubjectivity, so that the return to problems 
in neurolinguistics will enable us not merely to repeat 
Merleau-Ponty, but to renew his effort by taking up the movement 
of his thought. 7 
Our first task therefore is to reveal the structure of the 
relationship between the gesture and its goal. Secondly, we need 
to 'translate' this relationship into the realm of speech and to 
deduce the nature of speech and its signification, given that 
speech is in the same relation to its signification as the 
gesture is to its goal. We will then try to show how the various 
reflections on speech that Merleau-Ponty has made throughout his 
works, can be related and can be seen to manifest this idea of 
speech and its 
will be clear 
relationship to its signification, so that it 
that the comparison with the grasping gesture is 
not based on some superficial similarity but points to the very 
essence of the speech act. Finally we will turn to a description 
and an analysis of various forms of aphasia as these are 
presented, and discussed by Luria in 'Traumatic Aphasia' and 
'Basic Problems of Neurolinguistics'. Through an analysis of 
these forms of aphasia and Luria's explanations, we will attempt 
to corroborate our account of the speech act. 
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The first step in this process however proves to be problematic. 
We need to understand the relationship between the grasping 
gesture and its goal in a way that is both profound and 
sufficiently general to enable us to make the translation into 
the realm of speech. Certainly there is no question of embracing 
in thought some positive idea of which the grasping gesture and 
the speech act are merely actualizations. Nevertheless we must 
be able to disengage ourselves to some extent from 
Merleau-Ponty's actual reflections on the grasping gesture if we 
are to exploit the analogy between grasping and speech. We will 
demonst~ate that such a general concept of the relation of 
grasping can only be understood in terms of its break with the 
idealist relation of constitution, the relationship between a 
constituting consciousness and its object. The notion of the 
grasping body can only be given philosophical status via the 
notion of a transcendental constituting consciousness. By and 
large commentators have attempted to articulate Merleau-Ponty's 
position through a discussion of his relationship with realism 
and empiricism. For our purposes this is not sufficient. On 
various occasions Merleau-Ponty has made it clear that his 
analyses and criticisms of transcendental idealism are not 
simply of historical interest, or heuristic devices meant to 
prepare the reader for his own view. The ultimate meaning of 
Merleau-Ponty's thesis lies in this break with Husserl's 
idealism. The idealism is therefore "a route that must be 
followed." 
"Vhat will always make of the philosophy of reflection 
not only a temptation but a route that must be followed 
is that it is true in what it denies ... " (1968:32) 
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"This movement of reflection will always at first sight 
be convincing: in a sense it is imperative, it is the 
truth itself, and one does not see how philosophy could 
dispense with it. The question is whether it has 
brought philosophy to the harbor, whether the universe 
of thought to which it leads is really an order that 
suffices and puts an end to every question." (1968:31) 
We will devote a considerable amount of space to the 
presentation of the transcendental ego, precisely in order to 
bring it to the fore as convincing, as imperative, as the truth 
itself, because it is only in the movement of thought in which 
we go beyond this truth that the relationship between the 
gesture and its goal and the relationship between the speech act 
and its signification can emerge. Ve will see that every aspect 
of speech which our analyses of aphasia bring to the fore can be 
located conceptually only by returning to that movement of 
thought in which Merleau-Ponty breaks with the notion of the 
transcendental ego. 8 
• 
But giving such an account of transcendental idealism "from 
within", revealing its truth and its indispensability, has the 
added advantage of making our entire project accessible to those 
neurolinguistics, aphasiologists and philosophers who take the 
'natural attitude' as the only possible intellectual framework. 
The nature of this project also seems to require a particular 
style of writing. In keeping with his theory of meaning and 
communication, Merleau-Ponty presents his reflections on space, 
motility, language, intersubjectivity and transcendental 
idealism, without emphasizing their relations at each step. His 
vocabulary and metaphors change as he moves from one topic to 
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the next, so that it is not always easy to recognize the same 
theme as it appears in various contexts. 
Our project 
argument, the 
that we will 
requires us to emphasize at each step of our 
relationships between these topics. This means 
have to adopt a vocabulary and a set of metaphors 
that we can use throughout our research. Our descriptions and 
metaphors may at times appear rigid and severe, but this seems 
to be an inevitable consequence of trying to maintain a certain 
distance between us and our themes and of trying to bring out 
the relationships between the various topics we deal with. Ye 
will attempt to compensate for this rigidity and severity by 
introducing at various stages in our argument, quotations, which 
show how the same point is made by Merleau-Ponty in different 
contexts and in different works. In this way we hope to retain 
the coherency of our research and a certain 'altitude', while at 
the same time retaining the evocative power of Merleau-Ponty's 
writing, and, as it were, embracing as we proceed, insights, 
different nuances and different levels of subtilty as these are 
found in his various publications. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) "But, because he has experienced within himself the 
need to speak, the birth of speech as bubbling up at 
the bottom of his mute experience, the philosopher 
knows better than anyone that what is lived is lived 
spoken, that, born at this depth, language is not 
a mask over being, but if one knows how to grasp it 
with all its roots and all its foliation - the most 
valuable witness to Being." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968:126) 
2) Ricoeur expresses the necessity for this change of emphasis 
as follows. 
"If phenomenological reduction is to be something 
other than the suspension of our links to the world, 
it must be the 'beginning' of a life of meaning, the 
simultaneous 'birth of the spoken being of the world 
and the speaking - being of man". (1967(b):1) 
"In linking the question of sign to the level of the 
pre-reflexive, to the very heart of the 'perceived', 
phenomenology made the question of language 
fundamental; it made it a central question because 
it was universal." (1967(b):l0) 
3) Merleau-Ponty expressed this interdependence of his later 
4) 
and earlier writings in the following way: 
"This remark brings us to a series of further 
studies which I have under undertaken since 1945 and 
which will definitely fix the philosophical 
significance of my earlier works while they, in 
turn, determine the route and method of these later 
studies." (1964:6) 
"The musical meaning of 
the sounds which are 
heard it no analysis 
once the performance 
intellectual analysis 
a sonata is inseparable from 
its vehicle: before we have 
enables us to anticipate it; 
is over, we shall, in our 
of the music, be unable to do 
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anything by carry ourselves back to the moment of 
experiencing it." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:182) 
It is interesting to see Husserl sounding a similar warning 
as early as in Ideas. 
"Those who, not content with what is offered to them 
as intuitively manifest, demand 'definitions' of the 
type provided by the 'exact' sciences, or believe 
that with phenomenological concepts won from the 
rough analysis of a couple of illustrations and 
taken as firmly fixed they can think their 
scientific thought unhampered by intuition, and 
through such free-lancing further the cause of 
phenomenology, are still so truly beginners that 
they have not grasped the essential nature of 
phenomenology, nor the method of work which it 
intrinsically demands."(l931:245) 
5) It is clear that Merleau-Ponty himself recognised this need 
6) 
and intended to clarify the experience of speech by 
returning to the sciences of linguistic behaviour. 
"Ve shall attempt elsewhere to develop these remarks 
more fully in a theory of expression and truth. It 
will be necessary then to clarify or explicate the 
experience of speech in terms of what we know from 




this hypothesis [Goldstein's hypothesis 
brain lesions lead to a disturbance of 
'abstract set' or 'categorical behaviour'], was not 
confirmed by clinical observations. Careful clinical 
analysis showed that patients with conduction 
aphasia in fact have no disturbance of 'abstract 
set' and no defects of 'categorical behaviour'. 
(Luria, 1976:242) 
7) This is how Ricoeur presents the goal of his investigations 
of language and his relationship with Merleau-Ponty. 
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" I shall try to take up Merleau-Ponty's 
interrogation from the point at which he left it. 
Our position with regard to the greatest of French 
phenomenologists has, perhaps, already become what 
his was with regard to Husserl. We are not repeating 
him but taking up the movement of his thought." 
(1967(b):l) 
8) Our interest in Husserl's transcendental phase is therefore 
not historical. From a strictly historical point of view 
it would certainly be misleading to argue, as we do, that 
Husserl's work can be divided into three distinct phases. 
Even 'Cartesian Meditations', often taken as the most 
fully developed presentation of the transcendental phase, 
contains elements which predict the break with pure 
transcendental idealism. 
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THE FORMAL AND THE INFORMAL ESSENCE 
What characterises phenomenology and 
is its pursuit traditional thought, 
informal intelligibility 
distinguishes it 
of an intuitive 
from 
and 
of the world. Phenomenologists argue 
that the authentic meaning of all statements in the sciences and 
disciplines cannot be inferred from the basic axioms and 
definitions on which they are held to be based. Our actual 
understanding of these 
intuitive intelligibility 
formal presentation of 
statements is made possible through an 
which is completely ignored in the 
the science and its theoretical 
foundations. We can define a straight line for example, as "the 
shortest distance between two fixed points". But a radical 
philosophy of geometry should never accept such a definition as 
fundamental because our actual understanding of "distance", and 
therefore, of "shortest distance", already presupposes some 
grasp of a straight line. The definition is ultimately only a 
formula which enables me to make certain predictions. It does 
not offer me a grasp of the essence of straightness, it merely 
puts a question or a riddle to me which is only resolved if I am 
able to return to that perceptual grasp of straightness which I 
have as I identify an actual line as being straight. Long before 
discovering the formal definition, all straight lines "looked 
straight", they shared a certain common style or physiognomy. 
It is this physiognomy ignored in all theories of the basic 
axioms of geometry, which enables the individual to understand 
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what is meant by "the shortest distance between two points", and 
enables him to make sense of all the geometric constructions and 
proofs based on the straight line. It is the task of a 
phenomenology of geometry to explicate this physiognomy, this 
informal essence which is the sense a straight line has for me 
prior to any theory, a sense therefore to be discovered in my 
experience of the straight line itself. 
"This cannot be emphasized often enough - phenomeno-
logical explication does nothing but explicate the 
sense this world has for us all, prior to any 
philosophizing, and obviously gets solely from our 
experience a sense which philosophy can uncover but 
nev~r alter ... " (Husserl, 1969:151) 
Contrasting the formal definition and the physiognomy of the 
cube and the triangle, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates the way in 
which the physiognomy provides the meaning foundation. 
"One can bring together discursively the notion of the 
number six, the notion of'side' and that of equality, 
and link them together in a formula which is the 
definition of the cube. But this definition rather 
puts a question to us than offers us something to 
conceive. One emerges from blind, symbolic thought 
only by perceiving the particular spatial entity 
which bears these predicates all together. It is a 
question of visualizing that particular form which 
encloses a fragment of space between six equal faces." 
(1962:204) 1 
"Let us, at the outset, reject any idea of a formal 
essence of the triangle. Although attempts at 
formalization may be conceived, it is in any case quite 
certain that they lay no claim to provide a logic of 
invention, and that no logical definition of a triangle 
could rival, for abundant variety, the actual sight 
of the figure, or enable us to reach, through a series 
of formal operations, conclusions not already 
established by the aid of intuition ... There would be 
no experience of truth, and nothing would quench our 
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'mental volubility' if we thought vi formae, and if 
formal relations were not first presented to us 
crystallized in some particular thing." (1962:385) (My 
own emphasis) 
The intelligibility which phenomenology takes as fundamental is 
thus of the experiential order. It is a meaning embedded in and 
inextricable from the concrete experience. The definitions of 
the cube, the triangle and straight line do not actually answer 
the question "What is a cube?" "What is a triangle " and "What 
is a straight line?" The actual answer and ultimately the actual 
meaning foundation of solid and Euclidean geometry is found in 
an experience, in a 'contact' with straight lines, triangles and 
cubes, a contact which Husserl calls 'evidence'. 
Throughout his writings Husserl continuously changed his mind 
about how this contact is to be understood. In general however 
we can say that evidence is a contact with the thing itself, not 
an intuition of images, definitions, or symbols. Ricoeur 
summarises the notion as follows, 
"Evidence, according to Husser!, is the presence of the 
thing itself in the original (in contrast to the 
presentation, memory, portrait, image, symbol, sign, 
concept, word); one would be tempted to say presence in 
flesh and blood. This is the self-giveness 
(Selbstgegebenheit) which Husser! calls "originary"." 
(1967:101) 
This is not simply a repeat of Kant's recognition that concepts 
without intuitions are empty, and that it is only from the 
united co-operation of thought and intuition that knowledge can 
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arise. The informal essence transcends Kant's distinction 
between intuitions and concepts. The Kantian distinction, blinds 
us to the fact that in the physiognomy it is the sensuous matter 
of experience itself that manifests its form or essence. 
Perhaps the 
encountered 
simplest experience in which 





between intuition and thought, and indicates the nature of the 
informal essence, is the phenomenon of depth. If I stand with 
one eye closed, approximately 30 em from a thread suspended 
from the ceiling to the floor, so that the points of attachment 
are not in my field of vision, I cannot tell how far the thread 
is from me. The thread in fact appears to occupy an ambiguous 
position. As I open both eyes I am immediately able to see 
the exact distance of the thread from me. This perception of its 
distance is not based on any calculation because the thread 
appears to 'jump' to its determinate position. The experience 
is not equivalent to thinking about its distance from me, for if 
I close one eye again, the thread once again occupies an 
ambiguous position. Could we argue that closing one eye makes 
it impossible to think about or remember the distance? The 
experience we have of the thread taking up its position in front 
of us is so vivid that we recognize immediately that any attempt 
to reduce this distance to an act of judgement based on signs, 
misconstrues the experience entirely. 
One of the more important explanations found in modern 
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psychological theories of perception, takes as the sign of 
distance, the difference between the retinal images produced in 
the left and the right eye. Since the two eyes are about seven 
centimeters apart they do not produce identical images of the 
world. The images of those objects which are situated at a 
great distance will be found in corresponding positions in the 
two monocular images, while the images of those objects which 
are closer will be displaced (Vernon, 1962:119/20). The thread 
for example suspended in front of me, is seen on the right side 
of the visual field of the left eye, and on the left side in the 
visual field of the right eye. On the basis of this discrepancy 
the mind is held to infer which objects are close by, and which 
are further removed. This principle is held to be exploited in 
the stereo-scope where an illusion of depth is created by 
providing the viewer with two photographic images made of the 
same object from slightly different positions. 2 
But explanations of this kind, which suggest that depth or 
three dimensionality is only inferred, do not accord with the 
actual experience we have of the distance or proximity of an 
object. The explanation suggests that the perception of 
distance is actually the perception of two dissimilar images 
plus an estimation of, the objects distance. Yhat characterises 
genuine perception however, is that the two images, with their 
differences, have ceased to exist as identifiable entities. 
'The single thread 30cm from me', is not for me an idea, not a 
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way of thinking about the two images, not a notional unity as is 
Venus, which is a way of thinking about the morning star and the 
evening star. The two monocular images are not brought together 
under the concept of 'a single thread 30cm from me'. If this 
were the case I ought to have the perception of depth as soon as 
I notice the identity of the two images. But in actual fact I 
need to "wait much longer" for the single thread to appear 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:231). ~hat we have is a synthesis in which 
the two images have lost their density and substance and have 
entered into the thread itself 30cm from me. 
"The binocular perception is not made up of two 
monocular perceptions surmounted; it is of another 
order. The monocular images are not in the same 
sense that the thing perceived with both eyes is. They 
are phantoms and it is the real; they are pre-things 
and it is the thing: they vanish when we pass into 
normal vision and re-enter into the thing as into their 
daylight truth. They are too far from having its 
density to enter into competition with it The 
monocular images cannot be compared with the 
synergic perception : one cannot put them side by side; 
it is necessary to choose between the thing and the 
floating pre-things." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:7) 
"On passing from double to normal vision, I am not 
simply aware of seeing with my two eyes the same 
object, I am aware of progressing towards the object 
itself and finally enjoying its concrete presence." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:233) 
It is wrong to represent experience as a synthesis of intuitions 
through concepts when the most characteristic feature of the 
experience of the thing is the "re-entering of the images" into 
the thing, the emergence of the thing itself as the absolute 
simultaneity of form and content, as a matter which is pregnant 
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outer intuition, namely, liability 
objects, the representation of 
to be affected by 
space stands for 
nothing whatsoever." (1964:71) 
The depth that we have revealed, is not just an a priori form 
of intuition. It is a dimension of the world itself and for 
Husserl the source of our understanding of spatial objects. 
Ye could perform a similar experiment to the one above, this 
time using a wooden cube. Yith one eye closed and under 
appropriate lighting, it is possible to see the cube as a 
square or as two or three adjoining parallelograms~ As I open 
both eyes, a cube emerges from the flat shapes and, "of its 
own", takes up its solidity and volume. The experience of 
this emergence can never be described as an interpretation, or 
a way of thinking about the parallelograms. 
"The whole of the configuration strives towards its 
equilibrium on its own, by delving in depth, as a stone 
falls downwards." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:262) 
The solid cube is as unmistakably present to me as is the 
distance of the thread. The parallelograms, are not diamond 
shaped because they are not signs or images of the cube, but 
sides. The cube announces itself through its sides - which is 
why the sides become 'squares-seen-at-an-angle'. 
"An image or sign points to something that lies beyond 
it, which, could it but pass over into another form of 
presentation, into that of a dator intuition, might 
"itself" be apprehended. A sign and copy does not 
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"announce" in itself the self that is signified (or 
copied)." (Husser!, 1931:160) 4 
The cube "announces" itself through its sides, this means that 
the entire cube is "present in" any one of its sides. My 
perceptual field is not for me like a painting or a photograph 
which can be cut up into smaller pieces. The sides I see cannot 
be isolated from the entire configuration. They are squares 
seen at an angle because they are the sides of a cube. I could 
never define this cube as a figure bounded by six equal sides 
because it is only in grasping the cube as a physiognomic whole 
that I grasp the inevitable presence of its six equal sides. It 
is the cube itself as a solid entity that I see, and this is 
why its hidden sides, without ceasing to be hidden are present 
to me. 
If the hidden sides and attributes of the cube were available to 
me only through an express process of inference from a concept I 
would always be tempted to remake the inferences or to check the 
back of the cube to verify their existence, "··· and thus 
resemble the patient mentioned by Scheler who was constantly 
turning around in order to reassure himself that things were 
really there " (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:418). Ye are aware of 
the hidden sides as an "incontestable acquisition". 
Yhat we have said about the monocular image in binocular 
perception and the side of the cube, we can say of every spatial 
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entity and every sensory quality. My perceptual field is not 
'made up' of images or signs, and nor is it 'made up' of colour 
sense data. Vhat I encounter is 'the-true-colour-of-the-object 
announcing-itself-through-its-perspectival-variations', 
variations due for example to different lighting conditions. The 
colours I encounter in perceptual experience cannot therefore be 





colour appears "in" continuously varying 
of perspective colour-variations" (Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty provides a vivid description of this irreducible 
depth of a perceived colour. 
"I am sitting in my room, and I look at the sheets of 
white paper lying about on the table, some in the light 
shed through the window, others in the shadow. If I do 
not analyse my perception but content myself with the 
spectacle as a whole, I shall say that all the sheets 
of paper look equally white. However some of them are 
in the shadow of the wall. How is it that they are not 
less white than the rest? ... I notice that the sheets 
over which a shadow is thrown were at no time identical 
with the sheets lyning in the light, nor yet were they 
objectively different from them. The whiteness of the 
shaded paper does not lend itself to precise 
classification within the black white range." 
(1962:266) 
Furthermore, since the thing ultimately announces itself through 
its colour, 
"A colour is never merely a colour, but the colour of a 
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certain object, and the blue of a carpet would never be 
the same blue were it not a woolly blue." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:313) 
" a thing would not have this colour had it not 
also this shape, these tactile properties, this 
resonance, this odour." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:319) 
"In reality, each colour, in its inmost depths, is 
nothing but the inner structure of the thing overtly 
revealed One sees the hardness and brittleness of 
glass, and when with a tinkling sound, it breaks, this 
sound is conveyed by the visible glass. One sees the 
springiness of steel, the ductility of red-hot steel, 
the hardness of a plane blade, the softness of 
shavings." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:229) 5 
LANGUAGE AND THE FORMAL ESSENCE 
The definition in science and philosophy claims to answer the 
question "Vhat is ?" . . . . ' it claims to express the essence of 
the thing which would provide the ultimate explanation for 
the thing's properties. Vhen however we investigate the way in 
which individuals actually try to understand why a certain 
thing has certain properties it is not the definition to which 
they return, but the informal essence. It is the physiognomy 
of the cube which allows us to see at a glance, that doubling 
the length of a side would increase the volume eight times. 
If on the other hand, a particular individual was unable to 
'see', if his visual experience did not already suggest this 
feature of the cube, he could still resort to a blind faith in 
the definition of its volume and the mathematical rules for the 
manipulation of symbols. If volume 
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X 53 = 8 X volume. In this way he could be said to compensate 
for his lack of intuitive grasp through a blind attachment to 
formulae and definitions. 
Under certain circumstances we may be obliged to resort to using 
formulae in this way, particularly when dealing with objects we 
cannot visualize. Yith the use of formulae a mathematician may, 
for example, be able to deal with the 'volume' of a figure 
bounded by equal 'sides', in a multidimensional space. Here 
there is no physiognomy, no 'mute' intelligibility to exploit, 
he can only proceed by sticking blindly to the formulae and the 
rules for the manipulation of symbols. The formula for the 
'volume' of a multidimensional figure is not meaningful to the 
mathematician because it refers to some object or to an idea. 
He is unable to imagine any such object and the only way of 
thinking about the 'volume' is by recalling the formula. 
Nevertheless the formula is not meaningless. It has a technical 
meaning, in that it prescribes the exact rules for calculating 
the 'volume' of any such figure, for calculating the change in 
'volume' for any change in the length of its 'sides'. There is 
however a clear distinction between the 'sense' of volume given 
in an intuitive grasp of the physiognomy of the cube, and the 
technical meaning, which is ultimately reducible to a set of 
rules for the manipulation of symbols. 
Husser! argued for the importance of phenomenology, by 
demonstrating the way in which a technocratic mentality had 
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begun to replace a genuine understanding of the world, 
affecting, not the progress and successful application of the 
sciences, but the meaning of their theories, making it 
ultimately impossible for European man to achieve any radical 
reflection on himself. The paradigm case for this mentality 
Husser! found in modern algebra. In contrast to arithmetic, 
which still retains some connection to activities of adding and 
subtracting objects, algebra has become an entirely autonomous 
discipline. The functions of adding and subtracting for 
example, have become reduced to syntactical rules for the 
manipulation of symbols. In becoming autonomous, algebra 
breaks its ties with acts of adding and subtracting objects, and 
the mathematician becomes an ingenious technician who calculates 
simply through a blind adherence to rules. 
"One operates with letters and signs for connections 
and relations (+, X, = etc) according to rules of the 
game for arranging them together in a way essentially 
not different, in fact, from a game of cards or chess. 
Here the original thinking that genuinely gives meaning 
to this technical process and truth to the correct 
results ... is excluded." (Husser!, 1970:45) 
Vhat was unacceptable about the formal definition, was not that 
it was inaccurate, or failed to take into account all the 
features of the original phenomenon. A blind attachment to the 
correct definitions and rules would enable us to deal with 
straight lines and cubes, just as a blind attachment to the 
rules of algebra would enable us to add, multiply etc. Vhat was 
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unacceptable for Husserl was the fact that the authentic 
informal essence was being replaced by a technical meaning. 
Vhat Merleau-Ponty argues, particularly in The Visible and the 
Invisible, and what I will attempt to demonstrate, is that 
language in general and traditional philosophical language in 
particular, functions in a similar way to these systems of 
symbols. The meaning made possible by these languages, is in a 
sense, a technical meaning, in that it is ultimately inseparable 
from the language. Instead of revealing the essences of things, 
of perception, of thought, of the subject and the object, 
traditional philosophy replaces the authentic meanings, with a 
'linguistic' meaning. The concepts and ideas it analyses are not 
universal and eternal, but inseparable from a particular 
language and a particular mode of communication ordered by the 
language. 6 
"It is possible for me to believe that I am seeing an 
essence when, in fact, it is not an essence at all but 
merely a concept rooted in language, a prejudice whose 
apparent coherence reduces merely to the fact that I 
here become used to it through habit ••• I can never be 
sure that my vision of an essence is anything more than 
a prejudice rooted in language " (Merleau-Ponty, 
1974:259) 
"The separated essences are those of language. It is 
the office of language to cause essences to exist in a 
state of separation which is in fact merely apparent, 
since through language they still rest on the 
ante-predicative life of consciousness." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:xv) 
"Thought is no 'internal thing', and does not exist 
independently of the world and of words. Vhat misleads 
us in this connection, and causes us to believe in the 
thought which exists for itself prior to expression, 
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is thought already constituted and expressed which we 
can silently recall to ourselves, and through which we 
acquire the illusion of an inner life." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:183) 
If we devote our attention to the perception of speech for 
example, we will find that here too, the intelligibility is 
embedded in the physiognomy of the sound patterns. 
"Vhy not admit what Proust 
language as well as music can 
of its own arrangement, catch 
" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:153) 
knew very well ... that 
sustain a sense by virtue 
a meaning in its own mesh 
It is because of this intrinsic meaning in language that it can 
be used to compensate for a visual deficiency. In his analysis 
of Goldstein's patient, Schneider, Merleau-Ponty illustrates how 
Schneider compensates for the loss of the formal essence through 
the substitution of linguistic meaning. 
"If a fountain pen is shown to the patient, in such a 
way that the clip is not seen, the phases of 
recognition are as follows. 'It is black, blue and 
shiny,' says the patient. 'There is a white patch on 
it, and it is rather long; it has the shape of a 
stick. It may be some sort of instrument. It shines 
and reflects light. It could also be a coloured 
glass.' The pen is then brought closer and the clip is 
turned towards the patient. He goes on: 'It must be a 
pencil or a fountain pen.' (He touches his breast 
pocket.) 'It is put there, to make notes with.' It is 
clear that language intervenes at every stage of 
recognition by providing possible meanings for what is 
in fact seen, and that recognition advances pari 
passu with linguistic connections: from 'long' to 
'shaped like a stick', from 'stick' to 'instrument', 
and from there to 'instrument for noting things down', 
and finally to 'fountain pen'. The sense-data are 
limited to suggesting these meanings as a fact suggests 
an hypothesis to the physicist. The patient, like the 
scientist, verifies mediately and clarifies his 
hypothesis by cross-checking facts, and makes his way 
blindly towards the one which co-ordinates them all. 
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This procedure contrasts with, and by so doing throws 
into relief, the spontaneous method of normal 
perception, that kind of living system of meanings 
which makes the concrete essence of the object 
immediately recognizable, and allows its 'sensible 
properties' to appear only through that essence. It is 
this familiarity and communication with the object 
which is here interrupted. In the normal subject the 
object 'speaks' and is significant, the arrangement of 
colours straight way 'means' something, whereas in the 
patient the meaning has to be brought in from elsewhere 
by a veritable act of interpretation. The world in its 
entirety no longer suggests any meaning to him and 
conversely the meanings which occur to him are not 
embodied any longer in the given world. Ve shall say, 
in a word, that the world no longer has any physiognomy 
for him." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:131/2) 
If definitions and formulae are intelligible, this is not 
because they refer to universal and eternal concepts or ideas, 
but because they rely on a certain intelligibility intrinsic to 
the technical language as a strictly ordered system of sounds or 
symbols. The procedures of science and traditional philosophy, 
at least as these are portrayed in the formal presentation of 
their axioms and methods, have therefore something in common 
with Schneider's procedures for identifying objects and making 
sense of his world. 
THE TASK OF A RADICAL PHILOSOPHY 
Husserl does not suggest that this formalistic and technocratic 
mentality in science and mathematics is illegitimate, he 
concedes that it promotes a certain streamlining of concepts, 
allowing one to operate in the system with a certain clarity and 
ease, ~d that it is therefore imperative for the progress of 
science. But if philosophy is to be radical, if it is to 
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uncover the actual foundations of the sciences and mathematics, 
and reveal the true significance of their results, and make 
possible for man a genuine understanding of himself, it cannot 
be content with the substitute meanings of formal definitions 
and language in general. 7 
As Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
" philosophy is not a lexicon, it is not concerned 
with "word meanings", it does not seek a verbal 
substitute for the world we see, it does not transform 
it into something said, it does not install itself in 
the order of the said or of the written as does the 
logician in the proposition, the poet in the word, or 
the musician in music. It is the things themselves, 
from the depths of their silence, that it wishes to 
bring to expression." (1968:4) 
If philosophy is to illuminate the foundations of the sciences, 
if it is to make possible a dialogue between various schools of 
thought, be they different philosophical schools or different 
approaches in the empirical sciences, it would have to reveal 
beneath the formal definitions, the informal essences given in 
a primitive grasp of things, in relation to which the formal 
definitions will be an abstract and derivative sign language, 
as is geography, in relation to the countryside in which we have 
learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is. 8 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND KANT 
In order to break with linguistic meanings Husserl proposes a 
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method that would project the investigating philosopher beyond 
the realm of philosophical discourse, and terminate in an 
intuitive grasp of 
perception of depth 
things, such as we have seen in the 






about things, and 
things, return to 
thing itself, "in 
concepts and everything we 
return to an as yet mute 
an evidence in which we 
the original" in "flesh and 
blood" in contrast to an intuition of images, symbols, signs or 
words which only refer to the thing. Yhat is clear at this 
stage is that this rejection of formal definitions as the 
foundations of philosophy and science, and the pursuit of an 
informal essence found in things themselves, is not just a 
break with tendencies in science, but also a radical break with 
Kant's epistemology as put forward in the first critique. 
Husserl's resolve not to accept any judgement that is not 
derived from experience, means that we can no longer make an 
a priori and a posteriori absolute distinction between 
knowledge since any such distinction would itself have to be 
based on an experience. 9 Yhatever distinctions are to be held 
in philosophy would have to refer back to a primitive grasp of 
these distinctions in experience. 




to be given to me in evidence, i.e. in an experience 
the feature is present to me as it itself. Even the 
logic, will have to be grounded in an actual 
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experience of coherency or consistency and necessity. If we are 
to accept the necessity and universality of a logical 
implication such as P~Q, we will have to derive the necessity 
and universality from 'evidence', from an experience in which 
the necessity and universality is given to us as it 
itself. 10 Such evidence Husserl would call apodictic. In an 
experience of apodictic evidence he says, the affair-complex 
viz. that P~Q universally and necessarily, is given with the 
absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of ~Q. 
"Any evidence is a grasping of something itself that 
is, or is thus, a grasping in the mode "it itself", 
with full certainty of its being, a certainty that 
accordingly excludes every doubt An apodictic 
evidence, however, is not merely certainty of the 
affairs or affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) 
evident in it; rather it discloses itself, to a 
critical reflection, as having the signal peculiarity 
of being at the same time the absolute unimaginableness 
(inconceivability) of their non-being; thus excluding 
in advance every doubt as "objectless" empty." 
(Husserl, 1969:15/16) 
As we have seen above, Kant equates meaningful perception of 
objects with a process in which a sensuous element acquired 
through the senses is synthesized in accordance with the act of 
judging, since in judgements elements are brought under the 
unity of a concept. 
"Now we can reduce all acts of the understanding to 
judgements, and the understanding may therefore be 
represented as a faculty of judgement." (1964:106) 
He therefore deduces all the fundamental concepts from a list of 
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the possible logical judgements that can be made about objects. 
Kant 
"The functions of the understanding can therefore, be 
discovered if we are given an exhaustive statement of 
the functions of unity in judgements." ( 1964:106). 
has therefore, according to Husserl, equated the 
intelligibility of things themselves, grasped in experience, 
with that of the intelligibility of scientific discourse and 
logical judgements. For Husserl this is the intelligibility of 
the 'sign language', the objects synthesized in accordance with 
Kant's categories, were not objects of experience but objects of 
scientific discourse. The fundamental concepts or categories, 
rather than being those of the "pure understanding" were 
actually "rooted in language". 
In spite of the many changes in his approach, Husserl remained 
committed to the ideal of uncovering the informal essences as 
the genuine roots of all intelligibility, and the true 
foundations of philosophy and science. Nevertheless his 
understanding of the nature of the informal essence, and the 
particular way in which it was fundamental, changed throughout 
his life. At first, the intuitive grasp of things and the 
experience of evidence was interpreted as a psychological 
process. This meant that the physiognomy of the straight line, 
the experience of depth, the experience of reaching in 
perception the concrete object itself, the true colour 
announcing itself through its perspective variations etc., as 
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well as the experience of necessity and universality would all 
be private, subjective psychological phenomena. It meant that we 
discover the informal essence through introspection, by 
reflecting on these psychological processes. In the 'Philosophy 
of Arithmetic' Husserl attempted to find the foundations of 
arithmetic, the informal essence of adding, of multiplying, of 
number etc., in certain mental acts performed by the individual 
calculating. Vhen the weaknesses of psychologism became apparent 
to him, he moved to a form of transcendental idealism trying to 
discover the primitive essences of things in the constitutive 
acts of a transcendental ego. Finally, towards the end of his 
life, in the period of the Lebenswelt, the transcendental 
approach begins to give way to an existential one. Vhat seems to 
characterise the two earlier approaches is that certain formal 
essences were maintained in Husserl's own understanding of his 
project. As these were recognized as prejudices, and traced back 
to their roots, the very notions of an 'informal essence', and 
a 'grounding experience' became more refined. Since it is with 
Husserl's transcendental idealism, that Merleau-Ponty 
contrasts his own position, when arguing against the possibility 
of a complete reduction, we will try to capture the gist of this 
transcendental idealism, primarily as it is presented in the 
Cartesian Meditations, by showing how it follows immediately 
















THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EGO 
A purely formal approach to arithmetic would define it as a 
particular instance of algebra, where symbols like x and y have 
been replaced by symbols like 1, 2 and 3 etc. A formal 
arithmetic would be a purely syntactic system of symbols where 
the functions of adding and multiplying, were reducible to the 
manipulation of symbols in accordance with rules and 
definitions. 3 + 4 = 7 would be true by definition, or simply 
because the rules relating to the manipulation of the symbols 3, 
4 = and 7 had been respected, just as in Bridge, in a particular 
game 9 'no trump tricks' is 'equivalent' to 10 'tricks' in 
'spades'. But this is not the way in which arithmetic 
calculations are actually performed. Children 'discover' that 3 
+ 4 = 7 and few mathematicians know the rules relating to 
symbols like 478 + 526. In cases like this we need to calculate 
the answer, which means that two numbers must be brought 
together and a third number has to be 'produced'. Husserl's 
argument is that in the formalist interpretation of arithmetic, 
the real meaning of adding and multiplying has been lost. One 
can perform any of the algebraic functions simply through a 
blind manipulation of symbols according to syntactic rules. 
The operation can be performed without ever thinking about what 
it means to multiply or add. The genuine sense of adding and 
multiplying has been replaced by a sense of 'manipulation of 
symbols in accordance with rules'. The original thinking which 
gives meaning to the operations has been lost, and a 
technocratic meaning has been substituted. 
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Merleau-Ponty shows how patients suffering from "number 
blindness", patients who are unable to conceive of number, are 
still able to calculate by relying on this technocratic 
meaning, relying that is, on a blind attachment to ritual 
procedures of manipulating symbols. 
"It has been possible to demonstrate that the patient, 
though able to count, add, subtract, multiply or divide 
in relation to things placed in front of him, cannot 
conceive number, and that all his results are obtained 
by ritual procedures, which have no significant bearing 
on it. He knows by heart the sequence of numbers and 
recites it mentally, while checking off on his fingers 
the objects to be counted, added, subtracted, 
multiplied or divided: 'a number for him merely belongs 
to a sequence of numbers, and has no meaning as a fixed 
quantity, as a group or a determinate measure'. Of two 
numbers the greater for him is the one which comes 
'after' in the numerical series." (1962:133/4) 
Merleau-Ponty's description of the way in which the patient 
performs arithmetic calculations brings out by contrast the way 
in which we normally calculate. The patient appears to have 
lost the informal essence of number and adding, which Husser! 
claims is the sense of a plurality. Adding has sense for me not 
because I know all the rules relating to the symbols 3 + 4 ; 4 + 
1 etc., but because I can actually synthesize two quantities 
and produce a third. To uncover the informal essence of 
adding, Husser! suggests that we only have to reflect on the 
psychological process in which we abstract from the particular 
nature of the individual objects and intuit them as one 
plurality. 11 It may well be that after considering the two 
groups of objects as one plurality, I still have to use a 
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'ritual procedure' to determine how many objects constitute the 
plurality. For the patient on the other hand, the ritual 
procedure of adding has no sense of totalling up quantities by 
adding units. He could just as easily be reciting the days of 
the week. To each object then would correspond a certain day, 
and the final object 'counted' would correspond to Sunday. For 
the patient seven or seventh is a name like Sunday and there is 
a sense in which, rather than adding, he has determined the name 
of the last object counted. Vhat the patient has lost, has not 
affected his ability to execute any arithmetical function, it 
simply affects the way in which he executes the functions. His 
way, by contrast, points to a sense of adding a number which is 
central to our understanding of what we are doing when we add, 
but which is ignored in the formal description of arithmetic. 
This sense of number and adding can only be discovered by 
reflecting on our activity of intuiting various objects as a 
plurality. 
To uncover the grounding or informal sense of adding, we only 
have to reflect on our own productive activity, the activity 
through which two groups of objects become intuited as one 
plurality. The grounding sense of 'to add' is given in this 
activity. 
"Ve must rise above the self-obliviousness of the 
theoretician who while preoccupied with things, 
theories and methods is quite unaware of the 
interiority of his productive thought (die 
Innerlichkeit seines Leistens) and who while living in 
these things, theories, methods, never focuses his 
attention on his own productive activity." (Husserl, 
1969:14) 
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Frege's criticisms of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic led 
Husser! to reject this psychologistic position. He came to 
recognise that the psychological mechanisms, through which 
pluralities were intuited, does not tell us anything about the 
meaning or essence of adding or number. Arithmetical 
calculations can be carried out by an adding machine, but it is 
clear that we could not base the fundamental concepts of 
arithmetic on a description of the functioning of its 
mechanism. The informal essence discovered in this way is not 
fundamental. On the contrary the psychological processes, like 
the mechanical processes of the adding machine, follow the 
definition of adding. If arithmetical concepts were based on 
psychology, arithmetic would be a branch of empirical 
psychology. Arithmetical truths, such as 3 + 4 = 7, would have 
no universality or necessity because ultimately they would be 
statements about my psyche or at best they would reflect 
certain tendencies in the way people actually thought. 3 + 4 = 
7 would be true if I and others actually arrived at 7 every time 
we added 3 and 4, and it would be true because 7 was the result 
of our adding. 3 + 4 would be equal to 7 because like the 
structure of the adding machine, my psyche is of such a nature, 
that the intuition of 3 entities and 4 entities produces an f 
intuition of 7 entities. The truths of arithmetic would 
manifest or reflect peculiarities of the human psyche. 
Similarly if the validity of logic were based on an experience 
of apodictic certainty then the truths of logic would be 
determined by what was imaginable and what was not, and logic 
t • t 
! 
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' too, would be a branch of psychology reflecting the nature of 
our imagination. 
A description of the psychological process in which an 
intuition of 3 objects and 4 objects produces an intuition of 7 
objects, is analogous to a description of the way in which the 
mechanical operations effected by depressing the keys 3, +, and 
4, produce the mechanical operation in which 7 is typed. The 
relationships between psychological acts, like those between 
mechanical processes, are purely external and in this case 
causal. Vhat a philosophy of arithmetic needs to explain are 
the internal relations between elements. It needs to explain 
how 3 + 4 7 would be true, even if there were no minds or 
adding machines, how the elements are related to each other 
because of what they mean. It would have to account for 
relationships which do not become established in time or in the 
world, or through psychic causality. 
If we assume that the informal essences of things can be 
discovered by reflecting on our psychological processes, 
phenomenology, as the science of these essences, will be 
concerned with subjective private impressions. The fact that we 
may need some informal essence of adding or of straightness 
before we can add or understand the formal definition, would 
only be of interest to psychology, to a psychology of 
understanding geometry. Rather than being fundamental or 
39 
making possible the ultimate explanation, the informal essence, 
as a psychological phenomenon, would itself be something that 
needs to be explained, and in an explanation of this phenomenon 
we will need to refer back to the formal essence, i.e. the 
straight line as the shortest distance between two points, the 
straight line existing independently of its being perceived. 
The physiognomy of the straight line, will then be explained as 
the effect of a straight line on the psyche of the perceiver. 
It is the formal essence then, which is fundamental and which 
will explain the phenomenon of the informal essence. Any 
philosophy which aimed at being radical could never content 
itself with what would ultimately be psychological phenomena. 
Similarly, the experience of apodictic certainty, or the 
experience of unimaginableness, as psychological phenomena, may 
well play a role in an account of how we recognise or respond 
to logical truth, but can never account for the universality and 
necessity of logical validity. The laws of logic hold 
independently of there being any experience of apodictic 
certainty. In fact these experiences of certainty could be 




process, where through natural selection the human 
become structured to conform in its activities to 
of reality. In either account formal logic, as the 
law of reality is always presupposed, and any intuition of 
certainty is a secondary phenomenon. 
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Finally, if 'meaning' is not to become reducible to subjective 
private experiences, we will be obliged to define meaning in 
terms of truth conditions, and since only sentences, 
propositions or judgements have truth conditions only these can 
be said to be meaningful or meaningless, and the entire 
enterprise of finding a meaning in things, will end in 












Husser! was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand he wished to 
penetrate below formal definitions, to reveal those experiences 
through which the definitions have meaning for us, while on the 
other hand he wished to avoid the subjectivism and relativism 
which seemed to follow as soon as these experiences are taken as 
meaning foundations. He was convinced of something which at 
first appears to be a paradox. He was convinced that reflection 
on a primitive experience was not necessarily an exercise in 
introspective psychology, that 'categorical intuitions' were not 
private, subjective or psychological phenomena. The paradox 
disappears when we recognise that those philosophers who assume 
that the subject of experience is always a psychological ego, 
and that the informal essence discovered in experience is a 
psychological entity, have already taken for granted certain 
formal distinctions made in traditional philosophy, without 
trying to reveal their meaning foundations. They assume for 
example, the absolute distinction between a subjective or 
psychological realm, and the realm of the external world, or the 
absolute distinction between the processes in time of a 
psychological ego, and the timelessness of logical relations, or 
simply, the absolute distinction between thought and reality. 
But if for Husser! in his transcendental phase, these 
distinctions are not simply the products of a certain 
philosophical language, if they are to have an authentic meaning 
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for me, I must be able to return to an experience in which I 




external world's lying beyond my experience or 
my subjective realm, that is, I must be able to 
transcendence of the world. Long before 
discovering any formal definition of reality, I must have 
encountered the real itself, as opposed to signs or images of 
it. This encounter cannot be taken to be a subjective or private 
event, numerically distinct from the reality itself, for if it 
were distinct, it would be no more than a sign or image of that 
reality. Reflecting on this encounter would not be a form of 
introspection revealing the nature of my psyche, it would be a 
reflection on the act through which the world itself came to be, 
it would reveal the nature of reality. Husserl's commitment to 
the informal essence leads him to the subject which thinks the 
being of the world, not the idea or the meaning of being, but 
being itself. 
Traditional thought which begins with the absolute distinction 
between thought and reality, always introduces, surreptitiously, 
another subject, which sees these thinking and perceiving 
psyches as objects in the world, who is able to establish a 
numerical distinction between their experience and the object, 
between their thoughts of the world and the world itself. Yet it 
does not establish such a numerical distinction between its own 
experiences and the actual situation it observes. It could do so 
only by seeing itself as one of the objects in the world, but 
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this it could only do by mentally adopting the position of yet 
another observing consciousness. If it is to encounter the 
distinction between thought and reality, if it is to encounter 
the transcendence of the world, then it cannot begin by assuming 
a numerical distinction between its own thoughts and the world. 
It would have to take itself to be the last subject, the subject 
which is not seen by other subjects, the subject for whom there 
is no distinction between its thoughts of the world and the 
world itself. It would have to take itself to be the 
transcendental ego. Ve cannot therefore relegate all 
experiences and intuitions to the realm of the psychological and 
the relative. I cannot consider all my truths as only truths for 
me for it is I who makes sense of the distinction between a 
truth in itself and a truth for me. 
"Intellectualism certainly represents a step forward 
in coming to self-consciousness: that place outside the 
world at which the empiricist philosopher hints, and in 
which he tacitly takes up his position in order to 
describe the event of perception, now receives a name, 
and appears in the description. It is the 
transcendental ego. Through it every empiricist thesis 
is reversed: the state of Consciousness becomes the 
Consciousness of a state, passivity the positing of 
passivity, the world becomes the correlative of thought 
about the world and henceforth exists only for a 
constituting agent."(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:208) 
"I am not a 'living creature' nor even a 'man', nor 
again even 'a consciousness' endowed with all the 
characteristics which zoology, social anatomy or 
inductive psychology recognise in these various 
products of the natural or historical process - I am 
the absolute source, my existence does not stem from 
my antecedents, from my physical and social 
environment: instead it moves out towards them and 
sustains them, for I alone bring into being for myself 
(and therefore into being in the only sense that the 
word can have for me) the traditions that I elect to 
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carry on, or the horizon whose distance from me would 
be abolished - since that distance is not one of its 
properties if I were not there to scan it with my 
gaze. Scientific points of view, according to which my 
existence is a moment of the world's, are always both 
naive and at the same time dishonest, because they take 
for granted, without explicitly mentioning it, the 
other point of view, namely that of consciousness, 
through which from the outset a world forms itself 
around me and begins to exist for me." (Herleau-Ponty, 
1962: vii- ix)12 
" what we are finally as naturata we first are 
actively as naturans, that the world is our birthplace 
only because first we as minds are the cradle of the 
world." (Herleau-Ponty, 1968:33) 
Similarly, the critics of the informal essence, take for granted 
the traditional distinction between the present moment in time, 
and timelessness or eternity. Vhat characterises the truths of 
logic and arithmetic, as opposed to the truth of any observation 
statement in empirical psychology, is that the former are 
eternal, they were for example true before I recognised them to 
be true. Vhat characterises the existence of the world, is that 
it exists throughout time, it is not constantly annihilated and 
recreated, it survives throughout my experiences and thoughts of 
it (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:272). Vhenever I encounter the world I 
am aware that the world precedes and outlasts my encounter. But 
if this distinction between the present moment and eternity, has 
any authentic meaning for me, if it is not simply based on some 
formal definition of eternity, then I must in some way encounter 
eternity itself, or the world's existing in the past itself. My 
experience of the necessary truth of 3 + 4 = 7 is an experience 
of 3 + 4 = 7 being true before I recognized it as being true. It 
is not as if at T2 in the present, it becomes true that it was 
45 
true at T1 in the past. Its being true at T1 is independent of 
the truth of any thought or image at T2. This means that if I 
experience the necessity of the truth of 3 + 4 = 7, I cannot be 
confined to acts in the present, I must be able to encounter T1 
itself, not a memory or an image of T1 at T2. This means that 
there can be no numerical distinction between my thought of T1 
and T1 itself, which means I cannot be in time, I must be the 
constituter of T1, and in general I must constitute time itself 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:413/4). 
Perhaps the most useful way of thinking about this 
transcendental ego, which constitutes the world and time, is in 
terms of it being the last or ultimate subject, the subject 
which does not exist for another subject but the subject for 
whom everything exists. 13 This notion is brought out clearly 
where Merleau-Ponty, quoting Husserl, demonstrates 
timelessness of the transcendental ego 
"Ultimate subjectivity is not temporal in the empirical 
sense of the term: if consciousness of time were made 
up of successive states of consciousness, there would 
be needed a new consciousness to be conscious of that 
succession and so on to infinity. Ye are forced to 
recognize the existence of 'a consciousness having 
behind it no consciousness to be conscious of it' which 
consequently, is not arrayed out in time, and in which 
its 'being coincides with its being for itself'." 
(1962:422) 
the 
Similarly, the transcendental ego is the principle of all 
recognition and is not there to be recognized. 
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"Thus, whenever he thinks, the subject makes himself 
his point of support, and takes his place, beyond and 
behind his various representations, in that unity 
which, being the principle of all recognition, is not 
there to be recognized, and he becomes once more the 
absolute because that is what he eternally is." 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:373) 
This means that the transcendental ego has no outside; we can 
think it only by coinciding with it, only by taking up our 
position from within it. If ever there could be such a view of 
it from the outside, it would cease to be the last subject and 
there would be a numerical distinction between its thoughts and 
the world and it would be confined to its own private realm of 
experiences and thoughts. 
"The affirmation of an alien consciousness standing 
over against mine would immediately make my experience 
into a private spectacle, since it would no longer be 
co-extensive with being." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:353) 
After all, when critics like Frege recognise that an arithmetic 
based on psychology could have no claim to universal and 
necessary truth (from now on referred to as P.JQ, where P = all 
statements in arithmetics based on psychology and Q = all 
statements that are not necessarily and universally true) they 
cannot regard this act of recognition as itself an event which 
simply manifests some aspect of their psyche, for this would 
imply that their criticism of Husserl's 'Philosophy of 
Arithmetic' must itself be rejected since the criticism would 
be no more than a manifestation of a psychological disposition, 
it would imply that the inference P.Q, could only represent a 
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certain tendency in most psyches, for the idea of 0 to be 
associated with the idea of P, so that whenever P is thought the 
idea of 0 follows. The critic would not, therefore, in his 
claim that PJO, be making any statement about such an 
arithmetic, he would simply be describing some interesting 
peculiarity of his associations. Such a position would put the 
critic in a vicious circle, where the reason for rejecting the 
insight is founded on the very insight to be rejected. 
"If, indeed, the guiding thoughts and principles of the 
mind at each moment are only the result of external 
causes which act upon it, then the reasons for my 
affirmation are not the true reasons for this 
affirmation. They are not so much reasons as causes 
working from the outside. Hence the postulates of the 
psychologist, the sociologist, and the historian are 
stricken with doubt by the results of their 
researches." (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:44) 
Husserl's argument would be that in order to avoid this 
circularity, the critic would have to acknowledge that the act 
through which it becomes true for him that P~, cannot be an act 
in his psyche, an act which ultimately manifests the nature of 
his psyche. It would have to be an act which is synonymous or 
'co-extensive' with the state of affairs in the world, viz. that 
P.:>O, so that there can be no numerical distinction between "I 
think IOO "and "P.:>O". 
The most popular alternative to this argument presupposes the 
adoption of formal definitions. It is argued for example, that 
truth and certainty have nothing to do with intuitions or 
48 
thoughts, that truth and certainty are defined in terms of 




turn out to be as naive and dishonest as the 
points of view", 
granted, without 
for in their own way, they also 
explicitly mentioning it, a 
transcendental ego. 
For example, the critic may reply by pointing out that although 
I may have an intuition of the truth of PJQ, this intuition is 
nothing but a psychological phenomenon. ~0 is true not because 
it is seen to be true in an intuition, but because it can be 
proved to be true. My thoughts do not open onto reality itself 
or onto eternity. This impression of not being confined to my 
own thoughts and having access to a state of affairs in the 
world, in the past and the future, is a psychological 
phenomenon, perhaps produced by an unconscious recognition of 
the fact that P~O can be verified. The necessary and timeless 
truth of PJO is not based on an intuition but is based on the 
fact that it can be verified simply by applying the laws of 
logical deduction. If P = all statements found in arithmetics 
based on psychology R = all observation statements, and 0 = all 
statements that are not universally and necessarily true. Then 
since P.)R, and R)Q it follows that P-)0. The difficulty with this 
position is 
applicable 
that it assumes that the laws of formal logic are 
to the real world. Unless we are indubitably sure 
logic is also the logic of the world, the conclusion, that our 
P.jQ does not allow us to predicate anything about the nature of 
• 
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an actual arithmetic based on psychology. Perhaps it will be 
replied, that even though we can never be indubitably sure that 
our logic is the logic of the world, even though our axioms are 
only based on conventions, we can infer with confidence that an 
arithmetic based on psychology could have no claim to universal 
and necessary truths, because our logic has been shown to be 
reliable or fruitful in our interaction with the world. But if 
we take such a conventionalist or pragmatic approach to logic we 
still presuppose an absolute indubitable knowledge of these 
successes in our interactions with the world. 
I must simply assume that these successes are exactly what I 
think they are, for it will not be possible to verify my 
knowledge of them or verify my belief that they are effects of 
my interaction with the world, rather than due to chance 
factors, because any act of verification presupposes a logic 
which is the logic of the world. In general, it is not 
possible to test one's logic or one's rationality. If the test 
is to prove anything at all, it must be rational, and the 
interpretation of its results must be carried out rationally, 
and this rationality, which cannot be tested, will have to be 
assumed to be absolute. 
The critic may reply to all these arguments by saying that in 
any act of knowledge certain things have to be assumed. I have 
to assume that, for example, my logic is also the logic of the 
world. But, he may add that we are justified in making this 
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assumption. Although my ideas and conclusions as a psychological 
ego are produced by causal processes and associations, although 
my rationality manifests the peculiarities of my psyche, I can 
assume that the normal tendencies of my thinking will conform to 
the rationality of the world, because from a Darwinian point of 
view such a conformity would have been required for the survival 
of my species. But can I really make this assumption on the 
basis of the Darwinian account of the survival of the fittest? I 
can only make this assumption if I am sure that Darwin's 
explanation is a reasonable or a possible account of history. 
But how can I judge whether the theory is reasonable or not? 
Even if I do judge the theory to be reasonable, how do I know 
that the theory is reasonable in itself and not simply in 
conformity with my perhaps completely misguided idea of 
rationality? I can trust my judgement of the theory only if I 
already know that I am rational, or at least that my judgement 
is rational. The Darwinian argument cannot, therefore, provide 
me with any reason to assume that my brain has so evolved, that 
my thinking conforms to the rationality of the world, for I have 
to know that I am rational before I can accept the Darwinian 
argument. 
Finally, the critic could claim that the axioms of his logic 
need no verification. 'p~r and rjq then p~q' is valid by 
definition of logical validity. Logical validity is independent 
of the existence and nature of the world. In order to draw the 
conclusion (which is valid by definition) that ~0 we only have 
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to make a series of substitutions. Since P.JR, we can substitute 
P for p and R for r, and since R)Q we can substitute Q for q. 
Since the sylogism 'pjr, r.Jq therefore pjq' is valid by 
definition, it follows that the sylogism 'P.lR, R)Q therefore 
P~Q' is also valid by definition. 
Such a position would also be unacceptable. In the first place, 
a position like this would not seem to capture the spirit of 
Frege's criticism. Frege's argument with reference to the 
adding machine, seems to suggest that for him P.JQ because of 
what such an arithmetic would actually be like, rather than it 
simply being 
'Philosophy of 
true by definition, a definition which Husserl's 
Arithmetic' could be challenging. But resorting 
to P~'s being true by definition, has more serious weaknesses. 
In adopting this position the critic assumes an absolute, non 
temporal access to the world of propositions and symbols. 
For example, the initial substitution p = P, takes place before 
we draw our conclusion ~Q. I can draw the conclusion that P.)Q 
only if I am sure that P has been substituted for p. If I take 
myself to be a psychological ego confined to the present moment, 
I will have to rely on my memory of the act in which I 
substituted for p. Gurwitsch (1951:398/404) points out that what 
is always presupposed in any formal logical argument is the 
'ideal identity' of the presuppositions and acts that I 
perform. 14 If the conclusion of the argument is to be valid I 
must for example be able to return to the act in which I 
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substituted for p, as many times as I wish, I must be able to 
return to the act itself not to a memory or a recording of it, 
otherwise the truths of formal logic will depend on the accuracy 
of my memory or of my recording. There can be no ideal identity 
for a psychological ego, confined to the present moment, I must 
be a transcendental ego, one who has an absolute indubitable 
access to the past moment, one for whom the past moment is 
exactly what he thinks it is. 
The validity of a logical 
absolute indubitable access 
conclusion, then presupposes an 
to the world of propositions and 
access does not function as a symbols. Clearly this 
presupposition 
the condition 
in the technical sense, the indubitable access is 
for the possibility of logic. It plays a role at 
every step of the argument, which is probably why it passes 
unnoticed or why, as Merleau-Ponty would put it, it could be 
introduced surreptitiously. 
Vhether we adopt 
truth, we always 
of propositions 
a correspondence or a coherence theory of 
presuppose an indubitable access to the world 
and operations, i.e. to the ideal world. The 
objectivity or truth of this access can never be proved or 
disproved since it is assumed in any process of verification or 
any logical inference. If ever we claim to know anything 
whatsoever, and even the assertion that we know nothing can be 
shown to be such a claim, we have to accept that we have an 
access which is indubitable and unquestionable. But how can we 
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conceive of an act of knowing whose truth need not and cannot be 
questioned? Clearly such an act could not simply mirror an 
object in the world or in the past, for any such mirrored image 
could always be questioned or tested by comparing it with its 
object. The act of knowing, if it is to be indubitable would 
have to grasp the object itself or the past itself, so that 
there can be no numerical distinction between the act of knowing 
and the object in itself. The object cannot be beyond or 
outside the act in which I am conscious of it. In Husserl's 
language I must constitute it, i.e. constitute not only its 
sense but also its being. I must conceive of myself as the 'last 
subject'. 
"The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as 
something lying outside the universe of possible 
consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, 
the two being related to one another merely externally 
by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong together 
essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, 
they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute 
concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If 
transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible 
sense, then an outside is precisely nonsense." 
(Husser!, 1969:84) 
The world is what I think it is and I have an absolute 
indubitable access to the world because I have a absolute 
indubitable access to my own thought. Only in the relationship 
of thought to its object is it impossible to conceive of any 
numerical distinction between the act and its object. 
II 
question 
a consistent reflection dissipates every 
concerning the relationship between them [the 
mind and the world]. 
will be one of pure 
thinks, the world 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1968:46) 
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Henceforth their relationship 
correlation: the mind is what 
is what is thought 
Consciousness considered in its "purity", must be 
reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, as a 
system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can 
penetrate, and from which nothing can escape: which has 
no spatio-temporal exterior, and can be inside no 
spatio-temporal system, which cannot experience 
causality from anything nor exert causality upon 
anything." (Husser!, 1939: 153) 
At the root of all our knowledge we find a being which is not 
confined to any spatio-temporal position, but who constitutes 
the sense and being of space and time and of being in space and 
time, a being which regards everything that exists as existing 
through itself, that posits itself purely as the acceptance 
basis of all objective acceptances and bases. To perform the 
reduction, to put the real world and the ideal world into 
parentheses is not to consider our experience of them as a dream 
or an illusion, but to expose the surreptitiously introduced 
subject through which there is a real world and an ideal world. 
"The transcendental ego emerged by virtue of my 
'parenthesizing' of the entire Objective world and all 
others (including all ideal) objectivities." (Husser!, 
1969:99) 
~ must be true, we have argued because I, as this constituting 
subject, think P.JQ, but as we have seen what characterises the 
experience of truths like P~Q is that we recognize that this 
relationship holds even if there were no-one to think it or 
recognize it. This means that my own thinking that P.JQ cannot 
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be for me the thinking of a person in the world. My own thinking 
cannot be an object for me. I cannot consider myself a natural 
man among men, nor can I think of myself as a psyche. I must 
take myself to be the last subject, only then will 'I think that 
PJQ' be synonymous with 'F.JO', only then will it be impossible 
to establish a numerical distinction between my thinking and 
this state 
account of 
of affairs in the world. Vhat compromised Husserl's 
the informal essence in the Philosophy of 
Arithmetic was that the events reflected on were events in the 
individual philosopher's psyche and it was difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that Husser! had simply given a description of 
some peculiarity 
be objects for 
way of knowing 
way of thinking 
of his own associations. If my thoughts cannot 
me, then as this fundamental thinker the only 
myself is by co-inciding with myself. The only 
about me would be to become me. Because of the 
central role that will be played by this notion of a 
transcendental ego in my account of Merleau-Ponty's theory of 
motility and linguistic behaviour, it seems appropriate to make 
this notion more concrete by examining its relation to some 
aspects of the 'Ego' in the theories of Descartes and Kant and 
its relation to the traditional arguments in favour of solipsism 
and the argument from illusion. 
KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL EGO 
Kant also makes 




If Kant's epistemology 
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scepticism and relativism, as he claims 
transcendental consciousness cannot be 
succeeds in overcoming 
it does, then this 
objectified, cannot have a spatio-temporal exterior, and the 
must be indistinguishable from the possibility of knowledge 
possibility of a world. Kant's transcendental subject must be 
taken as a last subject. 15 
Kant argues that 
world I experience 
law-like because 
scientific knowledge is possible because the 
is regular and law-like. It is regular and 
the experienced world is synthesized in 
accordance with the a priori categories of the understanding. 
Unless it was synthesized in this fashion, it could not enter 
as an object of my consciousness. It makes sense to me, that 
the cup broke because 
intelligible because it 
category of cause and 
it fell to the floor. The event is 
is synthesized in accordance with the 
effect. Yhat Kant tries to demonstrate 
however, is that these categories and this consciousness are 
they are not simply relative to 'human' 
the knowledge some extra terrestrial 
machine might have of the world, they are 
to 
not arbitrary, that 







in the only sense that the word objective can have for 
is not possible to consider the thesis that they are 
to a human knowledge of things, without in that very 
considering, 
universality necessity 
asserting or presupposing their 
and objectivity. They are a priori 
subject, the subject which thinks and categories of the last 
considers - not he who is thought about or considered. I cannot 
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imagine that I have been programmed through evolution, for this 
would mean that my rationality was contingent on survival in 
this world. This would mean that even the explanation in terms 
of survival of the fittest may not actually make any sense, 
that it simply conforms to my subjective and contingent 
criteria. 
Kant asks whether the a priori categories could have been 
implanted in us by our Creator. He considers the possibility 
that they are "so ordered by our Creator that their employment 
is in complete harmony with the laws of nature ... " (1964:174). 
But he immediately points out that if this were the case, the 
categories would be no more than "subjective dispositions of 
thought" and their necessity would have been sacrificed. 
"The concept of cause, for instance, which expresses 
the necessity of an event under a presupposed 
condition, would be false if it rested only on an 
arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, of 
connecting certain empirical representations according 
to the rule of causal relation. I would not then be 
able to say that the effect is connected with the 
cause in the object, that is to say necessarily, but 
only that I am so constituted that I cannot think this 
representation otherwise than as thus connected." 
(1964:175) 
And it seems clear that Kant would reject any computer model of 
the mind where God is replaced by he who constructs or programs 
the computer. If the categories are not subjective dispositions 
of thought, even dispositions which are in complete harmony 
with the laws of nature, they can only be the a priori forms of 
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DESCARTES AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO 
Husserl credits Descartes with being the first philosopher to 
have seen the transcendental ego, to have recognized that the 
guarantee of certainty lies in an experience, an experience of 
the absolute access of thought to its object, an experience 
which is the access itself (1969:24). 
Vhen Descartes concludes that "I think therefore I am" is an 
indubitable truth, he is not revealing some interesting feature 
of his psychological make up. He is not saying that his psyche 




the thought that he exists is inevitably associated. He 
pointing to an external relation between the idea of 
and the idea of 'sum', a relation explicable in terms 
of conditioning processes or neurological connections. 
Descartes never argues for example that the cogito ergo sum is 
true because his associations are reliable, or because his 
subjective dispositions of thought are in harmony with the laws 
of reality. He never argues that since the thought that I exist 
inevitably follows the thought that I think, we can assume with 
confidence that my actual thinking implies my actual existence. 
If this were Descartes' argument, the cogito ergo sum would not 
be a first truth, it would depend on the harmony of the 
subjective dispositions with the nature of reality. Any appeal 
to a Darwinian explanation would render the cogito relative. 
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The cogito ergo sum is based not only on the indubitability of 
the thought, "I think that I think" but on its being 
indubitable for he who meditates. Could this thought have been 
produced in me by other thoughts or physical causes? If this 
were the case then I would have to verify its truth and for as 
long as each verification is itself caused each will presuppose 
another, and so on ad infinitum. Could the idea of 
'indubitability' be produced in me through some causal process? 
Are we then programmed into thinking that the thought, "I think 
that I think", is indubitable? But this would undermine its 
necessary truth. In the same way that Kant could never accept 
that the categories are subjective dispositions, Descartes could 
never accept that the idea of indubitability is produced in 
him in some or other fashion. 
Nor could Descartes 
which I applied to 
accept that 'indubitability' was a concept 




the mere fact 
Certainly 
of the 
"I think that I think" is true 
existence of the thought is a 
sufficient condition for its truth. This however does not yet 
mean that it is indubitably true for me. The process in which I 
recognize that the mere existence of the thought makes the 
thought true, presupposes an ability to classify this thought as 
a thought. But how do I know that the concept of thought I am 
using is the correct concept? 
a dependent truth, dependent 
classification of thought as 
This would also make the cogito 
on our having made the correct 




must be because there is no gulf between the 
or judging and the thought thought about. The 
two thoughts must collapse into each other, so that there is no 
numerical distinction between them, so that my thought is 
whatever I think it is. Our idea of thought does not precede our 
ability to recognize thought as thought. Descartes in fact says 
that the only way in which we can ever learn what it is to think 
is by thinking. I must then enjoy an immediate access to my own 
thinking. 
Similarly, cogito ergo sum is not the conclusion of a syllogism 
of which the major premise is, "everything that thinks exists". 
This would make the cogito dependent on some abstract a priori 
relation between the concept of thought and the concept of 
existence. Descartes is not relying on the formal definitions 
of the terms. It is not as if through a blind attachment to the 
philosophic and technical definitions of thought that we can 
infer that every thinker exists. 17 Surely the entire philo-
sophic tradition with all its definitions has been suspended in 
the methodic doubt. Vhat is presupposed in Descartes is the 
collapse of the distinction between epistemology and ontology. 
There can be for Descartes no distinction between the existence 
of my thought, 
knowledge of it. 
or its taking place, and my consciousness and 
If I conceive of myself as thought, there can 
be no distinction between my being and my consciousness of my 
being. As Lachieze-Rey points out, it is for Descartes precisely 
because we grasp our actual existence in our actual 
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thought that we are able to relate the idea of thought and the 
idea of existence. Ve know what it is to think, to doubt and 
exist as thinkers, because we actually think, doubt and 
exist. 18 Ve need then, a direct contact of thought with 
itself, and therefore a direct contact with our existence as 
thought. 
" the philosophy of reflection identifies my being 
with what I think of it". (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:48) 
Cogito ergo sum, is not the conclusion of a judgement; it 
expresses the direct contact of the self with the self, which 
is what Husser! calls evidence, the grasping of the self, by the 
self. The indubitability is found in this experience of 
apodictic certainty that thought has in its contact with itself. 
It does not and cannot presuppose any process of verification, 
or truth by definition. The thoughts of this thinking subject 
cannot be construed as events in a psychological ego. The 
inconceivability of my not existing does not reflect a 
limitation of my psychological ego, nor is it a sign to be 
interpreted, it is indistinguishable from the actual 
impossibility of my non-existence. 
"For an absolute self-evidence, free from any 
presupposition, to be possible, and for my thought to 
be able to pierce through to itself, catch itself in 
action, and arrive at a pure 'assent of the self to 
the self', it would, to speak the language of the 
Kantians, have to cease to be an event and become an 
act through and through ... " (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:395) 
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In the rationality with which I draw the conclusion ... "I 
exist", Descartes has revealed a rational act whose rationality 
cannot be tested, the validity of the conclusion is grounded in 
the experience of certainty. My intuition that I must exist does 
not "represent" a factual or logical necessity it is the 
constitution of that necessity, it is the rationality of the 
last subject, a rationality from within. 
Any theory which purports to establish objective criteria for 
rational action always surreptitiously presupposes a subject 
whose actions cannot be tested with these criteria, whose 
rationality must be synonymous with his acts, whose rationality 
is based on the absolute contact that thought has with itself. 
Davidson for example offers us objective criteria in terms of 
which we can test whether an action is rational or irrational. 
He argues that rational action is action that is related in a 
certain way to the beliefs and desires of the agent. Amongst 









cause the action (1980:3/19). But Davidson ignores 
which has to use his criteria. Unless this subject 
his testing procedures will not reveal anything 
action tested. In fact, unless the subject knows that 
procedure has been rational he cannot claim to have 
the rationality or irrationality of the agent's 
can he test his own testing procedures? By using 
criteria once again? But here too, unless this 
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testing of the test is rational, and unless he knows that it is 
rational, he cannot claim to have established the rationality of 
the testing procedure and hence the rationality of the agents 
action. Clearly this process can be carried on ad infinitum and 
nothing will ever be established, unless we can accept that a 
certain act can be rational and aware of its rationality, 
indivisibly, so that it will not require any verifying tests. As 
with the rationality of Descartes' conclusion ... "I exist", I 
know that I am rational and I know that my rationality is that 
of the world without having to verify or make any judgement. 




we need to consider the distinction between the truth 
reflecting subject and the truth in itself. It may be 
that Husserl's reduction has lead him into a solipsist 
position. Everything we have pointed out thus far about the 
transcendental ego, could simply refer to the way in which he 
who claims to know, must think of himself. Unless he takes 
himself to be transparent, to be the constituter of the world 
and of time, he will undermine his own claim to truth. But we 
have not yet demonstrated that the subject actually is what he 
needs to take himself to be. All that Husser! has shown thus far 
is that we can only have a sense of certainty if we can take 
ourselves to have an absolute opening onto the world, if we can 
accept that the world is what we think it is. Does this mean 
that in the end Husserl's transcendental ego is no different 
from that of Kant, and that we would have to accept the 
existence of a thing in itself lying beyond our knowledge and 
experience? 19 
But this is to misunderstand the way in which Husserl takes the 
thought of the transcendental ego to be founding, it is to 
accept, uncritically a certain formal distinction between truth 
'for me' and truth 'in itself'. It is in the solipsism of 
Descartes that the nature of these assumptions can be seen most 
clearly. Descartes presupposes, for those who meditate with him 
and understand his arguments, a certain grasp of the informal 
distinction between the dreamt and the real, which implies an 
immediate experience of transcendence itself, while his 
solipsist thesis assumes that this is impossible. Both Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty argue that if we are genuinely incapable of 
distinguishing between the real and the dream, as is assumed in 
Descartes' argument, then notions like solipsism and 'a world 
lying beyond my thoughts and experience' could have no 
meaning. 20 
Descartes begins his Meditations with the problem of 
distinguishing between the dream and reality. 
"I can see so clearly that there are no conclusive 
signs by which to distinguish between our waking and 
our sleeping moments, that I am dumbfounded, and my 
confusion is such that I can almost believe myself 
asleep at this moment." (1966:103) 
But if there are no signs what can the difference be for me 
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between dreaming and being awake? It is clear that Descartes 
begins with the distinction between my experience of the world 
and the world itself. The ultimate court of appeal for this 
distinction is not within the realm of experience. Vithin 
experience, I would at best only have signs. The distinction is 
made from without. This is brought out vividly when he says, 
"How often has it happened to me to dream at night 
that I was here, in this place, dressed and seated 
by the fire, when all the time I was lying naked in my 
bed." (1966: 102) 
There is then for Descartes a clear distinction between what I 
think I am and what I am in fact. But what meaning could this 
distinction have for me? Having resolved not to accept any idea 
which was not clear and distinct, this distinction would have 
to be grasped by me. Perhaps Descartes' reply would be that the 
distinction makes sense to me because I can imagine what some 
observer, who was not himself asleep would see. But this would 
only postpone the problem for I will have to imagine a real 
observer who really perceives me which means I already need to 
know the difference between real and dreamt. In Descartes' 
argument we can see that he always takes himself to be a natural 
man in the real world, one which can dream he is sitting in 
front of a fire while he is actually asleep in bed, a man that 
is, with an outside which is accessible to others. 
"Vhen I apperceive myself as a natural man, I have 
already apperceived the spatial world and construed 
myself as in space, where I already have an Outside 
He. Therefore the validity of world-apperception has 
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already been presupposed, has already entered into the 
sense assumed in in asking the question - whereas the 
answer alone ought to show the rightness of accepting 
anything as Objectively valid." (Husserl, 1969:83) 
Husserl argues (1969:82/3) that Descartes's fundamental 
question, viz., how the certainties and compelling evidences I 
attain in my own domain of consciousness can transcend the 
immanency of conscious life and acquire objective significance, 
or how evidence (clara et distincta perceptio) can claim to be 
more than a characteristic of consciousness within me, makes no 
sense. It is a meaningless question because it fails to 
recognize that it is through consciousness that there is a 
distinction between the immanency of conscious life, and "more 
than a characteristic of consciousness within me", and through 
consciousness that there is a distinction between a truth for me 
and a truth in itself. Descartes has, in Husserl's language, 
missed the transcendental ego, the last subject, because in 
assuming that I have an outside, that there is a world beyond 
consciousness, he failed to reveal the consciousness through 
which there is this outside or this 'beyond me'. 
The distinction between the real and the dreamt cannot be 
captured in a formal definition. As we have seen the formal 
definition of a transcendent object reduces the object to the 
abstract law governing its appearances or its properties, but as 
Descartes himself emphasizes, the dreamt object cannot be 
distinguished from the real either in terms of its appearances 
or in terms of the law governing the appearances. If such a 
distinction could be made, I would be able to distinguish 
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presupposes that his audience has an intuitive grasp 
distinction between a real and a dreamt world, an 
grasp which presupposes that we have had an experience 
distinction itself. If we understand Descartes's 





lying beyond our experiences, then we must have some 
the meaning of 'lying beyond my experience', i.e. we 
some grasp of the meaning of transcendence. This 
transcendence could never be given to us as an a 
priori 
should 
concept, for there would be no way of telling when it 
be applied and no way of checking when its application 
was appropriate. Not only are there no signs enabling us to 
distinguish between our dreams and our experiences of the world, 
but as an a priori concept it would be impossible to imagine 
what experience could ever induce me to apply the concept, and 
it would be, as Kant put it, empty, and could never be a source 
of knowledge. In some way actual transcendence must be present 
in my experiences, not simply signs of transcendence. I must 
therefore have transcended my "island of consciousness" and 
encountered the world itself. Since it cannot imply the 
interpretation of signs, this contact must be indubitable which 
means there can be no numerical distinction between my thought 
of transcendence and transcendence itself. 
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"Vhen Descartes tells us that the existence of visible 
things is doubtful, but that our vision, when 
considered as a mere thought of seeing is not in doubt, 
he takes up an untenable position ... the 'thought of 
seeing' implies that we have had in certain cases, the 
experience of genuine or actual vision to which the 
idea of seeing bears a resemblance and in which the 
certainty of the thing was, on those occasions, 
involved." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:375) 
But could we not imagine that this distinction between the real 
and the dreamt could be made entirely within the immanence of 
consciousness? Couldn't we argue for instance that I've only 
been dreaming that I dream and dreaming that I am awake? Perhaps 
the distinction between dreaming, and being awake and of having 
a direct access to the transcendent world, has been given to me 
in a dream? Surely not. Could we as Descartes's audience accept 
this argument without casting doubts on our ability to 
understand the argument itself? If I accept the possibility 
that my understanding of the difference between dreams and 
reality has been given to me in a dream, what faith could I 
have in my understanding? How could I be sure I have 
understood what Descartes means when he suggests that my 
understanding has been given to me in a dream? If I have only 
had dreams of dreams and dreams of being awake, I may not have 
grasped the essential difference between genuinely dreaming and 
genuinely being awake. To accept the possibility that all my 
experiences may be dreams is to accept that I might not know the 
difference between actual dreaming and actually being awake and 
therefore that I might not know what Descartes means when he 
suggests that all my experiences may be dreams. To accept the 
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argument is to accept that one might not have understood it. 
If we understand Descartes's argument, if we grasp the meaning 
of 'lying beyond my experiences', then we must have had at some 
stage an immediate and indubitable access to the transcendent 
world. 
If 
"It is thus a fundamental error to suppose that 
perception fails to come into contact with the 
thing itself ..• The thought that the transcendence of 
the thing is that of an image or sign has proved 
misleading here The spatial thing which we see 
is, despite all its transcendence, perceived. Ve are 
not given an image or a sign in its place." (Husser!, 
1931:135/6) 
"My perception does not bear upon a content of 
consciousness: it bears upon the ashtray itself." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:260) 
"The consciousness I have of seeing or feeling is no 
passive noting of some psychic event hermitically 
sealed upon itself, an event leaving me in doubt about 
the reality of the thing seen or felt ... Sight is 
achieved and fulfils itself in the thing seen." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:376/7) 
"Perception is precisely that kind of act in which 
there can be no question of setting the act itself 
apart from the end to which it is directed. 
Perception and the percept necessarily have the same 
existential modality, since perception is inseparable 
from the consciousness which it has, or rather is, of 
reaching the thing itself. Any contention that the 
perception is indubitable, whereas the thing perceived 
is not, must be ruled out. If I see an ash-tray, in the 
full sense of the word see, there must be an ashtray 
there, and I cannot forego this assertion. To see is 
to see something." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:374) 
this access to a transcendent world is absolute and 
immediate, if experience opens up to the transcendent world, 
itself then the experience could not simply be a psychological 
event 'indicating in me' the distinction between immanence and 
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transcendence. It could not simply be an event which allows me 
to recognize a distinction which otherwise exists in itself. 
For once again, this would reduce the experience to a 'sign'. 
If there must be an ashtray there, if sight is achieved and 
fulfils itself in the thing seen, if the existence of the thing 
is as certain as the experience of perception, then my 
experience cannot simply mirror this transcendence and there can 
be no distinction between my thought or experience of 
transcendence and transcendence itself. My experience must be 
co-extensive with it, or in Husserl's terms I must constitute 
it. 
"That the being of the world "transcends" consciousness 
in this fashion ... in no wise alters the fact that it 
is in conscious life alone, wherein everything 
transcendent becomes constituted, as something 
inseparable from consciousness, and which 
specifically, as world-consciousness bears within 
itself inseparably the sense: world - and indeed: "this 
actually existing" world. 
Only an uncovering of the horizon of experience 
ultimately clarifies the "actuality" and the 
"transcendency" of the world, at the same time showing 
the world to be inseparable from transcendental 
subjectivity, which constitutes actuality of being and 
sense." (Husserl,1969:62) 
Lauer spells this out clearly. 
"Husserl was, of course, not the first philosopher to 
identify being and intelligibility. Nor was he the 
first to seek in subjectivity an explanation of 
intelligibility. It is difficult, however, to find a 
philosopher who identifies being and intelligibility as 
deliberately as does Husserl in making both depend on 
constitutive intentionality. According to this theory 
not only is knowledge constituted in consciousness, 
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but the very being of that which is known is so 
constituted; only absolute being is in the full sense, 
and only being in consciousness (Bewusst-Sein) is 
absolute being. Now, since being is in consciousness 
only as constituted, being is absolute only as 
constituted. Thus, intentional constitution has become 
a universal explanation or "clarification" of being. 
"Nothing is, except by a proper operation of 
consciousness, whether actual or potential" (Formale 
und transzendentale Logik p.207] If, then, the task of 
philosophy is to understand being, its method must be 
to penetrate the subjectivity wherein being has its 
source. It is for this reason that only a phenomenology 
of being can be a science of being; the gap between 
being and consciousness highlighted by Descartes can be 
bridged only if consciousness is constitutive of 
being." (Lauer, 1958:79) 
This is confirmed by the way in which 'reality' is experienced. 
The existence of the world is not an hypothesis that I make on 
the basis of some or other evidence. If this were the case I 
would constantly be tempted to check whether I was awake or 
dreaming. 
"If the reality of my perceptions were based solely on 
the intrinsic coherence of 'representations', it ought 
to be for ever hesitant and, being wrapped up in my 
conjectures on probabilities, I ought to be ceaselessly 
taking apart misleading syntheses, and reinstating in 
reality stray phenomena which I had excluded in the 
first place. But this does not happen. The real is a 
closely knit fabric." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:x) 
He who distinguishes between the real world and his dreams does 
not classify his experiences under some concept of real and 
dreamt in accordance with some or other criterion. It is not as 
if those experiences of mine which are coherent and probable 
are classified as veridical experiences, or experiences of the 
world, while those which are incoherent and improbable are 
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classified as products of my imagination. On the contrary my 
experience of reality is immediate, and it is therefore easier 
for me to tell whether it is real or imaginary then to tell 
whether my experiences are coherent and probable or incoherent 
and improbable. 
As 
"The fact that sometimes the controls become necessary 
and result in judgements of reality which rectify the 
naive experience does not prove that judgements of this 
sort are at the origin of the distinction, or 
constitute it, and therefore does not dispense us from 
understanding it for itself. If we do so, we then will 
have to not define the real by its coherence and the 
imaginary by its incoherence or its lacunae: the real 
is coherent and probable because it is real, and not 
real because it is coherent; the imaginary is 
incoherent or improbable because it is imaginary, and 
not imaginary because it is incoherent." 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1968:40) 
Herleau-Ponty points out, even the most likely or 
reasonable dreams are immediately recognized by us as dreams 
when we awake and the most unlikely events in our lives are 
immediately and unmistakably recognized as real. 
"It [the real] does not await our judgement before 
incorporating the most surprising phenomena, or before 
rejecting the most plausable figments of our 
imagination" (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:x) 
"It .has often been pointed out that even the most 
credible imagination, the most conformable to the 
context of experience, does not bring us one step 
closer to "reality" and is immediately ascribed by us 
to the imaginary and that conversely an even 
absolutely unexpected and unforeseeable noise is 
from the first perceived as real, however weak be its 
links with the context." (Herleau-Ponty, 1968:39) 
" the most credible phantasm glances off at the 
surface of the world: it is this presence of the whole 
world in one reflection, its irremediable absence in 
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the richest and most systematic deliriums, that we have 
to understand, and this difference is not a difference 
of the more or the less." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:40) 
Even if we take as a criterion for reality, accessibility to 
others, it would be misleading to argue that we classify our 
experiences as illusory, whenever we discover that others do 
not share them. The occasion could just as easily lead us to 
question the perceptual sensitivity of others. 
"'Can't you hear my voices?' a patient asks the doctor; 
and she comes resignedly to the conclusion : 'I am the 
only one who hears them then'." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:291) 
Merleau-Ponty points out that modern psychology has gone beyond 
explaining delusions and hallucinations in terms of a loss of 
the concepts of real and illusory, or the loss of an 
intellectual power to classify experiences as veridical or 
illusory. 
"A hallucination is not a judgement or a rash belief, 
for the same reasons which prevent it from being a 
sensory content: the judgement or the belief could 
consist only in positing the hallucination as true; and 
this is precisely what the patient's do not do. At the 
level of judgement they distinguish hallucination from 
perception ... " (Merleau-Ponty, 1962;335) 
A schizophrenic patient, examined by Binswanger, never fails to 
identify the real world, as the real world which is why it is 
not possible to dispel his illusions by bringing the real world 
to his attention. Strictly speaking, the patient's powers of 
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judgement and his concepts of real and illusory are perfectly 
intact. He has no quarrel with the real world, he simply says 
that "it proves nothing against what he experiences" 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:291). Vhat is disturbed in the patient are 
not abstract concepts, but that primitive grasp of reality, 
the informal essence of transcendence, that immediate access to 
the world itself. Vhat characterises the schizophrenic, is that 
the distinction for him, between reality and illusion, rests on 
an act of judgement in which some experiences are judged to 
be illusory and others, veridical. No matter how rational or 
impartial he may be in this classification, he never enjoys the 
certitude of being in contact with the world itself. 
"My awareness of constructing an objective truth would 
never provide me with anything more than an objective 
truth for me and my greatest attempt at impartiality 
would never enable me to prevail over my subjectivity 
(as Descartes so well expresses it by the hypothesis of 
the malignant demon), if I had not, underlying my 
judgements, the primordial certainty of being in 
contact with being itself " (Herleau-Ponty, 
1962:355) 
But why should we concern ourselves with the question of how 
Descartes's audience come to understand the meanings of the 
terms he uses? In trying to understand how Descartes's 
audience could distinguish between a transcendent or real 
world and an immanent or subjective world are we not 
concerning ourselves with psychological questions? Could 
we not argue that I may in fact be confined to my own immanent 
world, even though I might not be able to understand what this 
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means? Could we not argue for example that the problem of how 
transcendence is conceived is a psychological problem, and that 
'true being' is defined as that which lies beyond my thoughts. 
According to the definitions of terms, all I could constitute 
would be the idea or meaning of true being, but never true being 
itself. Being itself is by definition not a cogitatum. But this 
would be contrary to the whole spirit of Descartes's break with 
Medieval thought. The methodic doubt rules out of court all 
distinctions, definitions and arguments which are not reducible 
to clear and distinct ideas. If the solipsist position is a 
legitimate stage in Descartes's argument then it must be, for 
me, reducible to clear and distinct ideas. Husserl would reply 
that the ultimate essences in philosophy cannot rest on formal 
definitions, which would be little more than technical formulae 
or rules for sportive arguments in philosophical contests 
(1969:86). If we are to emerge from "blind symbolic thought" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:204) we would have to return to an informal 
encounter with being itself, as opposed to an intuition of 
images and ideas or the adoption of definitions. 
The project of grounding the meaning of transcendence in a 
formal definition is dishonest in its own way. As a technical 
formula or a set of rules for philosophical discourse, the 
notion of a definition already presupposes a realm which is 
distinct from the psychological, and which lies beyond whatever 
I as a psychological ego think of it. The definition and the 
various stages in the argument in which it is applied must be 
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for me "abiding possessions". I must be able to return to them, 
rather than to images, memories or thoughts of them. They must 
therefore be conceived as lying beyond my psyche. The meaning of 
transcendence or "true being" cannot be restricted to technical 
formulae for arguments, since this meaning is always presupposed 
in the notion of a formula or an argument. 
How did Descartes come to make the assumption that he is 
confined to his own private realm of thoughts and perceptions 
which may or may not mirror the real world and why was it never 
suspended in the methodic doubt? Ricoeur argues that 
Descartes's philosophy is based on two sources, the cogito 
and God. 21 God's knowledge of me and of the world and my 
knowledge of God are never subjected to methodic doubt yet they 
play a decisive role in Descartes's solipsist argument. In order 
to cast doubt on his perception of the world Descartes points 
out that he can have no certainty that he is actually dressed 
and seated in front of his fire, because, in the past he has 
dreamt that he was dressed and seated in front of the fire, 
when all the time, he was asleep in bed. But what is the sense 
of this "all the time"? Presumably this is what someone else 
would have seen if he were observing Descartes while he was 
having this dream. Clearly Descartes assumes that it is always 
possible for him to be seen from the outside. 22 He assumes 
that he is not the last subject. This assumption is never 
questioned, Descartes never considers the possibility that the 
malignant demon is the author of the belief that I am not the 
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last subject. In fact the very notion of a malignant demon as a 
subject conscious of me, allows Descartes to make the assumption 
that I am not the last subject, that my thoughts are "mental 
events" taking place in the world. 
If it is indubitable that I can be seen from the outside, then I 
must have some special, indubitable access to this state of 
affairs lying beyond my thoughts and experiences. But it is the 
possibility of any such access that the solipsist needs to 
deny. According to Ricoeur, for Descartes, the indubitability 
of the fact that I can be seen from the outside does not -rest on 
an indubitable access to this state of affairs, but on the 
indubitability of the presence of God. Because of this 
surreptitious introduction of God as the genuine last subject, 
I become a substantia cogitans, metaphysically distinct from 
the world. There is no necessity to 'ground' this idea of 
myself because there is no necessity to ground the idea of God. 
It is because Descartes has two starting points, the cogito and 
God, that he fails to grasp the idea of the transcendental ego. 
"By rights the cogito is the transcendental subject. 
But Descartes betrayed his own radicalism, for the 
doubt should have put an end to all objective 
externality and should have disengaged a subjectivity 
without an absolute external world." (Ricoeur, 1967:83) 
Once thought is taken as an activity of such a substantia 
cogitans, as an internal and private event, the question of 
whether or not there is a world corresponding to this thought is 
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automatically raised. In Husserl's notion of 'thought' however, 
there can be no answer to this question since it is through 
thought that there is a within and a beyond. Because Husserl 
rejects Descartes's dual starting point, viz. consciousness and 
God, his notion of the subject is not that of a substantia 
cogitans, it has no outside, no sense is bestowed on it from 
another source, such as would be the case if God were the last 
subject. 
"Unities of meaning presuppose a sense-giving 
consciousness which, on its side, is absolute and not 
dependent in its turn on sense bestowed on it from 
another source." (Husserl, 1931:168) 
It is unfortunate that Husserl adopts Descartes's term 'cogito', 
when in fact he rejects any notion of a substantia cogitans. 
Similarly it is unfortunate that he compares his reduction with 
Descartes's methodic doubt, for in Husserl there is no question 
of doubting the existence of the world in the sense of imagining 
that beyond my thoughts there is nothing. In the preface to the 
English edition of Ideas, published in 1931, Husserl says 
quite clearly 
"Our phenomenological 
positive existence of 
Nature in the first 
an illusion." (Husserl, 
idealism does not deny the 
the real (realen) world and of 
place as though it held it to be 
1931:21) 
Merleau-Ponty expresses the same idea, 
"Reduction ... Vrongly presented- in particular in the 
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C.M. [Cartesian Meditations] - as a suspending of the 
existence of the world If that is what it is, it 
lapses into the Cartesian defect of being an 
hypothesis of the Nichtigkeit of the world, which 
immediately has as its consequence the maintenance of 
the mens sive anima (a fragment of the world) as 
indubitable Every negation of the world, but also 
every neutrality with regard to the existence of the 
world, has as its immediate consequence that one 
misses the transcendental." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:171) 
There is no question of putting the existence of the world in 
parentheses in order to focus our attention on the act of 
thought in which we recognize the existence of the world, for 
this would imply that the distinction between an existence in 
itself and an existence for me is taken for granted and that 
phenomenology is only concerned with the latter, since it is 
only the latter that is accessible to us as a phenomenon. Vhat 
we suspend in the reduction is an absurd sense of the existence 
of the world, an existence that by definition we could never 
know. 
"Ve subtract just as little from the plenitude of the 
world's Being, from the totality of all realities, as 
we do from the plenary geometric Being of a square when 
we deny (what in this case indeed can plainly be taken 
for granted) that it is round. It is not that the real 
sensory world is "recast" or denied, but that an absurd 
interpretation of the same, which indeed contradicts 
its own mentally clarified meaning, is set aside. It 
springs from making the world absolute in a 
philosophical sense, which is wholly foreign to the vray 
in which we naturally look out upon the world." 
(Husserl, 1931:169) 
This absolute existence in a philosophical sense is what we can 
describe as the formal essence of the existence of the world. 
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It is 'absurd' or naive because it feeds off the intuitive or 
informal essence which it when relegates to the realm of the 
psychological. As we have seen in Ricoeur's account of 
Descartes, the notion of an absolute existence is introduced as 
that which is seen by God, as opposed to that which is 
experienced by me, but such an account is always dishonest 
because it refuses to consider the act through which the 
absolute existence of God is present to me. Phenomenology does 
not confine itself to a description of the experience of things 
leaving aside the metaphysical and the ultimate questions of 
philosophy, it only rejects a "naive" metaphysics. 23 
any misunderstanding arise, I would 
as already stated, phenomenology indeed 
naive metaphysics that operates with 
in themselves, but does not exclude 
"Finally, lest 





into the wrong 




such. It does no violence to the 
that inwardly drive the old tradition 
line of enquiry and the wrong method: 
means professes to stop short of the 
ultimate" questions. 1123 (Husserl, 
refuses to start with the irreducible 
distinction between res cogitans and res extensa, because he 
rejects Descartes's dual starting point, the distinction between 
epistemology and ontology disappears. 
"'\lhereas Descartes would limit the being of the world 
in two ways (by the cogito which supports the thinkable 
and by God who supports the created) Husserl decides 
that there is but one possible system of limitations 
and that the ontological question is the 
epistemological question." (Ricoeur, 1967:89) 
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THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME 
Finally we need to consider the 
argument from illusion is probably 
argument to support the thesis 
argument from illusion. The 
the most commonly used 
that the subject is a 
psychological entity, confined to the present moment, and to his 
private experiences and judgements about an actual but 
transcendent world and an actually transcendent past and future. 
Ve have seen in our discussion of the perception of depth how 
the stereo-scope can provide an illusion of depth. If we can 
perceive depth when in fact there is none, this perception of 
depth could not have been an access to depth itself. Husser! has 
argued that we should not assume that "perception does not come 
into contact with the thing itself". He has argued that "the 
spatial thing which we see is, despite all its transcendence, 
perceived" ... that, "we are not given an image or a sign in its 




or an image for a perception" (1931:136). Merleau-Ponty 
argued that "if I see an ashtray, in the full sense of the 
see, there must be an ashtray there" (162:374). 
Nevertheless I know that it is always possible that I may, a 
moment later, on closer inspection, find that it is not an 
ashtray at all, but something else, like a folded serviette. 
Since I could not have seen an ashtray at Tl, because there was 
no ashtray, my perception at T1 must have been a judgement based 
on certain signs, a judgement that at T2 I recognize as being 
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an experience of signs and an experience of making 
even though the ashtray gives itself as 
present, the perception of the serviette at T2 
my perception at Tl, did not come into contact with 
itself. Since it is always possible for my 
perception of the serviette, in its turn to be exposed as an 
illusion, we must conclude that perception only mirrors the 
world and 
mirroring 
never makes contact with it, and that sometimes this 
is inaccurate. Being situated in the world I am badly 
distinguishing between my images and the object 
I can only infer from the fact that I sometimes see 
that don't exist, that I perceive only images and not the 






perceive the world itself. Since at Tl a cup presented itself to 
me as real and not as merely probable, since the presence of the 
cup was at Tl 'incontestable', and since at T2 we discover that 
there was no cup, we must conclude that the incontestability of 
the presence, its being experienced as real and not merely as 
probable, must be a psychological or subjective phenomenon. If 
we are unaware of making judgements, the processes must have 
been carried out unconsciously, and my actual experience of 
seeing the cup itself can be nothing other than a subjective 
decor which hides the actual process I carry out. 
But arguments like this assume what they intend to demonstrate. 
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The argument assumes that my perceptual experience can be 
divided into a perception at Tl and a perception at T2. But to 
assume that this is possible is to assume that we do not have an 
access to the world itself, or to any particular thing in the 
world. A real object is one thing identical with itself 
throughout the lapse of time. If perception comes into contact 
with the thing itself, perception cannot be divisible into a 
series of acts in time, for such a series can only give me a 
series of temporal perspectives on the object, which would then 
have to be subsumed under the concept of 'an identical object 
existing through time'. Ve have argued above that my perception 
of depth and of the three dimensional object, cannot be 
understood as a synthesis of the two monocular images under the 
concept of 'an object lOcm from me'. Perception, we argued, 
opens up to the three dimensional object in the world, itself. 
To assume that my perception can be reduced to two images 
subsumed under a concept, is to assume that I do not perceive 
the object itself. Similarly, to assume that my experience of 
an object can be fractured into isolated moments in time, is 
already to have assumed that I am confined to images. Since 
the object is transhistorical, only a perceptual act which was 
not divisible in this way, which was contemporaneous with it, 
could reach the object itself. 
"Ve can no more construct perception of the thing and 
of the world from discrete aspects, than we can make up 
the binocular vision of an object from two monocular 
images. My experiences of the world are integrated into 
one single world as the double image merges into the 
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one thing, when my finger stops pressing 
eyeball. I do not have one perspective, then 
and between then a link brought about 
understanding, but each perspective merges 





"Ve exclude the term perception to the whole extent 
that it already implies a cutting up of what is lived 
into discontinuous acts ... " (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:158) 
Speaking about the various perceptual acts involved in the 
perception of one identical die Husserl notes that 
"Their unity is a unity of synthesis: not merely a 
continuous connectedness of cogitations (as it were, a 
being stuck to one another externally) but a 
connectedness that makes the unity of one 
consciousness, in which the unity of an intentional 
objectivity, as 'the same' objectivity belonging to 
multiple modes of appearance, becomes constituted." 
(1969:41/2) 
But is the experience of having had an illusion, the experience 
of a dis-illusion not itself the experience of a disruption or 
a fracturing of my perception? Since I see a serviette now 
where previously I saw an ashtray does this not imply that my 
experience must be divisible into at least two distj_nct and 
successive acts? On the contrary, an unbiased description of 
the experience of a dis-illusion reveals, that it is only a 
subject whose experience of the world is not divisible into an 
experience at T1 and an experience at T2, which could have the 
experience of a dis-illusion. Let us begin with a description of 
what our experience of dis-illusion would be like if our 
perception of the world was made up of a succession of 
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discontinuous acts. At T2 I would have an image and I would make 
the judgement that I have in front of me a serviette. I would 
also have the 'faded' image of a cup and the memory of the 
judgement I made that I have a cup in front of me. How do I 
decide that my present judgement, that it is a serviette, is 




Could it be more reliable because I am now better situated 
I was at Tl, or because I have looked more carefully, or 
closely? But, if we do not yet know whether the object is a 
cup or a serviette, how can we tell which position is better, 
which way of looking is 'more careful'? The mere fact that at T2 
I may be spatially closer is not a sufficient warrant for 
deciding in favour of a serviette, because there are 
circumstances 
at a certain 
is 
where the object can only be seen to be what it is 
optimal distance. It is not as if my present 
more reliable or probable than my past hypotheses hypothesis 
because I 
little 
now occupy a "better" point of view, "have gotten a 
closer" to the object or looked at it more closely. On 
the contrary 
ontological 
it is because the serviette has taken over the 




the sense of a "better point of view", or that my 
can have the sense of "a closer look" at the 
The truth of my present perception and the reality of the 
serviette as opposed to the illusory quality of the cup, is not 
based on any judgement. Just as in binocular perception we found 
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that the thread 'of its own' takes up its position in front of 
me, and just as the cube, as I open both eyes, emerges from the 
flat shapes and 'strives towards its equilibrium by delving into 
depth, as a stone falls downwards', so here my experience of the 
'reality' of the serviette is not reducible to a change from one 
hypothesis to another. The serviette, 'of its own' takes up the 
ontological function, gives itself as real, as the cup loses 
its substance and enters into the serviette as 'into its 
day-light truth'. Our analysis of Descartes's argument has shown 
that our ability to distinguish between the real and the dreamt 
is not based on an act of judgement in which we apply the 
concepts of reality and of the dreamt. As Descartes has pointed 
out, there are no undeniable signs. Consequently if ever we know 
what reality is, it 
access to the real 
moment unquestionable, 
must be because at some stage we have had 
itself and that our certainty was at that 
and did not therefore involve judgements 





in which the serviette comes to replace the ashtray 
described as a metamorphosis. The image of the 
ashtray cannot be compared with the perception of the serviette, 
one cannot put them side by side. The serviette is infinitely 
more concrete. It is not like seeing two paintings of the same 
object one after the other and having to decide which is the 
more accurate or reliable representation. Just as the change 
from seeing the two faces to seeing the vase in the ambiguous 
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figure, is not simply a change in my belief about what is 
represented, but is a total re-organization of the picture, a 
re-organization which appears to take place on its own, so the 
metamorphosis in which the serviette takes over the ontological 
function from the ashtray, is not a change of an hypothesis. It 
is the serviette itself that has supplanted the ashtray. It is 
the ashtray that has disappeared into the serviette as into its 
daylight truth, so that the experience can never be described 
as an experience of contesting images. 
"Vhen faced with a perceptual appearance we not only 
know that it can subsequently "break up", we also know 
that it will do so only for having been so well 
replaced by another that there remains no trace of it, 
and that we seek in vain in this chalky rock what a 
moment ago was a piece of wood polished by the sea .... " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968:41) 
If the serviette takes over the ontological function then it did 
not emerge into existence only at the present moment. 
Experienced as the real object means that the serviette is 
experienced as that which was on the table even when I saw 
an ashtray and will be on the table in the future. Unlike the 
image it is a transhistorical object. But to say that its being 
the real object for me is not based on a judgement and that it 
has of its own taken over the ontological function is to say 
that the metamorphosis is a change of the past and the future 
itself. Speaking about the monocular images and the way in 
which they disappear into the object in binocular perception 
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Merleau-Ponty says 
"They- are the phantoms and it [the thing] is the real; 
they are pre-things and it is the thing: they vanish 
when we pass to normal vision and re-enter into the 
thing as into their daylight truth. They are too far 
from having its density to enter into competition with 
it." (1968:7) 
But, since real things are not constantly annihilated and 
recreated (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:272) then this re-entering of the 
image into the thing, this loss of density, cannot be an event 
confined to the present moment, leaving perfectly intact the 
images in the past. The dissipation of an illusion and the 
taking over of the ontological function by the serviette, the 
emerging of the serviette as the concrete real object while the 
cup looses its substance and re-enters the serviette as into its 
daylight truth, is a process which effects the cup, there where 
it is in the past. I cannot hold in front of me the memory of a 
cup giving itself to me as incontestable, as being the true 
object, the emergence of the serviette, drains the cup 
perceived at Tl of its substance. It is not the present memory 
of perceiving a cup that is now interpreted as the memory of an 
illusion. If the reality of the serviette and the illusory 
nature of the ashtray were based on a judgement, all my 
memories and expectations tied to the perception of the ashtray 
would have to be re-interpreted one by one. Each would have to 
be changed in accordance with a rule. For it to be true for me 
now that a serviette and not an ashtray lay on the table when I 
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entered the room, I would have to reconstruct the event, form a 
mental picture of the whole process and identify this image of a 
serviette in the past, with the serviette I see at the moment. 
But what sense could all this re-interpretation and 
re-construction have for me? If the reality of the serviette 
depended on a judgement and if I am confined to the present 
moment what possible sense could reality and a transhistorical 
object have for me? If my only access to the past were based on 
images and judgements what meaning could "the serviette at Tl " 
have for me? Memories of the past, whether these are seen as 
faded images, psychic traces left by the past event, or 
physiological traces such as established nerve connections would 
always have to be in the present, if they are to be for me. 
They could not therefore of their own refer to the past. As 
with the perception of depth, unless I have a direct access to 
the past I will be unable to interpret all the alleged signs 
which are held to indicate or refer to the past. 
"If I find in them signs of some 'previous' event, it 
is because I derive my sense of the past from elsewhere 
A preserved fragment of the lived-through past can 
be at the most no more than an occasion for thinking of 
the past, but it is not the past which is compelling 
recognition: ... The past and the future cannot be mere 
concepts abstracted by us from our perceptions and 
recollections, mere denominations for the actual series 
of 'psychic facts'. Time is thought of by us before 
its parts, and temporal relations make possible the 
events in time. Correspondingly it is necessary for 
the subject not to be himself situated in it, in order 
to be able to be present in intention to the past and 
the future. Let us no longer say that time is a 'datum 
of consciousness'; let us be more precise and say that 
consciousness unfolds or constitutes time. Through 
the ideal nature of time it ceases to be imprisoned in 
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the present." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:413/4) 
If the experience of dis-illision is an experience of the 
serviette taking over the ontological function, then it must be 
a metamorphosis which at one stroke changes the past and the 
future itself, so that it is never possible to fragment this 
experience and to isolate a T1 in the past as some event 
complete in itself and unchangeable. For it to be true for me 
now that the serviette was on the table when I entered the room, 
even when I saw an ashtray, I do not need to form a mental 
picture of the event, the new situation weighs upon me with all 
its weight, it is there for me in the past even though I may not 
recall any detail of it. 24 A new future opens up with new 
possibilities even though I may not expressly think about the 
future in relation to the fact that there is a serviette and not 
an ashtray on the table. The new situation is on the periphery 
of all my experience, it is the new background against which I 
think, perceive and have expectations. Our description of the 
dis-illusion shows not only that it is not an experience of the 
fracturing of perception into discrete perceptual acts, but, 
that it is an experience of the simultaneous access to the past 
and the future. 
But could we not argue that all we have revealed in this 
description are the psychological conditions for the experience 
of a dis-illusion? Perhaps I am so constituted that it is 
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impossible for me to recognize the ashtray as an illusion 
unless I take the serviette as the real, and at that particular 
moment I may well be unable to imagine that the serviette too 
is an illusion. But even if at this moment the serviette gives 
itself to me as incontestably present so that I am unable to 
forego the assertion that there is a serviette there, this may 
simply reflect a certain restriction on my powers of imagination 
and may tell us nothing about the actual presence of the 
serviette. 
Perhaps my experience of the world is actually fractured into 
discrete 'now' moments, but the only way in which I can take the 
serviette to be real is to be so sure that it existed in the 
past and that it will exist in the future that I take myself to 
be aware of it in the past and the future. Perhaps there is no 
necessity to change each memory and each anticipation one by one 
because all this is done automatically. Perhaps, as with Gestalt 
psychology, we have only revealed the psychological laws of the 
organization of perceptions, memories and anticipations. The 
truth is after all that, no matter how convincing my experience 
of having access to the serviette at Tl may be, this experience 
was only made possible by the metamorphosis. Since this 
metamorphosis must itself take place in time, surely it is still 
possible to speak of a Tl which occurred before the 
metamorphosis, a Tl therefore which is itself unaffected by the 
experience of the dis-illusion, and which is therefore isolated 
from T2. Even if I am now incapable of representing to myself 
93 
the original incontestability of the presence of the cup, the 
fact remains that from an objective point of view, the cup was 
at Tl taken to be the real object. 
But on what basis must we relegate in this way our description 
of the dis-illusion to the realm of the psychological? As we 




for the experience is never an experience of the 
perception into distinct acts at Tl and T2. To 
this account of the dis-illusion only reveals 
certain psychological aspects of the experience and tells us 
nothing 
that the 
about our actual contact with the world is to assume 
perceiver is always confined to his own private sphere 
of images and judgements, which is what the phenomenon of 
illusion was meant to demonstrate. 




screen hiding a multitute of unconscious processes, 
world and an actual past, has begun with a 
distinction and is guilty of the same dishonesty we 
found in Descartes. If I am always confined to my present 
subjective acts, what meaning could I possibly attach to a real 
world, and a real Tl, in the past, owing nothing to my 
experience of them? 25 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) The same point can be made with the circle. 
" what constitutes the difference between the 
Gestalt of the circle and the significance 'circle', 
is that the latter is recognized by an understanding 
which engenders it as the abode of points 
equidistant from a centre, the former by a subject 
familiar with his world and able to seize it as a 
modulation of that world, as a circular 
physiognomy." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:429) 
As is clear from the above quote the notions of physiognomy 
and Gestalt are used interchangeably by Herleau-Ponty. I 
have chosen not to introduce the notion of the Gestalt at 
this stage because of its psychologistic associations 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1974:207). 
2) Given that an illusion of depth can be produced with the 
stereo-scope, it may seem at this stage that, since it is 
possible to perceive depth when in fact there is none, it is 
not depth itself that we perceive. But as we will see 
below, such arguments are based on formalistic concepts of 
illusion and truth. 
3) Pierre Lachieze-Rey, regards this as one of the central 
weaknesses of the Kantian system. 
"Cette lacune des grandes oeuvres kantiennes nous 
interesse particulierement ici dans l'examen du mode 
de genese des representations de l'espace et du 
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temps. L'auteur de la Critique nous dit que la 
sensibilite et l'entendement sont les deux 
conditions necessaires de la connaissance; par la 
premiere, les objets nous sont donnes, tandis que 
par le second ils sont penses (1); mais la 
sensibilite a son tour comprend une matiere et une 
forme; et cette forme, qui ne peut plus etre 
evidemment donnee a la fa~on de la matiere, comment 
done est-elle present a !'esprit, comment se 
traduit-elle dans la matiere qu'elle organise ou 
qu'elle s'incorpore? Voila' une question sur 
laquelle la Critique ne fournit aucun 
renseignement." (1959:324) 
4) "The sides of the cube are not projections of it, 
but precisely sides. Vhen I perceive them 
successively, with the appearance they present in 
different perspectives, I do not construct the idea 
of the flat projection which accounts for these 
perspectives; the cube is already there in front of 
me and reveals itself through them." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:204) 
5) Sartre's description here is particularly vivid. 
"But the yellow of the lemon is not a subjective 
mode of apprehending the lemon: it is the lemon. And 
it is not true either that the object X appears as 
the empty form which holds together disparate 
qualities. In fact the lemon is extended throughout 
its qualities, and each of its qualities is extended 
throughout each of the others. It is the sourness of 
the lemon which is yellow, it is the yellow of the 
lemon which is sour." (1969:186) 
6) "Let us only say that the pure ideality is itself 
not without flesh nor freed from horizon 
structures." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:153) 
7) "Since his early article on "Die Philosophie als 
strenge Vissenschaft", he maintained that there ~¥as 
nothing in common between intuition, as he 
understood it, and a scholastic process which 
"pretends to draw a real knowledge of things from 
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the analytic judgement 
meanings of words." 
aware of the danger of 
by "eidetic intuition"." 
that one can make on the 
Husserl was, therefore, well 
self-deception in proceeding 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1974:259) 
8) "To return to the things themselves is to return to 
that world which precedes knowledge, of which 
knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which 
every scientific schematization is an abstract and 
derivative sign-language, as is geography in 
relation to the country-side in which we have 
learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a 
river is" (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:ix) 
9) This means that in relation to Kant Husserl could be taken 
to have extended the notion of intuition, as Taminiaux 
argues, or to have extended the realm of a priori 
knowledge, as Lauer argues. 
"For Kant, intuition is strictly bound to 
sensibility and a categorial intuition would be 
absolutely impossible. A category, in Kant's 
vocabulary, deduced from the table of judgements 
inherited from traditional logic, is in no way given 
to an intuition. The phrase "categorial intuition" 
on the other hand refers obviously to the intuitive 
givenness of a category. In spite of the Kantian 
style of the general setting of the sixth 
Investigation, the notion of "categorial intuition" 
denotes thus a certain passing beyond Kant's 
setting, a passing-beyond which supposes a 
broadening of Kant's notion of givenness." (Sallis, 
1978:68) 
"Kant has specified the ideal order as belonging 
exclusively to subjectivity and its necessity as 
attaching solely to the formalizing function of 
reason. Husserl sought to extend necessity from 
form to content, thus apriorizing the whole of 
knowledge content as well as form." (Lauer, 
1958:79) 
10) "Yith Husserl ... it is logic itself which becomes 
phenomenological. That is, he will not wish to give 
any other foundation to the affirmations of logic 
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than our actual experience of truth." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964:52) 
"Ve will not admit a preconstituted world, a logic, 
except for having seen them arise from our 
experience of brute being, which is as it were the 
umbilical cord or our knowledge and the source of 
meaning for us." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:157) 
11) " an aggregate arises in so far as a unitary 
interest and in and with it a unitary observation 
makes different contents stand out and embraces 
them. The collective connection can therefore only 
be apprehended through reflection on the mental act, 
through which the aggregate comes into being." 
(Husserl, 1970:79) 
12) It is curious that Merleau-Ponty should make such a 
statement without qualification. If it is consciousness 
which is this other point of view, then he would appear to 
be defending the basis of Husserl's Idealism. As we will 
see later however, the 'scan of my gaze', is not 
consciousness. 
13) According to both Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty, Husserl 
himself uses the expressions, "ultimate subject". (letzte 
subjekt) (Ricoeur, 1967:69) and "last, radical 
subjectivity", (Merleau-Ponty, 1974:235) for 
transcendental ego. 
14) "In an article, "Presuppositions Philosophiques de 
la logique" Aron Gurwitsch expresses a similar 
idea. His concern is with the "ideal identity of 
propositions", which he argues is a philosophical 
presupposition of logic. 
the 
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"Partout il s'agit de l'identite ideale de 
propositions, c'est-a-dire de la possibilite de les 
reprendre, aussi souvent qu'on le veut en tant 
qu'identiquement les memes et aussi de la 
possibilite ideale de reiterer les operations 
logiques ... 
L'identite ideale des propositions n'est mentionee 
nulle part parmi les axiomes ou parmi les premisses 
qui figurent de facon explicite dans la construction 
de la logique. Cependant on en fait constamment 
usage, et l'on peut nullement s'abstenir d'en faire 
usage." (1951:404) 
"A tous les niveaux de la logique - "grammaire 
purement logique", logique de la pure consequence, 
logique de la verite - il y a renvoi a l'experience 
perceptive d'un monde coherent qui, done, figure a' 
titre de presupposition a' chacun de ces niveaux." 
(1951:402) 
"Le monde perceptif tel qu'l apparait dans 
l'experience pre-predicative s'est revele dans nos 
analyses comme une des presuppositions fondamentales 
de la logique." (1951:398/9) 
15) This is the conclusion Lachieze-Rey comes to in 
distinguishing between the transcendental and the 
psychological ego in terms of the distinction between la 
conscience determinante and le moi empirique. 
"Cette solidarite [du moi et des phenomenes du sens 
externe] fait du moi empirique un object au 
milieu des autres dans l'ensemble des phenomenes 
d'Univers tandis que cet ensemble est sous-tendu par 
l'unite de la conscience determinante; les 
consequences de cette critique paraissent done 
pouvoir etre resumees d'une maniere tres precise au 
point de vue de la situation des objets du sens 
externe; ces objets sont hors de moi en tant que 
moi empirique, ils sont au contraire en moi, ainsi 
que l'espace qui en est la forme et le permanent qui 
en est l'ossature generale, si, par ce moi, on 
entend celui de l'aperception." (1950:207) 
"Ce qui doit 
entierement a 
etre, au contraire, considere comme 
rejeter, sinon par un appel precis au 
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detail de tous les textes particuliers, ... c'est 
!'admission, du cote du sens externe ou du sens 
interne, d'objets correspondant a nos 
representations, objets auxquels celles-ci devraient 
se conformer pour etre vraies et qui en seraient 
radicalement distincts ... " (1950:368) 
16) "Une interpretation du cogito dans le sens d'un 
jugement de subsomption y introduirait d'ailleurs 
necessairement une possibilite' d'erreur par suite 
de l'admission d'un dualisme entre les termes 
compares bien plus, le rejet d'une telle 
interpretation depasse de beauconp la question meme 
du cogito et s'impose si l'on ne veut pas rendre, 
d'une maniere generale, toute reconnaissance et tout 
jugement impossibles, car, s'il me fallait, pour 
reconnaitre que je pense, confronter mon acte a' 
la notion de pensee, je devrais encore reconnaitre 
que cette notion de pensee a laquelle je compare mon 
acte est bien conforme a la notion de pensee et 
ainsi de suite a l'infini •.. " (1950:8) 
17) Herleau-Ponty expressed the same idea when he points out 
that for Descartes irrestably self-evident truths are 
still de facto truths and never valid de jure. 
"Vhich is why Descartes maintained, it is true both 
that certain ideas are presented to me as 
irresistibly self-evident de facto, and that this 
fact is never valid de jure, and that it never does 
away with the possibility of doubt arising as soon 
as we are no longer in the presence of the idea." 
(1962:396) 
18) " la liaison de la pensee et de l'existence 
n'est nullement une liaison necessaire de possibles 
qui precederait la liaison effective des realites 
correspondantes; mais ces possibles eux-memes ne 
peuvent au contraire etre precisement traites comme 
possibles que parce qu'ils ont d'abord ete 
apprehendes comme reels. L'idee ne precede pas le 
contact direct avec l'etre, mais elle est saisie 
dans ce contact meme parce qu'elle est immanente a 
l'etre; telle est la signification qu'il faut donner 
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aux nombreux textes ou Descartes affirme que le 
cogito n'est pas la conclusion d'un syllogisme dont 
la majeure serait: tout ce qui pense est, - que "le 
propre de notre esprit" est "de former les 
propositions generales de la connaissance des 
particuli~res" que la liaison de la pensee et de 
!'existence est aper~ue par une "simple inspection 
de !'esprit" et nous est enseignee d'apr~s ce que 
nous sentons en nous memes - que, pour apprendre ce 
que c'est que le doute et ce que c'est que la 
pensee, il ne faut que douter et penser soi-meme, -
et qu'il en est ainsi egalement de !'existence." 
(Lachieze-Rey, 1950:7/8) 
19) Pivcevic argues that this is the position Busser! is unable 
to avoid. 
"But if this is so [i.e. if "the whole 
spatio-temporal world in which man and the human 
Ego view themselves as subordinate realities is such 
that it has merely intentional existence: in other 
words, it exists in a secondary, relative sense of 
the word, i.e. for a consciousness it is 
such that consciousness posits its existence in 
experience and is, in principle, intuitable and 
determinable only as the identical reference point 
of the harmoniously motivated experiential 
manifolds, but beyond this is nothing at all, more 
accurately, it would be an absurdity to suppose that 
it could be anything else beyond this" Ideen 1 p 
117], can we be sure that there is an 'external' 
spatio-temporal world at all?" (1970:77/8) 
20) "Therein lies the great problem, according to the 
traditional view. That I attain certainties, even 
compelling evidences, in my own domain of 
consciousness, in the nexus of motivation 
determining me, is understandable. But how can this 
business, going on wholly within the immanency of 
conscious life, acquire objective significance? Bow 
can evidence (clara et distincta perceptio) claim 
to be more than a characteristic of constiousness 
within me? Vhat does phenomenology's 
transcendental self-investigation have to say about 
this? Nothing less than that the whole problem is 
inconsistent." (Busser!, 1969:82/3) 
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"If I said, as do the sensationalists, that we have 
here only 'states of consciousness', and if I tried 
to distinguish my perceptions from my dreams with 
the aid of 'criteria', I should overlook the 
phenomenon of the world. For if I am able to talk 
about 'dreams' and 'reality', to bother my head 
about the distinction between imaginary and real, 
and cast doubt upon the 'real', it is because the 
distinction is already made by me before any 
analysis: it is because I have an experience of the 
real as of the imaginary, and the problem then 
becomes one not of asking how critical thought can 
provide for itself secondary equivalents of this 
distinction, but of making explicit our primordial 
knowledge of the 'real', of describing our 
perception of the world as that upon which our idea 
of truth is for ever based. Ye must not therefore 
wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must 
instead say: the world is what we perceive." 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:xvi) 
21) "Before taking another step, we must stop to 
consider this interpretation of Descartes, for it 
completely fails to recognize the polarity which 
supports the whole Cartesian philosophy. This is 
the polarity between the cogito which in itself 
absorbs all objectivity as its sense (the "ideas" 
of physics and mathematics are the sense of the 
cogito) and, on the other hand, the existence of God 
from which every being as created depends. These two 
requirements intersect again in the idea of 
infinity, an idea which belongs at once to the cycle 
of the cogito, insofar as it is an idea like others, 
and to the cycle of being, in the respect in which 
it is the mark of the infinite being in my thought. 
One can certainly contest the possibility of a 
philosophy with two sources - the cogito and God. 
That is to say, one can deny the possibility of 
holding at one and the same time a philosophy where 
subjectivity is the reference pole of all that can 
be thought and a philosophy where being is the 
reference pole of all that exists. However, to 
fail to recognize this structure of Cartesianism is 
to produce a philosophy other than Descartes's and 
not to radicalize Cartesianism." (Ricoeur, 
1967:83/4) 
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22) Herleau-Ponty points out that the solipsist's argument is 
unable to cast doubt on the existence of the world without 
surreptitiously assuming its existence. 
"'We are not so much thinking here of the age-old 
argument from dreams, delirium, or illusions, 
inviting us to consider whether what we see is not 
"false". For to do so the argument makes use of 
that faith in the world it seems to be unsettling 
The argument therefore postulates the world in 
general, the true in itself: this is secretly 
invoked in order to disqualify our perceptions and 
cast them pell-mell back into our "interior life" 
along with our dreams, in spite of all observable 
differences, for the sole reason that our dreams 
were, at the time as convincing as they - forgetting 
that the "falsity" of dreams cannot be extended to 
perceptions since it appears only relative to 
perceptions and that if we are able to speak of 
falsity, we do have to have experiences of truth." 
(1968:5) 
23) Peter Hutchenson (1980:144/162; 1981:165/178) fails to 
recognize the true meaning of the reduction and 
consequently of Husserl's transcendental ego. Hutchenson 
argues against Sartre and Schutz's interpretations of the 
fifth Meditation. These au~hors argue that Husser! failed 
to prove the existence of other minds. Hutchenson claims 
that Husser! makes no attempt to establish the existence of 
other minds because it is impossible to do so from the 
phenomenological standpoint. 
"The reason why Husser! cannot assert 
(or the non-existence) of other 
transcendental or otherwize, 
phenomenological reduction the 
device with which Husser! begins 








existential questions. A minor consequence of this 
point is that Husserl must remain neutral with 
regard to the existence of other subjects." 
(1981:167) 
"For the "problem of other minds", as it is called 
is a problem that Husserl cannot answer from the 
phenomenological standpoint performing the 
phenomenological reduction amounts to abstention 
from ontological commitment. Post-epoche, one 
refuses to assert (or deny) straight-forwardly that 
anything (with the exception of one's own 
consciousness exists Since existential 
commitments are ruled out of court by 
phenomenological reduction, problems which require 
such commitment in order to answer them are 
impermissible, too." (1980:145/6) 
"Vith regard to other subjects, Husserl wants to 
clarify what we take to be sufficient reason for 
believing that there are other subjects. That is 
why Husserl can speak of the sense "truly existing 
others", but not truly existing others. Indeed, if 
"conceptual analysis" is construed sufficiently 
broadly, then Husserl's phenomenology is a kind of 
conceptual analysis It is a kind of conceptual 
analysis, since Husserl tries to clarify the way we 
conceive the world and things in it. In this 
respect, Husserl's philosophy bears some 
resemblance to some forms of recent Anglo-American 
philosophy." (1981:168) 
Recently Husserl has attracted the attention of a whole 
new generation of analytic philosophers. Dreyfus claims 
that he is beginning to emerge as the "father of current 
research, in cognitive psychology and artificial 
intelligence" (Dreyfus,1982:2) By and large however, 
these new approaches (following Follesdal) share 






pains to understand what it 
to count in our experience as 
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an actually existing reality, what meaning 
components make it possible for our experience to 
have as part of its meaning a successful reference 
to the real world. This reference is part of the 
sense of natural experience which according to 
Husser!, philosophy can only explicate or uncover. 
The question that cannot be raized philosophically 
is a question of fact - namely, is that reference 
which is built into the meaning of our experience 
in fact successful?" (1982:184/5) 
This seems to me to misunderstand Husser! entirely and to 
ignore so much of what Husser! says in Ideas and 
Cartesian Meditations. The reduction is only the 
rejection or suspension of an absurd sense of being, of a 
naive metaphysics but it does not exclude metaphysics as 
such (1969: 56). The reduction, is more a rejection of the 
radical, dogmatic and unfounded distinction between 
questions of meaning or sense and questions of being or 
fact. The reduction leads us to the transcendental 
consciousness, which is the source of both being and sense. 
"Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, 
whether the latter is called immanent or 
transcendent, falls within the domain of 
transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity 




except by a proper operation of 





is a realm whose existential status 
is secondary; it continually 
realm of transcendental being." 
105 
Sallis points out that Husser! had completely endorsed an 
article by Fink in which the basic question of 
phenomenology is identified as that of the origin of the 
world. According to Fink the task of phenomenology 
"is to make the world comprehensible in all its real 
and ideal determinateness in terms of the ultimate 
ground of its being." (Sallis, 1973:19) 
According to the interpretations of Hutchenson and Hall 
the distinction between questions of meaning and questions 
of being can be made prior to and independently of the 
reduction process. If we can say that the reduction leads 
us to a realm of meaning and excludes the problem of the 
being of the world we must already have the sense of to 
exist, whereas Husser! says quite clearly : 
"This concept of the transcendental and its 
correlate the concept of the transcendent, must be 
derived exclusively from our philosophically 
meditative situation." (1969:26) 
"The Objective world, the world that exists for me, 
that always has and always will exist for me, the 
only world that ever can exist for me - this world, 
with all its Objects, I said, derives its whole 
sense and it's existential status, which it has for 
me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental 
Ego, the Ego that comes to the fore only with the 
transcendental phenomenological epoche." (1969:26) 
If ever we argue that the world has the sense of actually 
existing and that this still leaves open the question of 
whether it actually exists or not, we will have two senses 
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of the word exist. If Husserl says that the only sense 
which the being of the world has is derived from me the 
transcendental Ego, then there is no way in which we can 
make the distinctions Hutchenson and Hall wish to make. 
"If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of 
possible sense, then an outside is precisely 
nonsense." (Husserl,1969:84) 
The problem with these interpretations is that they adopt 
what we could describe as a "high altitude" style of 
thinking which is contrary to the project of 
phenomenological research. Hutchenson claims for example 
that: 
"There are varieties of solipsism, one which 
expresses a metaphysical thesis; the other is an 
epistemological one. Metaphysical solipsism is the 
thesis that only I and my ideas exist. 
Epistemological solipsism, on the other hand, is 
the thesis that one cannot know or demonstrate that 
anyone other than oneself exists." (1980:145) 
In this extract we can see that the distinctions between 
ideas and reality and between thinking and knowing that the 
world exists are taken as the a priori givens of any and 
every philosophical enterprise. Husserl wishes to 
transcend this entire problematic. To follow the reduction 
is to be lead to see how these problems and these 
alternatives are built on formal and ultimately 'absurd' 
concepts of reality, knowing, thinking, etc. Our intention 
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in the analysis of Descartes's solipsism was to lead to 
such an intuition of the naivity and dishonesty at the 
roots of these distinctions. 
The reduction is not an abstention from "ontological 
commitments", provided commitment is not taken as a 
psychological phenomenon. The reduction is only an 
abstention from a dogmatic, unfounded belief that the 
world exists in an absolute sense, as it does in Kant's 
theory of the thing-in-itself. 
"Nor is it [transcendental phenomenology) a Kantian 
idealism, which believes it can keep open, at least 
as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world 
of things in themselves." (Husserl, 1969:86) 
To reveal the existence sense of the world is to reveal its 
mode of existence. To reveal the original experience in 
which the existence of the world is grasped is to reveal 
the process in which the world forms itself around me and 
comes to exist for me, prior to any judgement about my 
reasons for believing that there is a world. Vhat Sartre, 
and as we will see Merleau-Ponty, find unacceptable in 
Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity, is not that Husserl 
failed to prove the existence of other minds, but that for 
Husserl "my fundamental connection with the Other is 
realized through knowledge" (Sartre. 1969:233). The 
solipsism Sartre accuses Husserl of is never the 
ontological or the epistemological solipsism as defined by 
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Hutchenson. Husserl remains attached to the notion of the 
transcendental ego as a pure, presuppositionless 
consciousness, a pure interiority and he is therefore 
unable to account for being-amongst-others, since this 
involves being-beyond-oneself, or ex-tase. But if the 
notion of being-amongst others is unthinkable in 
transcendental phenomenology it is equally so if we take 
the other to exist in an absolute or realist sense as 
something in-itself lying beyond my consciousness. 
24) "I do not form a mental picture of my day, it weighs 
upon me with all its weight, it is still there, and 
though I may not recall any detail of it, I have 
the impending power to do so, I still 'have it in 
hand'. In the same way, I do not think of the 
evening to come and its consequences, and yet it 
'is there', like the back of a house of which I 
can see only the facade, or like the background 
beneath a figure." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:416) 
The question of whether Husserl's transcendental Idealism 
can make any sense of the past and hence whether it can 
make possible an unbiased description of the experience of 
dis-illusion, we will consider later. All we wish to 
establish at the moment is the necessity of this movement 
of reflection, to expose the assumptions of the natural 
attitude. 
25) In a recent article, "Must the other be derived from the 
I? Towards the reformulation of Husserl's 5th 
Cartesian Meditation" (Husserl Studies 1 79-104 [1984]) 
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Robert Harlan not only accepts the argument from illusion 
but argues that it can be used to illustrate the 
fundamental thesis of transcendental phenomenology vez. 
"That the subjective functioning of mental life is 
responsible for the various accomplishments that enable 
objects to be presented to and verified to exist by 
subjects." 
"Upon entering a dark, unfamiliar room I might 
mistake a shadow in the corner for a table. The 
error is revealed when the lights are turned on and 
the "table" disappears, or when I place books upon 
"it" and they fall to the ground. (Two aspects of 
mental life are illustrated by this phenomenon. 
First of all, the "table" qua correlate of my act of 
perceiving has a certain sense for me (e.g., 
something upon which I can place books, 
something which remains the same given changes in 
lighting, etc.) which both determines my behaviour 
towards it and delineates what I may expect in the 
course of my further experience of it. Failure of 
further experience to conform to these expectations 
result in my canceling my initial belief that it 
was a table that I saw in the corner. Secondly, 
neither the object that I "saw" (i.e. , the "table") 
nor the horizon of expectation pertaining to this 
object, the horizon in virtue of which my error 
was subsequently discovered, could be explained 
wholly in terms of causal relations between what 
was the physical cause of my perception and my 
body. "Operations of mind," operations that take 
place independently of the causal and physiological 
processes which make perception possible and which 
are responsible for the significance assigned to the 
physical stimulus, thus, must be introduced to 
account for the correlate of my intentional act in 
this case, the "table."" 
It should be clear that the genuine transcendental 
subject, the last subject, in Harlan's illustration 
is the philosopher himself and not the individual 
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entering the unfamiliar room. It is the transcendental 
subject for whom there is, from the start a distinction 
between the real shadow and the "internal" subjective 
table constructed through the operations of the mind. 
Clearly, in this example, the validity of world 
apperception has already been presupposed. (Husser!, 
1969:83) The subject in the room is a piece of the world, 
whom we find as a man and who as a substantia cogitans 
constructs a private table in purely internal 
experience. (Husserl, 1969:25) The reduction is not needed 
as Harlan argues, "to isolate the subjective functioning 
in virtue of which intentional acts which present objects 
[such as the table] with specific senses and specific 
horizons of expectations are formed II The reduction 
is needed "in order to attain that Ego and conscious 
life by which transcendental questions, as questions 
about the possibility of transcendental knowledge, can be 
asked." (Husser!, 1969:83), i.e. to attain that Ego 
for whom there is from the start, a difference 
between a real shadow and an "internal table", between 
the moment before and the moment after the error is 
revealed, for whom there is error and truth. 
"All my distinguishing between genuine and 
deceptive experience and between being and illusion 
in experience goes on within the sphere itself of my 
consciousness .. " (Husser!, 1969:82) 
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Certainly Husser! refers to his phenomenology as 
transcendental idealism, speaks about the constitution 
of meaning and sense and often refers to the constitutive 
processes as subjective. But it is clear from the rest 
of his thesis and his rejection of psychologism and the 
possible wrong interpretations of his philosophy (1969:86) 








phenomenology is eo ipso "transcendental idealism", it is 
so in a fundamentally and essentially new sense. His 
idealism is not "a product of sportive argumentations, a 
prize to be won in the dialectical contest with 
"realisms"." It is "sense-explication achieved by actual 
work" (1969:86). Similarly the terms meaning and subjective 
cannot have their traditional philosophical definitions 
since the meaning of meaning and of subjective will 
only be discovered in phenomenological explication. 
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THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE VORLD AND THE PRESENCE OF THE OTHERS 
In our argument against Descartes' solipsism it became evident 
that I cannot think of myself as an isolated res cogitans 
to confined 
world. For 
world as an 
its ow thoughts about an actually transcendent 
the 
act 
same reason I cannot think of my access to this 
of perception, for as long as perception is 
actual and contingent process in the world taken to be an 
(Husser!, 1969:84). 
It is Descartes who conceives of the universe of true being, 
the transcendent world, as something lying outside of the 
universe of consciousness, to which I do not have direct access, 
whose existence I only surmise. But as we have seen Descartes's 
method of conceiving is both naive and dishonest. The universe 
of true being is conceived positively as that which would be 
seen by another observer, or according to Ricoeur's reading of 
Descartes, that which would be seen by God. The problem of 
conceiving true being is simply replaced by the problem of 
conceiving an actual God or actual others. The problem is not 
one of entertaining the idea that the world exists. The problem 
is that there is a difference for me between thinking that the 
world exists and the actual existence of the world. Descartes 
can make this distinction only by involving himself in a vicious 
circle. 
Philosophy must account for the fact that I make this dis-
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tinction and for Husserl this means that I not only think 
thoughts, but also the being of the world. I must ultimately 
recognize in myself the subject that thinks the being of the 
world, the subject for whom the universe of true being and 
consciousness are one (Husserl,1969:84). 
Vhere Descartes argues that the real world is beyond my thoughts 
about it, Husserl agrees, only to answer that "its lying beyond 
my thoughts" must be a cogitatum. If the very transcendence of 
the world which Descartes recognises in order to doubt it can be 
shown to be a cogitatum, Husserl will have overcome solipsism 
simply by showing that nothing genuinely lies beyond 
transcendental consciousness and that the very transcendence of 
the world, which the solipsist claims we cannot be sure about, 
is itself a cogitatum. All that Husserl has to show is how a 
transcendental consciousness can constitute the "lying beyond 
consciousness" of the world. This will demonstrate once and for 
all that in the transcendental reduction nothing has been lost 
but only an 'absurd' sense of being. 
"On the one hand, idealism would be established if, in 
effect, one could show that the philosophy of "sense" 
omits no question concerning being, for this being 
would be a function of sense. The epoche should suspend 
all questions about the being or non-being of the 
world; and in fact this distinction is recovered again 
within consciousness. The being of the world, not 
just its schematic sense, would be "in" consciousness." 
(Ricoeur, 1967:101) 
Ve have seen that the depth we encounter in binocular perception 
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is not reducible to an hypothesis or to a thought that the 
object is lOcm from me. The depth we encounter is not an object 
of thought, it lies beyond what I may think of it. Similarly we 
have also seed in our account of the dis-illusion, that the 
reality of the serviette, its ontological function, was not for 
me, based on a judgement. The serviette, we said, "of its own" 
takes over the ontological function. This we described as a 
metamorphosis in which the past and the future itself is 
changed, even though I do not expressly think of them, even 
though they are not objects of thought. It is clear that the 
world's lying beyond me, is for me. The world's being more than 
an object of thought is itself a cogitatum. 
The task of the 5th Meditation, which is to overcome the 
challenge of solipsism, is therefore the task of showing how 
"the lying beyond my thought" of the world, can be the cogitatum 
of the last subject, and how this independence of the world is 
constituted i.e. is dependent on me. 
Yhat is it that characterises for Husserl the true being of the 
world? The actual world, as opposed to an object of thought or 
an image or judgement, is not only "for me" but "there for 
everyone". 
"The existence sense [Seinsinn] of the world and of 
nature in particular, as Objective Nature, includes 
after all thereness for everyone. This is 
always co-intended wherever we speak of objective 
actuality." (1969:92) 
Yorld-experience, as constitutive, signifies, not just 
115 
my private experience, but community-experience. The 
world itself, according to its sense, is the one 
identical world, to which all of us necessarily have 
experience access, and about which all of us by 
changing our experiences that is: by making them 
common can reach an understanding " (Husser!, 
1969(b):236) 
" ••. I experience the world (including others) -and, 
according to its experiential sense, not as (so to 
speak) my private synthetic formation but as other than 
mine alone [mir fremde], as an intersubjective world, 
actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of 
its objects to everyone." (1969:91) 
Since we will present Merleau-Ponty's theory of language and 
intersubjectivity as an answer to Husserl's theory of 
intersubjectivity we must be careful to avoid misinterpreting 
these passages. Clearly Husser! could not be making any 
metaphysical claims. He is not saying that because the vorld is 
real in some absolute sense it is also accessible to others. Any 
such claim would mean that its being accessible to others was an 
actual, and therefore, , contingent state of affairs. 
Accessibility to others would not be included in the "existence 
sense of the world". The " accessibility to others" is not an 
actual state of affairs for, says Husser!, "it would not be 
lost, even if a universal plague had left only me" (1969:93). If 
"accessibility to others" is taken to be an actual state of 
affairs, it would mean that Husser! has put himself into a 
vicious circle, for it will be as difficult to explain how we 
constitute an actual state of affairs as it is to explain the 
constitution of 'being'. 
This is the mistake that Descartes makes. As we have seen 
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Descartes appears to establish the distinction between his 
private world of dreams and the real world, through the 
existence of some external observer such as God. Vhat 
distinguishes for Descartes the real fireplace from the dreamt 
fireplace, is that the former is accessible to some external 
observer. Descartes makes the mistake of interpreting this 
accessibility of the world to others, in an absolute or 
metaphysical sense, forgetting that accessibility to others 
cannot be conceived as real since it is that through which 
things are real, and that if it is conceived of as real, it 
becomes inconceivable that I could ever encounter this 
accessibility itself, and hence encounter being itself. 
"As philosophy, realism is an error because it 
transposes into dogmatic thesis an experience which it 
deforms or renders impossible by that fact But it is a 
motivated error, it rests on an authentic phenomenon 
which philosophy has the function of making explicit." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1967:216) 
To avoid this circularity, to return to the primitive existence 
sense of the world, to our most fundamental encounter with 
being, really existing others and a really existing world must 
be put into parentheses. The reduction allows me to focus my 
attention on the particular way in which a world lying beyond my 
thoughts, comes to exist for me, as being-for-us. Accessibility 
to others must be a cogitatum of the last subject, which is why 
Husser! insists that it is discovered "within myself". 
" within myself, within 








experience the world (including others) and, 
according to its experiential sense, not as (so to 
speak) my private synthetic formation but as other than 
mine (mir fremde] ... " (1969:91) 
Nor is Husserl making any, formal claim about the definition or 
the 'meaning' of 'true being' in spite of the use of words like 
"existence sense", in the quotes given above. It is not as if 
the notion of accessibility to others is logically implied in 
the notion of 'true being' or that reality is defined as that 
which is accessible to others. As we have seen logical, 
conventional and formal relations are only possible in a realm 
of symbols or discourse to which I can return as many times as I 
wish, which like the world, lies beyond me in a certain sense, 
and also presents itself as 'for us'. Before we can conceive of 
a logical, conventional or semantic relationship we already need 
to have grasped the distinction between my private world and the 
transcendent world, and therefore grasped "accessibility to 
others". 
Vhat Husserl is referring to in these quotations is the informal 
essence of 'true being', the grasping of being itself by the 
last subject. The 'real world' is 'experienced' by me as 
something experienced by us. In my experience of others and the 
world, I do not experience others as each confined to his own 
private experiences. If I am standing with Paul and I point to a 
mountain, I point to the same mountain that Paul perceives. It 
is not at all as if my pointing hand is duplicated, so that 
there is, beside my pointing hand for me, also my pointing hand 
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for Paul, existing in Paul's experienced world and directing his 
attention to his mountain. I experience the world as being the 
same world for him and for me. 
Nor 
"Suppose that my friend Paul and I are looking at a 
landscape. What precisely happens? Must it be said that 
we have both private sensations, that we know things 
but cannot communicate them to each other - that, as 
far as pure lived through experience goes, we are 
each incarcerated in our separate perspectives - that 
the landscape is not numerically the same for both of 
us and that it is a question only of a specific 
identity? When I consider my perception itself, before 
any objectifying reflection, at no moment am I aware of 
being shut up within my own sensations •.• My friend 
Paul and I point out to each other certain details of 
the landscape; and Paul's finger, which is pointing out 
the church tower, is not a finger-for-me that I think 
of as orientated towards a church-tower-for-me, it is 
Paul's finger which itself shows me the tower that Paul 
sees, just as, conversely, when I make a movement 
towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I 
do not imagine that I am producing in Paul, in virtue 
of some pre-established harmony, inner visions merely 
analogous to mine: I believe, on the contrary, that my 
gestures invade Paul's world and guide his gaze. When I 
think of Paul, I do not think of a flow of private 
sensations indirectly related to mine through the 
medium of interposed signs, but of someone who has a 
living experience of the same world as mine " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:405) 
are Husser! and Merleau-Ponty making claims about 
psychological processes, about relationships of association 
between ideas and impressions. Could we argue that it is my 
perception of Paul and his gestures as he looks at the landscape 
which produces in me, either through association of ideas or 
impressions or through some cerebral mechanism, the belief that 
he sees the same landscape I see? If the identity of Paul's 
world and my world is not a formal identity, not simply a manner 
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of speaking about our experiences, could we argue that the 
identity is reducible to a subjective experience of it being the 
same world? It is inconceivable that I could explain this 
experience of identity as a psychological phenomenon because, 
any such explanation would imply that there was no necessary 
connection between my impression or idea of "the same world for 
all of us" and the actual identity of the real world for all of 
us. He, who postulates the existence of these associative or 
cerebral processes, postulates them as lying beyond his own 
thoughts about them, he postulates them as objects of psychology 
or neuro-psychology and as such objects which are held to exist 
for everyone. He postulates therefore an actual identity of the 
world while at the same time admitting that there is no way in 
which he could know what such an actual identity could mean, 
since the only ideas of identity he is capable of having are 
produced in him through a contingent process and have therefore, 
no necessary connection with the actual identity which he 
postulates. Similarly I cannot postulate the existence of 
psychological or neurological processes which produce in me the 
idea of a world lying beyond my thoughts, of a realm of true 





not argue that this conviction that the world I 
is accessible to Paul, is based on a judgement? Could I 
into account Paul's behaviour, his speech and his 
gestures and come to the conclusion that he sees the same world 
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I see - and conclude therefore that the world I see lies beyond 
me? Any such judgement would always presuppose what it was meant 
to account for. It would presuppose that I was able to 
distinguish between my thoughts of Paul's behaviour and Paul's 
behaviour itself, i.e. it would presuppose that I could 
recognise, prior to any judgement, those aspects of Paul's 
behaviour which were accessible to others. Furthermore, if my 
judgements and inferences are not simply manifestations of my 
psyche, the realm of judgements and inferences must transcend me 
in a certain sense, and would to that extent, exist 'for us'. My 
conviction that the world I perceive is accessible to Paul could 
not be based on a judgement. There can be for me Paul's 
behaviour itself, and the actual validity of a judgement, only 
if, I already encounter a world 'for us', a valid argument 'for 
us,. 
"My awareness of constructing an objective truth would 
never provide me with anything more than an objective 
truth for me, and my greatest attempt at impartiality 
would never enable me to prevail over my subjectivity 
(as Descartes so well expresses it by the hypothesis of 
the malignant demon), if I had not, underlying my 
judgements, the primordial certainty of being in 
contact with being itself, if, before any voluntary 
adoption of a position I were not already situated in 
an intersubjective world, and if science too were not 
upheld by this basic doxa." (Merleau-Ponty,1962:355) 
Ve are left with only one possible interpretation of Husserl's 
thesis. If I distinguish between the world itself, the universe 
of true being and the realm of thought about the world, then I, 
as the last subject, must be able to have an original experience 
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of being itself, I must constitute a world that lies beyond any 
act of thought, (which for Husserl means that the world's being 
more than what it is for me, the world's being accessible to 
others must be for me). I must be able to experience others not 
only as psycho-physical objects in the world but also as 
subjects for the world. 
" ... I experience them at the same time as subjects for 
this world, as experiencing it (this same world that I 
experience) and, in so doing experiencing me too, even 
as I experience the world and others in it." (Husserl, 
1969:91) 
If I experience true being itself then I must have a direct 
experience of other subjects. This means that Husserl departs 
radically from those theories which attempt to account for our 
experience of other subjects in terms of an inference based on 
certain signs in the behaviour of these other subjects. Since I 
have some familiarity with the gestures I execute or the words I 
utter when I have certain thoughts or certain perceptions, could 
I not infer from the behaviour of others, by analogy with my own 
behaviour, what it is that he thinks or perceives? As we have 
seen above, these theories presuppose what they are meant to 
account for viz. a world of behaviour and a validity "for us". 
It would be circular if I could perceive their external 
movements as events in the real world prior to perceiving their 
perception of the world. An unbiased reflection on my experience 
of others, reveals that I do not experience signs, but others 
themselves as subjects. 
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"If we stick to our de facto experience, our experience 
of someone else as it comes to pass at any time, we 
find that actually the sensuously seen body is 
experienced forthwith as the body of someone else and 






actually see is not a sign and not a mere 
a depiction in any natural sense of the word; 
contrary, it is someone else." (Husser!, 
"Experience is original consciousness; and in fact we 
generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the 
other is himself there before us "in person"." 
(Husserl,1969:108) 
The champion of the natural attitude or the dualist would have 
to argue that these experiences of a direct access to others are 
illusions. Given the absolute existence of the world each 
subject will be seen as separate from others, firstly, because 
the mind is separ~te from the body, which only manifests through 
signs the state of the mind, and secondly, because the body of 
each subject is separate from all other bodies. 'ilithin the real 
world subjects will be separate from each other as pebbles in a 
box are separate from each other. But such an argument would 
only succeed in undermining its own foundations. If we deny the 
immediate presence of others, it will be inconceivable that we 
could ever encounter or conceive of a world lying beyond our 
private thoughts, which is the only possible world the dualist 
could refer to with his notion af an absolutely existing world. 
"Quite rightly, 
someone else and 
world, perceiving 
at the same world, 
therefore, we speak of perceiving 
then of perce1v1ng the objective 
that the other Ego and I are looking 
..• (Husserl,1969:124) 
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Ve must therefore perform the reduction in order to reveal our 
authentic experience of others. Ve must put into parentheses 
this actually existing real world as well as really existing 
other subjects, we cannot think of this "us", for whom the world 
exists, as a bundle of parallel consciousnesses or as a 
collection of individual subjects. 
"No more than space is made of simultaneous points in 
themselves, no more than our duration can serve j_ ts 
adherence to a space of durations, is the communicative 
world a bundle of parallel consciousness. Our traces 
mix and intermingle; they make a single wake of "public 
durations." (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:19) 
"Sofern das Dasein Uberhaupt ist, hat es die Seinsart 
des Miteinanderseins. Dieses kan nicht als summatives 
Resultat des Vorkommens mehrerer 'Subjekte' begriffen 
werden." (Heidegger, 1949:125) 
It is true, as has been argued in recent research (Hutchenson, 
1980:144/62), that Husser! doesn't attempt to offer a proof of 
the existence of others. Such a proof would demonstrate 
precisely the sense of existence which Husser! wishes to put 
into parentheses. But this does not mean that his investigations 
are only concerned with an explication of the sense or meaning 
of actually existing others. Husserl's transcendental 
phenomenology is not neutral to ontology, and performing the 
reduction on the actual existence of others does not amount to 
an abstention from every ontological commitment. It is only the 
absurd sense of actually existing others which is put into 
parentheses. Husser! is simply rejecting the possibility of 
claiming that others exist in a certain sense, a sense which 
would imply that we could never know what it was that we were 
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asserting when we assert that others exist. Husser! is concerned 
with an explication of the act in which I, as the last subject, 
constitute, actually existent others, an act which is of such a 
nature that the question of whether there actually are existing 
others or not, is not left open. 
If I return to an unbiased reflection on my experience of the 
other, I find that the other is present to me "in person", I am 
not confined to "signs" of a subject or to making inferences or 
hypotheses about a possible subject. This means that my thoughts 
or experiences must be co-extensive with the other himself. It 
means that there can be no numerical distinction between my act 
of thinking the other and the other himself, I must constitute 
the other. This is why Husser! insists that, 
" within myself, within the limits of my 
transcendentally reduced pure conscious life, I 
experience the world ... as an intersubjective world, 
actually there for everyone." (1969:91) 
"Vithin and by means of this ownness the transcendental 
ego constitutes, however, the "Objective" world, as a 
universe of being that is other than himself - and 
constitutes, at the first level, the other in the mode: 
alter ego." (1969:100) 
If the other, which is discovered "within myself", is a 
psychological subject, then he will be confined to his own 
thoughts and experience, and the world will not be "for us". 
The other which I constitute must be, like me, a last subject, 
one which has an immediate access to the world itself. There can 
be no numerical distinction between the world he grasps in 
thought and the world itself, his thought must be, like mine 
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co-extensive with the world. But how is this possible? 
"In so far as I constitute the world, I cannot conceive 
another consciousness, for it too would have to 
constitute the world and, at least as regards this 
other view of the world, I should not be the 
constituting agent. Even if I succeeded in thinking of 
it as constituting the world, it would be I who would 
be constituting the consciousness as such, and once 
more I should be the sole constituting agent." 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:350) 
Furthermore, since the other is precisely that subject for whom 
everything, including myself is an object in his world, my 
experiences and thoughts would have an outside, I would not be 
the last subject, I would not be co-extensive with reality and 
would in my experiences and thoughts, simply manifest the nature 
of my psyche. 
"The affirmation of an alien consciousness, standing 
over against mine would immediately make my experience 
into a private spectacle, since it would no longer be 
co-extensive with being. The cogito of another person 
strips my own cogito of all value, and causes me to 
lose the assurance which I enjoyed in my solitude of 
having access to the only being conceivable for me, 
being, that is, as it is aimed at and constituted by 
me." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:353) 
How is it possible for a last subject to constitute another last 
subject, which would prevent it from being last, and turn its 
constitution into a private spectacle, like a dream? 
It will not do to suggest that each simply thinks of himself as 
the last subject turning the other into a psycho-physical entity 
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with an outside. 
"He must and I must have an outer appearance, and there 
must be, besides the perspective of the For Oneself -
my view of myself and the other's view of himself - a 
perspective of For Others my view of others and 
theirs of me. Of course, these two perspectives, in 
each of us cannot be simply juxtaposed, for in that 
case it is not I that the other would see, nor he that 
I would see. I must be the exterior that I present to 
others, and the body of the other must be the other 
himself." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:xii) 
If these two perspectives are simply juxtaposed, then what I 
perceive will not be the other as a subject for whom the world 
exists, I will perceive only his outside, and once again, there 
will be no world "for us", and consequently there will not even 
be a realm within which perspectives would be thought to be 
juxtaposed. If we are to avoid a vicious circle, we cannot begin 
with multiple perspectives, I must be the exterior I present to 
others and they must be the exterior they present to me. But how 
can I be the exterior that I present to others, either I will 
lose my access to the world and to others, or I will not be this 
exterior but he who constitutes "having an exterior for others"? 
The problem appears to be irresolvable and it seems as if we 
have simply replaced the impossibility of constituting a world 
which lies beyond my thoughts, by the impossibility of 
constituting another constituting consciousness. Husserl's reply 
to all this is that there can be no doubt that others are 
present to me "in person", and that if this presence is not 
non-sense, I must constitute it. The task of phenomenology is 
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simply to lay hold of this experience of others and to explicate 
the intentional processes through which it comes into being. 
"Imperturbably I must hold fast to the insight that 
every sense that any existent whatever has or can have 
for me in respect of its "what" and "it exists and 
actually is" is a sense in and arising from my 
intentional life -." (Husser!, 1969:91) 
The existent to which Husser! turns his attention, is the 
transcendent world with its essential characteristic of being 
there for everyone. This means that in my experience of the 
world I find not only those aspects which are there "for me", 
but also other aspects which are there "for others" or rather, 
since my experience is one of our accessibility to the world 
itself, my experience, involves not only my constitutions but 
those of others. For example, a certain object which is closer 
to me than it is to Paul could be experienced by me as both 
"over here" and "over there", at the same time. The "over here", 
due to, "my" constituting, is described by Husser! as belonging 
to my primordial ownness, while the "over there", a sense 
constituted by Paul, is described as "foreign" to me (mir 
fremde). 
If we ignore for the moment his emphasis on the perception of 
the Other's behaviour, Merleau-Ponty provides us with an 




has my gaze fallen upon a living body in 
acting than the objects surrounding it 
take on a fresh layer of significance: they 
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are no longer simply what I myself make of them, they 
are what this other pattern of behaviour is about to 
make of them. Round about the perceived body a vortex 
forms, towards which my world is drawn and so to speak 
sucked in: to this extent, it is no longer merely mine, 
and no longer merely present, it is present to x " 
(1962:353) 
It should be clear that the phenomenon Husser! and Merleau-Ponty 
are referring to could not be understood as a mental 
reconstruction of the objects. It is not here a question of 
trying to imagine what the other sees, and then thinking of the 
object as a synthesis of what I see and what I imagine the other 
sees. As we have seen above, explanations of this sort are not 
only unfaithful to the phenomenon, but presuppose what they 
claim to explain. I can execute the reconstruction or judgement 
only if I have before me the behaviour of the other, only if I 
am able to distinguish between my own impressions or thoughts 
about his behaviour, and his behaviour itself. In my 
reconstructions and judgements I would have to be able to return 
to the behaviour itself, and not to my private thoughts about 
it. I need therefore an encounter with the actual behaviour 
itself, or as Husser! puts it, with "objective subjects, 
subjects existing in the world", which like any other actually 
existing reality, is what it is because of the layers of 
significance contributed by others. Consequently, the others 
which I discover in my experience of an actual world, and the 
"living body" on which Merleau-Ponty's gaze falls, cannot be 
"objective subjects, subjects existing in the world" 
"If the transcendental constitution of other subjects 
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and accordingly the transcendental sense, "other 
subjects", are in question, and consequently a 
universal sense - stratum that emanates from others and 
is indispensable to the possibility of an objective 
world for me is also in question, then the sense, 
"other subjects", that is in question here cannot as 
yet be the sense: "Objective subjects, subjects 
existing in the world." (Husser!, 1969:92/3) 
It is of course equally inconceivable that I could explain this 
'impression' of encountering a foreign layer of significance, 
through some unconscious process of association or some 
neurological mechanism. Since I must conceive of these processes 
as 'real', any such explanation would always assume that I 
already understood what a 'real' process was. For as long as 
this sense of 'real' is produced in me and bears no necessary 
relation to actual reality, any such explanation would be 
tantamount to admitting that I do not necessarily understand 
what it is that I am asserting. 
It is therefore not a reconstruction or a private impression 
that I experience but the object itself, the object which is 
more than what it is for me. Its lying beyond what it is for me, 
the fresh layer of significance is encountered as it itself. 
This means that I must constitute the object as the synthesis of 
what is due to 'my' constituting and what is due to the 
constituting by the other. But how is such a paradoxical state 
of affairs possible? If it is the fresh layer of significance 
itself, the 'mir fremde' itself that I encounter then I must 
encounter the other as a constituting consciousness But a 
constituting consciousness can only be encountered from the 
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inside i.e. by coinciding with it. How could I constitute a 
foreign constituting without this immediately becoming my 
constitution? If I genuinely encounter the other as a last 
subject how can there be any distinction between the other and 
myself ? 
"Experience is original consciousness; and in fact we 
generally say, in the case of experiencing a man: the 
other is himself there before us "in person". On the 
other hand, this being there in person does not keep us 
from admitting forthwith that, properly speaking, 
neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective 
processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything 
else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our 
experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to 
the other's own essence were directly accessible, it 
would be merely a moment of my own essence, and 
ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same." 
(Husser!, 1969:108/9) 
Husserl's answer is that I do not constitute the other as an 
object for me but as "that which cannot be perceived directly" 
as "that which can only be experienced by analogy with myself". 
Thus the analogical perception of the other, which plays such a 
central role in the fifth meditation, is not a real process in 
the world. It is constituted. The alter-ego is constituted as 
that which exists in a certain relation to me, he is constituted 
as that which is perceived analogically. His being perceived 
analogically is not a contingent characteristic, it is part of 
his original essence, of his particular mode of being. Even 
though Husser! appeals to the verbal sense of alter-ego as an 
"initial guide", it is clear that he is explicating the 
originating experience, the constitution of the Other. 
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"Initial guidance can be furnished by the verbal sense, 
an Other: an Other Ego. "Alter" signifies alter-ego. 
And the ego involved here is I myself." (1969:110) 
The Alter-ego is never constituted as an independent entity, -
but always as alter, as that which exists in a certain relation 
to me myself. 
"The "Other", according to his own constituted sense, 
points to me myself; the other is a "mirroring" of my 
own self and yet not a mirroring proper, an analogue of 
my own self and yet again not an analogue in the usual 
sense." (1969:94) 
But how is this possible? How can anything be conceived as 
existing in a relation to me since it is I, the last subject, 
which constitutes both things and relationships. The only 
relationship I have with the world is the relationship of the 
constituter to the constituted. Husser! argues that the 
experience of an alter-ego implies an experience of myself as 
having an outside, as being part of the world, and being 
confined to a particular view of the world. 
Husser! now attempts to reveal the act in which I constitute 
myself as a being in the world, as the being in relation to 
which the other can be alter. In order to do so he needs to 
carry out another kind of reduction. In this reduction the 
problem is not to reveal on this side of the constituted world a 
constituting subject, but to reveal within the realm of the 
constituted, that which is primary or always presupposed. He 
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argues that if in our experience of a transcendent object we put 
into parentheses the contributions of others, if I ignore the 
added layers of significance, the objects being present to x, we 
will be left with a sphere which Husser! calls the sphere of 
primordial ownness 
" we disregard all constitutional effects of 
intentionality relating immediately or mediately to 
other subjectivity and delimit first of all the total 
nexus of that actual and potential intentionality in 
which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiar 
ownness" (1969:93) 
This is not equivalent to imagining that I am the only subject 
or alone, in any metaphysical or natural sense, and there is no 
suggestion in this return to the sphere of personal ownness that 
Husser! regards solipsism as a phase through which phenomenology 
needs to pass. Traditional solipsism which doubts the 'real' 
existence of others, already presupposes the existence sense 
which Husser! is explicating here and hence presupposes the 
presence of others which the sphere of primordial ownness 
excludes. Traditional solipsism is therefore not genuinely 
radical in its methodic doubt. 
"If I "abstract" (in the usual sense) from others, I 
"alone" remain. But such abstraction is not radical; 
such aloneness in no respect alters the natural 
world-sense, "experienceable by everybody", which 
attaches to the naturally understood Ego and would not 
be lost, even if a universal plague had left only me." 
(Husser!, 1969:93) 
"I decide to abstract from all that is given to me as 
alien. This does not mean that I remain alone in the 
ordinary and non-phenomenological sense, as if the 
empirical solitude of an isolated or solitary man did 
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not already assume association with other men. In the 
transcendental sense this means, rather, that I decide 
to take into consideration only "what is my own" (das 
mir Eigene)." (Ricoeur, 1967:118) 
Husser! argues that if I reflect on this sphere of ownness, I 
will find amongst its objects, (which have of course been 
purified of all sense pertaining to other subjects, and hence of 
objective reality) one object which is unique, my owned body. 
Yithin this pre-objective world of ownness this is the only body 
which is an animate organism, a psycho-physical unity, the only 
body to which I ascribe fields of sensations, the only body in 
which I rule and govern and so operate in the external world, 
which is affected by the external world, and which is part of 
the world. The constitution of a world of ownness therefore 
implies that I constitute myself as mundanized, or "having 
carried out a mundanizing self-apperception" (Husser!, 1969:99) 
"Ye now can say this: while I, this ego, have 
constituted and have continued to constitute this world 
existing for me as a (correlative) phenomenon, I have 
carried out, by means of corresponding constitutive 
syntheses, an apperception of myself (as 'me' in the 
habitual sense of a human personality immersed within 
the totality of the constituted world) which transforms 
me into a being of the world (eine Verweltlichende 
Selbstapperzeption)." (Ricoeur, 1967:123) 
The mundanized self has of course a special relation to 
everything else in the sphere of ownness If I am to constitute 
objects 'there' or 'here', 'near' or 'far away', I can only do 
so because I have constituted myself as occupying a place in the 
sphere of ownness I am 'here' by virtue of having a body. 
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"This body serves as reference pole for all physical 
bodies (Korper) which, under this second degree 
reduction, no longer make up an objective world but 
rather a primordial nature, an owned nature." (Ricoeur, 
1967:121) 
Now that I have constituted myself as a being with an outside, 
it is possible to constitute a relationship of analogical 
perception between the Other and myself. It is possible to 
constitute the other as that which is perceived by analogy with 
myself. 
"Let us assume that another man enters our perceptual 
sphere Since, in this Nature (the realm of my 
primodial ownness) and this world my animate organism 
is the only body that is or can be constituted 
originally as an animate organism (a functioning 
organ), the body over there, which is nevertheless 
apprehended as an animate organism, must have derived 
this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my animate 
organism, It is clear from the very beginning that 
only a similarity connecting, within my primordial 
sphere, that body over there with my body can serve as 
the motivational bash for the "analoghing" 
apprehension of that body as another animate organism." 
(Husser!, 1969:110/1) 
Later he developes this insight to the perception of contents 
belonging to the "higher psychic sphere". 
"Such contents too are indicated somatically and in the 
conduct of the organism towards the outside world - for 
example: as the outward conduct of someone who is angry 
or cheerful, which I easily understand from my own 
conduct under similar circumstances." (1969:120) 
Needless to say none of this must be taken as a description of 
an actual process in the world. 1 There is no real act in which 
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sense is transferred onto the body of the other, no real 
similarity connecting his body and mine, nor do I actually 
understand the other by observing certain somatic indications 
and interpreting them on the basis of a familiarity with my own 
outward conduct. The actual world and actual processes have been 
suspended in the reduction. There is the phenomenon of transfer 
of sense, the phenomenon of perceiving and interpreting the 
behaviour of the other on the basis of an analogy with myself. 
It is clear that Husser! is describing and not explaining, and 
that the phenomenon of analogizing perception for example is 
what I take it to be; it is an object of thought, constituted by 
me the last subject. The spatial aspect of my body and the 
spatial separation of our bodies does not explain why the other 
can only be perceived by analogy. It is not as if there is a 
metaphysical gulf between his sphere of interiority and mine, on 
the contrary, as we have seen, the real world of space, like any 
other actual object, presupposes my experience of others as 
co-constituters of the world. It therefore presupposes the 
distinction between my sphere of ownness and the sphere that is 
foreign to me. The distinctions are not simply given, they are 
constituted in the experience of an actually existent world and 
of others. As Husser! puts it, the distinction between my 
primordial sphere and the primordial sphere of the other, which 
is for me an appresented sphere, presupposes that the experience 
of someone else has "done its work". 
"How can 
within my 
I speak at all of the same body, as appear:ing 
primordial sphere in the mode There and 
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within his and to him in the mode Here? These two 
primordial spheres, mine which is for me as ego the 
original sphere, and his which is for me an appresented 
sphere are they not separated by an abyss I cannot 
actually cross, since crossing it would mean, after 
all, that I acquire an original (rather than an 
appresenting) experience of someone else? ... The body 
belonging to my original sphere and the body 
constituted, after all quite separately in the other 
ego become identified and are called the identical body 
of someone else. How does this identification come 
about? How can it come about? But the enigma appears 
only if the two original spheres have already been 
distinguished a distinction that already presupposes 
that experience of someone else has done its work." 
(1969:121) 
If the landscape exists for Paul and myself, if it is "for us" 
then I must constitute a world which precedes the division, 
which is the unity of "the landscape for me " and the "landscape 
for Paul". The distinction between these two spheres is implied 
in the constitution of this landscape because it is their 
unity. This is how Husserl attempts to explicate the 
constitution of the being of the world and the being of other 
subjects. This is his argument showing that nothing has been 
lost in the reduction but an absurd sense of being. Husserl 
claims to have overcome solipsism because he has shown that the 
sense of true being, which is presupposed in Descartes's 
argument, is constituted as that which exists 'for us'. 
Clearly Husserl's argument fails. It is inconceivable that an 
alter-ego can draw me out of a solipsist retreat for as long as 
it is constituted by me, even if it is constituted as lying 
beyond me, as accessible only indirectly through analogical 
perception. Since the alter-ego is ultimately still whatever I 
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think it is, the world existing 'for us' will still be my world 
even thought it may have the nominal sense of being 'for us'. If 
the otherness of the other, is constituted by me, then I am not 
the subject in relation to which the other is alter. I am the 
last subject who constitutes both 'myself' and the alter-ego for 
whom the alter-ego is one of its own cogitata. 2 Husser! 
cannot account for the constitution of being because it is 
inconceivable that a transcendental ego could constitute itself 
as mundanized or as embodied. I will always be the last subject, 
the subject which constitutes, not the subject constituted. At 
best I could delude myself that I am embodied, in the world and 
in time, but it is difficult to understand how a last subject 
could delude itself. 
"To say that it is still myself who conceive(s) myself 
as situated in a body and furnished with five senses is 
clearly a purely verbal solution, since I who reflect 
cannot recognize myself in this embodied I, since 
therefore embodiment remains in the nature of the case 
an illusion, and since the possibility of the illusion 
remains incomprehensible." 
" how could the working of my own thought be 
concealed from me, since by definition thought is for 
itself." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:213) 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) It is interesting to see how Harlan's faulty 
conception of Husserl's transcendental ego leads him to 
misinterpret Husserl's account of intersubjectivity. 
Not having put the real world into parentheses, Harlan 
sees the process of analogizing apperception as a real 
process in the world in an ego which is actually 
separated from the other. 
"Because direct access to mental life is restricted 
to the subject of mental life, consciousness of the 
other as another subject must be originally founded 
upon a connection made by the I between his own 
mental life and its external manifestation." 
(1984:89) 
If direct access to mental life is restricted, this would 
never be for Husser! a metaphysical truth which would 
precede and limit phenomenological analysis. As Husser! 
puts it, the distinction between my primordial sphere and 
the primordial sphere of the other are not separated by an 
abyss, the distinction is constituted. 
2) " as universal subject I cease to be a finite 
self, and become an impartial spectator before whom 
the other person and myself, each as an empirical 
being, are on a footing of equality, without my 
enjoying any particular privilege. Of the 
consciousness which I discover by reflection and 
before which everything is an object, it cannot be 
said that it is myself: my self is arrayed before me 
like any other thing, and my consiousness 
constitutes it and is not enclosed within it, so 
that it can without difficulty consitute other 
(my)selves. In God I can be conscious of others as 
of myself, and love others as myself. But the 
subjectivity that we have run up against does not 
admit of being called God ... I can never recognize 
myself as God without necessarily denying what I am 
in fact trying to assert I might love others as 
myself in God, but even then my love of God would 
have to come not from me, and would have to be 
truly, as Spinoza said, the love which God has for 
himself through me. So that finally nowhere would 
there be love of others or indeed others, but one 
single self-love linked to itself beyond our own 
139 
lives, and nowise relevant, indeed inaccessible, to 
us. The act of reflection and love leading to God 
places the God sought outside the realm of 
possibility. Ye are thus brought back to solipsism 
" (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:358/9) 
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THE AUTHENTIC SUBJECT DEMANDS IN PRINCIPLE "THE CONTRADICTION 
OF IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE" 
For Merleau-Ponty, Husserl was unable to account for the 
presence of an alter-ego because he had unconsciously adopted 
what proves to be a formal ideal of truth and certainty, an 
ideal which he traces back to Descartes, an ideal which 
identifies truth with presuppositionlessness, and certainty with 
the transparency of the knowing subject to itself. He was 
therefore committed to what he took to be a complete reduction, 
which meant that the reflecting philosopher had to reveal, as 
the ultimate foundation of all meaning, the acts of a pure 
constituting consciousness, the acts of a subject which enjoyed 
an absolute consciousness of itself, which was perfectly self 
contained, a last subject whose only relation with the world 
is the relation of cogito to cogitatum, a subject without an 
'outside', for whom therefore, there could be no other genuine 
subject. 
"The plurality of consciousness is impossible if I 
have an absolute consciousness of myself ... If it is 
perfect, the contact of my thought with itself seals me 
within myself and prevents me from ever feeling that 
anything eludes my grasp; there is no opening, no 
'aspiration' towards an Other for this self of mine, 
which constructs the totality of being and its own 
presence in the world, which is defined in terms of 
'self possession', and which never finds anything 
outside itself but what it has put there." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:373) 









relativism and subjectivism it could not trace the essences of 
things themselves back to the private, contingent processes of a 
psychological ego, an ego in space and time, whose processes are 
numerically distinct from the things themselves, 
"the two being related to one another merely externally 
by a rigid law." (Husserl, 1969:84) 
But does this imply that phenomenology must be the elucidation 
of a transcendental subject which constitutes its world? Must we 
go from a subject naturata to a subject naturans? 
"And because we assuredly must reject the idea of an 
exterior relation between the perceiving and the 
perceived, must we pass to the antithesis of immanence, 
be it wholly ideal and spiritual, and say that I who 
perceives am the thought of perceiving and the 
perceived world a thing thought? Because perception is 
not centripetal, must it be centrifugal, as is a 
thought I form or the signification I give by judgement 
to an indecisive appearance? " (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968:32) 
Merleau-Ponty's argument would be that if I attempt an unbiased 
reflection on my experience of truth and certainty, whether I 
take that experience of having immediate access to the thing 
itself (which we have seen in the disillusion, as the serviette 
becomes the real object and the vase an illusion), or whether I 
take that moment at the end of a logical argument, in which I 
recognise that P.Q or even that moment, following Descartes, in 
which I come to the conclusion that 'I am', I find that it is 
never an experience of being absolutely self conscious or 
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absolutely transparent to myself. My thoughts and experiences 
take place against a background, or within a situation, which 
determines their meaning and being but which is not constituted 
by me, which is always already there. In any act that I perform, 
even acts of consciousness, reflection and methodic doubt, I am 
saturated through and through with a meaning and being which 
does not have its ground in me, which is bestowed on me from 
another source. 1 Every centrifugal act of constituting meaning 
and being is inseparably centripetal (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:439), 
every "inside" is indistinguishable from its "outside". There is 
for me truth and certainty not in spite of the fact that I am 
opaque to myself but precisely because this sense bestowed on me 
and my acts, does not have its source in me, and precisely 
because the meanings of things and the meaning of being which I 
encounter is 'out of my hands'. My most original experience of 
truth and certainty is an experience of being in a situation 
which is already there, whose foundations cannot be found in me, 
a situation which I allow myself to "rest in" (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:396); a situation which is the background of all my 
thoughts. Speaking about this new idea of truth and being 
situated historically and socially, Merleau-Ponty says: 
"Since we are all hemmed in by history, it is up to us 
to understand that whatever truth we may have is to be 
gotten not in spite of but through our historical 
inherence. Superficially considered, our inherence 
destroys all truth; considered radically it founds a 
new idea of truth ... " (1964:109) 
My inherence in the social and historical is the source of all 
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truth, because authentic truth does not have its source in a 
constituting consciousness, but in a subject existing as a 
social and historical being, i.e., a subject with an outside. 
The last subject, has an outside or a 'body'. This incarnation 
or mundanization cannot be treated as Husserl believes, as a 
cogitatum, for it is that through which there are cogitata and 
through which there is certainty and truth. 
"In so far as, when I reflect on the essence of 
subjectivity, I find it bound up with that of the body 
and that of the world, this is because my existence as 
subjectivity is merely one with my existence as a body 
and with the existence of the world, and because the 
subject that I am, when taken concretely, is 
inseparable from this body and this world." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:408) 
I am not self contained, I am beyond myself an alienated self, a 
self in ec-stase in being because every act of consciousness 
throws me beyond myself as the source of meaning and being, 
because my contact with myself is not the transparency of 
thought to itself, not the immediate relation of the binding to 
the bound, but presupposes an openness to the world, an ec-stase 
in being and time. 
Let us begin with that vivid experience of truth which we have 
in the dis-illusion, the experience in which the serviette takes 
over the ontological function, to emerge in front of me as the 
concrete real object. Ve will return later to the other 
intellectual truths, and we will attempt to show that all truths 
are ultimately perceptual, just like all consciousness is 
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ultimately perceptual consciousness. My most original encounter 
with being itself, that encounter which is always surreptitious-
ly presupposed in solipsist arguments, is never an encounter 
with being 'face on'. Because I am not a nothingness, being 
always emerges in and through a concrete context or against an 
horizon which I do not constitute but which envelopes me. Ve 
have argued above that what characterises the experience of the 
dis-illusion is that I am not confined to signs indicating the 
presence of a real object. It is the ontological function, the 
true being of the serviette itself that is encountered. This 
means that the serviette itself could not be numerically 
distinct from my experience of it, it could not genuinely 
transcend me. Yet, we have also seen that true being could not 
be constituted by me, that unless it escaped me in some way it 
would not be real. The being of the object is neither inferred 
from signs nor is ita cogitatum to which I have an immediate 




itself' or 'announces itself through its 
(1931:160). "Ve must not substitute the 
of a sign or an image for a perception" 
(1931:136). There is for example no pure datum of whiteness, it 
is always the whiteness of something in the world such as the 
whiteness of a starched linen serviette. It is not as if there 
is one configuration of white which was at first taken to be the 
white of a vase and now, the white of a serviette. As the 
serviette emerges and the vase disappears there are no data 
which have remained unchanged. 
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The phenomenon teaches us that we can no longer distinguish 
between form and content and ultimately between the appearance 
of an object and its presence or being. This means both, that we 
must reject any notion of a pure appearance, since, all data 
have a 'depth, in that something announces itself through them, 
and it means that we must reject any direct encounter with being 
'face on', for the real object always announces itself through 
appearances. 
"The 'things' in naive experience are evident as 
perspectival beings: it is essential to them, both to 
offer themselves without interposed milieu and to 
reveal themselves only gradually and never completely 
I grasp in a perspectival appearance, which I 
know is only one of its possible aspects, the thing 
itself which transcends it." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:187) 
Neither realism which puts 'true being' absolutely beyond the 
realm of experience and thought, nor transcendental idealism 
which attempts to deal with being as a cogitatum can account for 
our authentic experience of being. 
Similarly, we cannot distinguish between the apparent shape and 
the true shape of the object. The sides of the cube for example, 
that I see in front of me, do not appear as diamond shaped 
figures. The cube shows itself through these visible sides 
making them "squares seen at an angle". I do not have to take 
into account the angle from which I am perceiving the object, in 
order to reconstruct in my mind its true shape, because I am not 
limited to a distorted projection which would need to be 
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interpreted. 
"The sides of the cube are not projections of it, but 
precisely sides. Vhen I perceive them successively, 
with the app~arance they present in different 
perspectives, I do not construct the idea of the flat 
projection which accounts for these perspectives; the 
cube is already there in front of me and reveals itself 
through them." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:204) 
Every element of the object presents itself in terms of its 
relationship with the object as a whole. The simplest datum is a 
figure against a background. Any attempt to isolate an element of 
the object· such as its colour, its side or even its appearance as 
opposed to the object itself, merely places these elements against 
a new background and so transforms them. It is possible for me to 
perceive the sides of the cube as diamond shaped either by closing 
one eye, or by screening off the rest of the object, but this does 
not imply that natural perception is built up out of these diamond 
shaped artificial creations. It is therefore impossible to isolate 
any part of the perceived object, or the perceived world, in the 
same way that we can cut a photograph of an object into pieces. 
The perceived object is a 'Gestalt', a whole that does not reduce 
itself to the sum of its parts (Herleau-Ponty, 1968:204). The 
Gestalt is not spread out in space, partes extra partes as are the 
pieces of a photograph. 
Nor for that matter is it spread out in time, seen as an 
infinite series of now moments. As we have seen the real object 
lasts through time, and just as the perceived cube cannot be 
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constructed out of diamond shaped figures, so it cannot be 
reduced to an infinite series of instantaneous snap shots. 
"The Gestalt is not a spatio - temporal individual, it 
is ready to integrate itself into a constellation that 
spans space and time - but it is not free in regard to 
space and time, it is not aspatial, atemporal, it only 
escapes the time and space conceived as a series of 
events in themselves .... " (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:205) 
This wholism or Gestalt of the object is not only incompatible 
with empiricism and its theory of sense data, but also with 
transcendental phenomenology. Vhat characterises the experience 
of the thing itself is the phenomenon of self giving or 
selbstgegebenheit. If the object 'announces itself' or gives 
itself, then the original or 'last' experience of the world 
involves an inalienable element of passivity on the part of the 
perceiving subject. In the Logical Investigations Husser! had 
described the objective of phenomenology as a return to the 
things themselves, "zu den Sachen selbst". The informal essence 
was encountered in a Vesenschau or categorical intuition, not in 
the relation of thought to its object. If however we accept, 
with Husser! of Cartesian Meditations, that the being of the 
world is constituted, then the notion of Selbstgegebenheit must 
be superceded by that of constitution or Sinngebung. 
"The notion of presence in flesh and blood seems to 
introduce a disparate factor, self (selbst) of the 
object (be this object a thing, a value, a state of 
relation), which 'fulfills' a void, keeps a promise. 
The thing is present itself. Has not the idealistic 
interpretation of 'sense' destroyed the possibility of 
there being a 'Selbst' of the thing?" (Ricoeur, 
1967:102) 
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Vhat Merleau-Ponty argues is that this 'Selbstgegebenheit' can 
never be treated as a 'Sinn' that this announcing of itself 
through its appearances, which results in the phenomenon being 
an irreducible 'Gestalt', cannot be the cogitatum of an 'I 
think'. 
" the perception of ... the Gestalt cannot be a 
centrifugal Sinngebung, the imposition of an essence, 
or vor-stellen ... " (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:181) 
Ve have said that the simplest datum is a figure against a 
background, but since this background in its turn is what it is 
for perception because it is against yet another background, 
there is ultimately no pure datum, no possibility that the 
subject could contemplate in front of himself a pure phenomenon, 
since the ultimate background is the world in which he is 
enveloped, from which he cannot extricate himself. 
"The natural world is the horizon of all horizons ... " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:330) 
"Ve are involved in the world and we do not succeed in 
extricating ourselves from it in order to achieve 
consciousness of the world." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:5) 
"To be conscious = to have a figure on a ground - one 
cannot go back any further." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:191) 
The informal essence, or the physiognomy of the thing can only 
be encountered by a subject which is part of the scene he 
encounters. My body is a member of every Gestalt. The Gestalt is 
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not simply a whole which I encounter in front of me but a whole 
which envelopes me, both in terms of its temporal and spatial 
span. 
"My body is a Gestalt and is 






If ever an object were absolutely present to me so that I 
encountered it 'face on', so that I possessed it in its 
entirety, instead of some of its aspects being only 'meant from 
afar' (Husserl, 1969:10) or implying an horizon which is not 
possessed, it would no longer form a Gestalt and there ~vould no 
longer be a Selbst of the thing. 
"Matter is pregnant with its form. 'Which is to say that 
in the final analysis every perception takes place 
within a certain horizon and ultimately in the 
'world'." (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 12) 
For example, we have seen that the real object, unlike the image 
or the illusion, exists through time or spans time. If, I 
encounter the object itself, (in its Selbstgegebenheit), I must 
encounter its 'being-there-before-I-encountered-it'. 'Whenever I 
perceive the object it is always 'already there'. 
"Vhat distinguishes intentionality from the Kantian 
relation to a possible is that the unity of the world, 
before being posited by knowledge in a specific act of 
identification is 'lived' as ready-made or already 
there." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:xvii) 
"Vhen I find again the actual world such as it is ... I 
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find a visibility older than my operations or my 
acts." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:123) 
Certainly the past cannot actually precede my present 
perception, for then I could not encounter its being already 
there. I would only have signs in the present referring to the 
past, and the real object would not announce itself to me. If 
this 'preceding me' is not real, could it be constituted by me ? 
Could I constitute myself as being in the present, and being 
preceded by a past? No, for then it would not precede me the 
last, constituting consciousness. I have an immediate relation 
with the objects of my thought; if the past were constituted by 
me it would not be 'past'. Unless the past escaped me in some 
way, unless I could have access to the past only by 'reaching 
through a layer of time,' it would not be past (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:416/7). Since it is inconceivable that anything could 
escape a pure Sinngebung, the subject that encounters the 
'already there' of the object, cannot be the constituter of the 
past. For the world to be 'already there' I must be in the 
present and yet capable of reaching out to the past, without 
possessing it, I must be able to precede myself, or as 
Merleau-Ponty puts it "steal a march on myself" (1962:360). 
There could therefore be no Selbst of the thing for a pure 
consciousness. If the Gestalt "spans" time, then every 






if it is true that the object shows itself through 
shows its true shape and size, then I must not only 
and outlasted by the object, I must be in tRe world 
and surrounded. In some way I must be in space, and yet able to 
reach the distant object without any distorted projections, such 
as apparent size and apparent shape. 
This is brought out clearly in the, perception of depth and the 
perception of objects placed at an angle to me. Ve have seen 
above that the perceptual synthesis of the thread is not 
reducible to two monocular images plus the hypothesis that the 
actual thread is 30cm. from me. '0ne-single-thread-30cm.-from-
me' is an irreducible Gestalt. It has been argued that a man 
standing four meters from me "appears" smaller than when he 
stands immediately in front of me. But what is this apparent 
size? Is it a genuine element in my perceptual experience or is 
it an artificial creation? If I am asked what size the man at 
four meters appears to have for me, I can answer only if I am 
allowed to close one eye, and hold up something, such as my 
thumb. I am then able to measure this perceived man against the 
length of my perceived thumb. In so doing, I have not simply 
cancelled the results of an interpretation process, to reveal 
the original components of my perceptual field. On the contrary, 
I have managed to see the man and my thumb as if they were 
equidistant from me. I have therefore flattened out my 
perceptual field at a certain distance from me, causing sizes to 
appear in a single plane where they can be compared. Previously 
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size had attached itself to the object there where it was in the 
distance. In genuine binocular perception the man four meters 
away, is neither smaller nor the same size as when he is 
directly in front of me. 
" he is anterior to equality and inequality, he is 
the same man seen from further away." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:261) 
'The same man seen from further away' is an irreducible 
phenomenon, which means that my perception of the man cannot be 
distinguished from a complementary perception of myself, as seen 
from the outside, situated in the world at a certain distance 
from the man. The presence of the man to me is inseparable from 
my presence in the world. The more carefully I devote myself 
exclusively to my experience, the more I discover myself in the 
world, as seen from the outside. 
"As soon as I see, it is necessary that the vision (as 
is so well indicated by the double meaning of the word) 
be doubled with a complementary vision or with another 
vision: myself seen from without, such as another would 
see me, installed in the midst of the visible, occupied 
in considering it from a certain spot." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968:134) 
Similarly in the perception of a circular plate placed at an 
angle to me, I do not perceive the image of an ellipse and then 
interpret from this image and from the angle at which I am 
perceiving, the original circular shape of the plate. I perceive 
neither an ellipse nor a perfect circle. 'The circular plate 
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perceived from an angle' is an irreducible phenomenon. 
"And finally it is why a disc placed obliquely to our 
face resists geometrical perspective, as Cezanne and 
other painters have shown by depicting a soup plate 
seen from the side with the inside still visible .... 
The constancy of the circular shape in a plate is not 
the resistance of the circle to the flattening of 
perspective, and this is why the painter who can 
represent it only by a real outline on a real canvas 
surprises the viewer, although he is trying to render 
perspective as experienced." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:260/1) 
Vhat the painter tries to represent with a real line and real 
canvas, is not something that forms an object in front of me, it 
is the presence of the viewer in the scene which he views. 
"Thus the seer is caught up in what he sees, it is 
still himself he sees: there is a fundamental 
narcissism of all v1s1on. And thus, for the same 
reason, the vision he exercises, he also undergoes from 
the things, such that, as many painters have said, I 
feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is 
equally passivity ... so that the seer and the visible 
reciprocate one another and we no longer know which 
sees and which is seen." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:139) 
"Inevitably the roles between him (the painter) and the 
visible are reversed. That is why so many painters have 
said that things look at them. As Andre Marchand says, 
after Klee: "In a forest, I have felt many times over 
that it was not I who looked at the forest. Some days I 
felt that the trees were looking at me, ... I think the 
painter must be penetrated by the universe and not want 
to penetrate it ... I expect to be inwardly submerged, 
buried. Perhaps I paint to break out." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964:167) 
In the experience of "the same man seen at a distance" or "the 
circular plate seen at an angle" we have the paradoxical 
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synthesis of a centrifugal and centripetal relation to the 
world. 'From the inside' and 'from the outside' are inseparable, 
they turn about each other. A philosophy which would take as its 
theme "the same man seen at a distance" would have to situate 
itself within the subject and in the world simultaneously. At 
the moment when I perceive the true size of the man or the true 
shape of the plate, meaning and being are imposed on me from 
another source. Perceiving the world or an object is comparable 
to perceiving someone looking at me. Vhile his perception of me 
does not reduce me to an object it does insure that I do not 
have a sovereign possession of anything I see, that my 
experience is not reducible to 'contents'. 2 
" it is possible to perceive a smile, or even a 
sentiment in this smile, without the colours or the 
lines which "compose" the face, as one says, be:tng 
present to consciousness or given in an 
unconsciousness. Thus, the frequently noted fact that 
we can know a physiognomy perfectly without knowing the 
colour of the eyes or of the hair, the form of the 
mouth or of the face should be taken quite literally." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1967:166) 
"Just as we do not see the eyes of a familiar face, hut 
simply its look and its expression, so we perceive 
hardly any object." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:281) 
"The truth is that there are no things, only 
physiognomies ... 'In nature', says Goya, 'there are 
as few colours as lines." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:168) 
It now appears that the physiognomy and the informal essence 
which I have presented as the central issue for phenomenology, 
not only presupposes that we reject notions of perception and 
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consciousness for as long as these are understood as 
relationships to contents such as data, or objects of 
consciousness, but it also presupposes that we overcome the 
dilemma which compromised Husserl's attempt to account for the 
presence of other subjects and ultimately his attempt to account 
for the being of the world. The encounter with a physiognomy, as 
its name suggests is an encounter with my being encountered. If 
my body is co-present in every Gestalt then perception is a 
relationship in the world, rather than an intuition of data or a 
consciousness of objects. 
If we insist on asking how I experience or come to be aware of 
the world's consciousness of me, we would be unfaithful to our 
most original experience of truth and certainty. 3 Instead of 
allowing the experience to teach us the informal but authentic 
essence of being in truth, we would be suppressj_ng the 
experience, subjecting it to the formal assumptions of 
traditional thought. We would be assuming that I am a centre of 
experiences and thoughts, and that before anything can count for 
me, it would have to figure in that centre, we would be assuming 
that the totality of being, and my own presence in the world is 








proper operation of 
or potential." (Lauer, 
but if it is true that 'the same man seen at a distance', 'a 
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circular plate seen at an angle', 'the world being already 
there', are irreducible phenomena, then having an outside, being 
in space and time, cannot be grounded in an operation of 
consciousness. They are phenomena which demand the collapse of 
the distinction between inside and outside, between what I am 
for myself and what I am for the world. They are phenomena which 
demand a subject whose inside is its outside, a subject vrhich is 
for example, through and through spatial, whose spatiality is 
not one of its cogitata, not due to a 'proper operation of 
consciousness', but a spatiality which enters on 'this' side of 
consciousness, so that it is consciousness itself that is 
spatial, so that any reflection on my experience of the world 
leads me back to my being spatially situated in the world. Vhile 
traditional realism describes the world and the perceiver from 
the outside, or from an external point of view, idealism takes 
up its point of view within the perceiving subject. Vhat my 
experience of being in truth reveals however is that these two 
points of view cease to be mutually exclusive. It is not a 
question of absorbing the view from the inside into the view 
from the outside as is done in empiricism and psychologism which 
sees the images as a domain within the real world and perceptual 
processes as events in the psyche, in space and time."• Nor is 
it a question of absorbing my outside, my body into the point of 
view from the inside as is done by Husser!, in his theory of 
mundanization. 5 
"Such is the 
account for. 
total situation that a philosophy must 
It will do so only by admitting that as 
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Hegel said to retire into oneself is also to leave 
oneself." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:49) 
"One of its 'results' [Husserl's inquiry] is the 
realization that the movement of return to ourselves -
of 're-entering ourselves', St. Augustine said- is as 
if rent by an inverse movement which it elicits. 
Husser! rediscovers that the identity of 're-entering 
self' and 'going-outside self' which, for Hegel, 
defined the absolute." (Merleau-Ponty,1964(b):161) 
"Ve do not have to choose between a philosophy that 
installs itself in the world itself or in the other and 
a philosophy which installs itself 'in us', between a 
philosophy that takes our experience 'from within' and 
a philosophy ... that would judge it from without ... " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968:160) 
"Inside and outside are 
wholly inside and I 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:407) 
inseparable. The 
am wholly outside 
world is 
myself." 
"there is inside and outside turning about one 
another." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:264) 
The reduction will not lead us back to pure immanence but to 
this irreducible inside and outside turning about one another, 
which we refer to as being-beyond-oneself, or being-in-the-
world. If I attempt to reflect on my experience of dis-illusion, 
of the emergence of the serviette as the true object, I find 
that this experience is synonymous with a certain "awakening" to 
the situation or a certain projection of myself into the 
situation. 
" to say that I have a view of it [the cube] is to 
say that, in perceiving it, I go from myself into it, I 
go out of myself into it. I, my view, are caught up 
in the same carnal world with it." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968:202) 
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"We can effect the passage [from monocular to synergic 
30 perception ] by looking, by awakening to the world: 
we cannot witness it as spectators" (Herleau-Ponty, 
1968:8) 
But this awakening or projection is not simply a cogitatum, it 
is not simply what I think it is. When I awake to find that I am 
not standing in front of the fireplace but that I am lying in 
bed, and that "it has all been a dream", it is not at all as if 
I have simply changed one set of cogitata for another. I wake up 
to the world which is an act I perform in the world, an act 
which is more than what I think it is, more than what it is for 
me, because in that movement I am thrown beyond the private 
world of 'for me', beyond the immanence of consciousness into 
the world itself. 
"The fact is that if we want to describe it, we must 
say that my experience breaks forth into things and 
transcends itself in them." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:303) 
"Consciousness defined by its intentionality bursts 
outwards, moves to where things are." (Ricoeur, 1967:6) 
This is why, although we begin our research by reflecting on an 
experience, such as the experience of depth or of the 
dis-illusion, we are not necessarily doomed to a subjective or 
an Idealist account of the world. The resolution to ask of 
experience itself its secret is not an idealist commitment, 
because consciousness and experience burst outwards beyond 
themselves so that an unbiased reflection on experience can lead 
us to the most concrete grasp of what lies beyond the realm of 
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experience (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:159). The phenomenological 
philosopher, 
"abides at the point where the passage from the self 
into the world and into the other is effected, at the 
crossing of the avenues." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:160) 
I say that I am thrown beyond the immanence of consciousness 
because at this moment, I am more sure that I am awake and 
in the world, than I am sure that I think I am awake or think 
that I am in the world. My certainty that I am awake cannot be 
traced back to an indubitable thought that I am awake. On the 
contrary I am sure that I think, rather than hallucinate or 
dream, because I am sure that I am awake and in the world. My 
certainty that I am in the world and not in the realm of dreams, 
is not based on it being the most likely hypothesis, on the 
contrary, I am confident that I evaluate hypotheses rationally 
and consistently because I am sure that I am awake and in the 
world. 
" ... it is because first I believe in the world and in 
the things, that I believe in the order and connection 
of my thoughts." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:50) 
" beneath affirmation and negation, beneath 
judgement, it is our experience, prior to every 
opinion, of inhabiting the world by our body ... " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968:28) 
Certainty is thus not originally an attribute of thoughts or 
thinking, but of modes of being and acting in the world. 
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"My love, hatred and will are not certain as mere 
thoughts about loving, hating and willing; on the 
contrary the whole certainty of these thoughts is oved 
to that of the acts of love, hatred or will of which I 
am quite sure because I perform them." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:382) 
It is absurd for me to doubt the existence of the vorld or 
consider the possibility that I may be dreaming, for the 
authentic question will always be whether I genuinely doubt or 
genuinely consider possibilities. We distinguish between 
dreaming and being awake, not as two sets of cogitations which 
are respectively false and true, but as two modes of existence. 
The reality of the world or the true being of the serviette, its 
ontological function, are not objects of thought, but 'objects' 
that correspond to a certain mode of being in the world. The 
reality of the serviette or of the world is neither inferred 
from signs nor is it constituted, it is 'awakened to'. A 
reduction carried out on this experience of the reality of the 
serviette would not reveal an act of consciousness, but this 
mode of being in the world which is awakening to, or being awake 
to, the world. This is why "the same man seen at a distance" and 
"a circular plate seen from an angle" are irreducible phenomena. 
I am more sure of seeing, when seeing is an act in the world 
directed towards its object, than I am sure that I think I 
perceive. 
"It is through my relation to 'things' that I know 
myself; inner perception follows afterwards " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:383) 
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The reduction will always lead back to this 'relation to things' 
or to my 'being-in-the-world' and consciousness, rather than 
being that through which there is anything at all, will be shown 
to be secondary. 
" it is not the 'I am' which is pre-eminently 
contained in the 'I think', not my existence which is 
brought down to the consciousness which I have of it, 
but conversely the 'I think', which is re-integrated 
into the transcending process of the 'I am' and 




1) In contrast to Busserl where, 
"Unities of meaning presuppose a sense-giving 
consciousness which, on its side, is absolute and 
not dependent in its turn on sense bestowed on it 
from another source." (1931:168) 
2) The interaction with the world is therefore far more muted 
3) 
than Sartre in Being and Nothingness thought possible 
"I can not therefore direct my attention on the look 
without at the same stroke causing my perception to 
decompose and pass into the background •.• This is 
because to perceive is to look at, and to apprehend 
a look is not to apprehend a look-as-object in the 
world (unless the look is not directed upon us) it 
is to be conscious of being looked at." (Sartre, 
1969:258) 
Unfortunately Herleau-Ponty sometimes resorts to some 
careless expressions, 
"The looks with which I scan the world like a 
blindman tapping objects with his cane, are seized 
by someone at the other end and sent back to touch 
me in turn. It is no longer enough for me to feel: 
I feel that someone feels me." (1973:134) 
"And thus, for the same reason the vision he 
exercises, he also undergoes from the things, such 
that as many painters have said, I feel myself 
looked at by things." (1968:139) 
which have lead commentators like Sallis to similar 
misleading expressions, 
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"In seeing a thing, the thing reflects back to me 
an image of myself seeing it; the thing, in its very 
way of presenting itself to my seeing, points to 
that place from which it is seen, points to the 
seer's position in the midst of the visible, thereby 
reflecting back to the seer an image of himself as 
so positioned." (Sallis, 1973:91) 
"Sent back to touch me", "feel myself looked at" "reflects 
back to me", are all incompatible with the general thesis 
of man as ec-stase, and tempt us to think of this 
phenomenon in terms of a reconstruction or reception of an 
image of myself seen from the outside within the immanence 
of consciousness. 
Similarly in trying to argue that authentic truth has its 
ground in the social and historical subject rather than in 
a pure transparent consciousness, Merleau-Ponty uses the 
notion of "taking for granted". 
" a self evident truth is irresistible in fact, 
yet always questionable, which amounts to two ways 
of saying the same thing: namely, that it is 
irresistible because I take for granted a certain 
acquisition of experience, a certain field of 
thought .•. " (1962:396) 
Sallis says much the same thing, 
"Indeed, this is not to deny that, in fact, I have 
experience of truths, that I experience certain 
truths as self-evident. But such experience always 
occurs against the background of what I already 
believe, have already acquired ... Thus there are 
self-evident truths but only in the sense of truths 
which are self-evident in so far as I take for 
granted a certain acquisition, a certain 
internalized sedimentation: ... " (1973:100/1) 
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But there can be no suggestion that my being in the world, 
my being in my society and history, can be understood in 
terms of assuming that certain things are true, either 
consciously or unconsciously. All my acts, even acts of 
taking things for granted, assuming or believing that such 
and such is the case, will only be genuine acts if they 
take place against a background, if they have an outside. 
Notions of 'taking for granted', of 'beliefs' whether 
thematized or unthematized whether conceptual or 
pre-conceptual, still suggest that being-in-the-world can 
be traced back to immanence. If we reject the rationalist 
identification of truth with presuppositionlessness, it 
does not imply that I am entitled to make assumptions, it 
implies that truth and certainty refer to modes of 
being-in-the-world, of awakening to the world, that the 
subject of truth is an incarnate subject. 
4) " ... the empiricist philosopher considers a subject 
x in the act of perceiving and tries to describe 
what happens: there are sensations which are the 
subject's states or manners of being and, in virtue 
of this, genuine mental things." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:207) 
5) "Ve do not say that ... the subject thinks himself 
inseparable from the idea of his body and the idea 
of the world: for if it were a matter of no more 
than a conceived relationship, it would ipso facto 
leave the absolute independence of the subject as a 
thinker intact and the subject would not be in a 
situation." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:408) 
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CONSCIOUSNESS IS IN THE FIRST PLACE NOT A MATTER OF 'I THINK 
THAT' BUT OF 'I CAN' (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1962:137) 
There is an important sense in which we have thus far, not so 
much resolved Husserl's problem of accounting for the existence 
of another transcendental subject, but simply generalized it. 
The existence of others is no longer a problem because +:he last 
subject is always already in the world, is its outside, is in 
some sense its body in space and in time. But if it is true that 
the affirmation of an alien consciousness would immediately turn 
my experience into a private spectacle and cause me to lose the 
assurance of having access to the world itself, how can I claim 
that it is the world itself that I see and that it is I the 
seer, that the world sees? How can I have an access to the world 
itself, be the last subject and yet have an outside. Ve have 
seen that consciousness must in some sense be in space and in 
time, but in Euclidean space of partes extra partes and 
objective time as an infinite series of 'now' moments, 
consciousness would be fractured into parts and the only 
relationships possible between those parts would be external. 
How can space and time enter on 'this' side of consciousness 
without cutting it off from the world and from itself. It would 
certainly be inconceivable for my perception of the world to be 
synonymous with the world's perception of me, if my perception 
is taken as the representation of data or objects, and the 
world's perception of me, reveal me as a physiological entity. 
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"The Yeltlichkeit of minds is ensured by the roots they 
push forth, not in the Cartesian space, to be sure " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968:216) 
"He has his place not in that objective space, which, 
as Descartes has said, is without mind, but " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973:138) 
"As far as the body is concerned, even the body of 
another, we must learn to distinguish it from the 
objective body as set forth in works on physiology. 
This is not the body which is capable of being 
inhabited by a consciousness ... How significance and 
intentionality could come to dwell in molecular 
edifices or masses of cells is a thing which can never 
be made comprehensible, and here Cartesianism is right" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:351) 
Since the "I think" must always be followed by its object, the 
cogitatum, the encounter with the physiognomy <md the 
integration of consciousness into existence would be 
inconceivable if consciousness were conceived as an "I think". 
If I am fundamentally an "I think" it would be inconceivable 
that I could be more sure of being in the world than that I 
think I am in the world, and the contradiction of immanence and 
transcendence would ultimately defy thought and all our 
descriptions would be quite meaningless (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:365). 
But a closer examination of perception will reveal a new 
approach to the subject and its world, an approach that will 
point towards a resolution of these antinomies (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:351). For example, we will see that the subject is not 
primarily an "I think" but an "I can" and that the world and the 
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body are not in Cartesian space but "in" a space of purpose, a 
space in which the ultimate meaning and being of distance and 
orientation are synonymous with my purposeful orientation 
towards my tasks in the world. 
Vhat is important about "having" and ilbeing" an outside is that 
objects transcend me, that objects are not whatever I take them 
to be. Although it is the object itself, and not a private image 
of it that I encounter, nevertheless the object is not a 
cogitatum because it eludes me or escapes from me in some 
way. 
"The aseity of the thing, its unchallengeable presence 
and perpetual absence into which it withdraws, are two 
'inseparable aspects of transcendence. Intellectualism 
overlooks both ... "(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:233) 
"If the thing itself were reached, it would be from 
that moment arrayed before us and stripped of its 
mystery. It would cease to exist as a thing at the very 
moment when we thought to possess it. Vhat makes the 
reality of the thing is therefore precisely what 
snatches it from our grasp" (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:233) 
"The perceptual thing, offering itself always through 
some particular aspect or other, thereby presents 
itself as simultaneously holding itself in reserve -
that is, as not reducible to what it is for - me, as 
surpassing what it offers to my gaze, as transcendent: 
'the thing holds itself aloof from us and remains 
self-sufficient'"· (Sallis, 1973:39) 
This elusiveness of the world cannot be conceived in a realistic 
manner. 1 I cannot think of myself as a psychological ego 
genuinely transcended by the world, for as such an ego, I could 
have no original experience of this elusiveness. I would be 
confined to signs that the real world lay beyond my experiences, 
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and hence I would not encounter the reality of the world. 2 On 
the other hand however, nor could the elusiveness of the object 
be given to me as it itself, for then the elusive object, would 
not elude me, it would only have the nominal sense of an elusive 
object and as such I would be in full possession of it. The 
object must elude me as the last subject, it is not an 
'eluding-me' for me, but an eluding me 'eluding-me'. 3 This 
paradox is brought out clearly in the experience of depth and 
the experience of an object retreating from me. Let us return to 
our example of the binocular perception of the thread. As we 
have pointed out, the moment both eyes are focussed on the 
thread the monocular images "fall back" of their own and 
disappear into the real concrete thread. 
"Monocular images float vaguely in front of things 
having no real place in the world; then suddenly they 
fall back towards a certain location and are swallowed 
up in it, as ghosts, at day break, repair towards the 
rift in the earth which let them forth." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:233) 
Speaking about the perception of a drawing done in perspective, 
i.e. where distant objects are drawn smaller than those close 
by, Merleau-Ponty says that; 
"The perspective drawing is not first of all perceived 
as a drawing on a plane surface, and then organized in 
depth. The lines which sweep towards the horizon are 
not not first given as oblique, and then thought of as 
horizontal. The whole of the drawing strives towards 
its equilibrium by delving in depth. The poplar on the 
road which is drawn smaller than a man, succeeds in 
becoming really and truly a tree only by retreating 
towards the horizon. It is the drawing itself which 
tends towards depth as a stone falls downwards." 
(1962:262) 
169 
But what is this "falling back" or "retreating" ? As we have 
seen this is not something I infer from signs. I do not for one 
moment believe there has been an actual falling back of the real 
thread in the real world. But if it is not a real "falling back" 
is it the falling back of an image? Since images are conceived 
of as "subjective" (or as private phenomena) and hence as 
equidistant from me. The "falling back" is neither an image nor 
a cogitatum, it is not one of my contents, it is not a "falling 
back" for me and I could never limit myself to a description 
of the pure phenomenon of "falling back" because it is a 
"falling back" from me not from me as a thing in the 
world, but from me as the last subject. The falling back of the 
thread is the emergence of its eluding me, its being more than 
what it is for me, its being snatched from my total possession. 
Speaking about the perception of depth Merleau-Ponty says, 
"Vhen I look at a road which sweeps before me towards 
the horizon, I must not say either that the sides of 
the road are given to me as convergent or that they are 
given to me as parallel: they are parallel in depth. 
The perspective appearance is not posited, but neither 
is the parallelism. I am engrossed in the road 
itself, and I cling to it through its virtual 
distortion, and depth is this intention itself which 
posits neither the perspective projection of the road, 
nor the 'real' road." (1962:261) 
and speaking about the perception of a retreating object he 
says; 
"Taking the various 'apparent sizes' of the retreating 
object, it is not necessary to link them in a synthesis 
if none of them has been specifically posited. Ve 
'have' the retreating object, we never cease to 'hold' 
it and to have a grip on it, and the increasing 
distance is not, as breadth appears to be, an 
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augmenting externality: it expresses merely that the 
thing is beginning to slip away from the grip of our 
gaze and is less closely allied to it. Distance is what 
distinguishes this loose and approximate grip from the 
complete grip which is proximity." (1962:261) 
Clearly these descriptions presuppose the suspension of our 
belief in the existence of a real world, real space and of a 
real psychological ego. Merleau-Ponty is not simply describing a 
private experience which would signify an actual distance in 
the world. If he says that proximity is the complete grip, he 
does not mean to say that there is an experience of proximity, 
such as the experience of the proportionately large size of the 
retinal image , which would represent an actual state of affairs 
in the world, such as a set of actual relations between my 
organs of grasping and the object, which from an external point 
of view could be judged as a complete grip. Nor on the other 
hand does he mean that there is an experience of the complete 
grip, such as an experience of kinesthetic sensations in the 
grasping organs, associations and projections of kinesthetic 
sensations and images, which would be a sign of the object's 
proximity. 
It is clear that for Merleau-Ponty the relationship with the 
world expressed in "I cling to the road", "I am engrossed in the 
road it-self", I "have" the retreating object, and "the thing is 
beginning to slip from the grip of our gaze", are all 'original' 
relationships, they are relationships between the last subject 
and its world. Realism will always misconstrue the grasping 
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relation because it insists on seeing both the grasp and the 
perceiving subject's experience of his own grasp as real events 
in the world numerically distinct from the object grasped. In so 
doing it surreptitiously introduces another subject whose 
perspective is last and which opens up to the world itself. For 
Merleau-Ponty the grasping and clinging relations, like the acts 
of the transcendental ego are not relations within the world 
since they are that through which there is a world. If I reflect 
on a real act of grasping such as grasping the telephone 
receiver in my right hand, I will not be led back to a 
perceiving and thinking subject, one which infers and controls 
the positions of its hand on the basis of kinesthetic 
experiences and representations of the world. I will find that 
for him who grasps, grasping is a way of being present to the 
object or making the object present to himself. It is an 
original relation because it can bring about this presence 
without internal or external perceptions, without represent-
ations, images or thoughts. 
"The plunge into action is from the subject's point of 
view, an original way of relating himself to the 
object, and is on the same footing as perception." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:110/1) 
Similarly, perception is a form of grasping and visual 
perception is a grasping with the gaze, not an intuition of 







is a certain power of making contact 
not a screen on which they are 
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projected. The relation of my eye to the object is not 
given to me in the form of a geometrical projection of 
the object in the eye, but as it were a hold taken by 
my eye upon the object, indistinct in marginal vision, 
but closer and more definite when I focus upon the 
object." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:279) 
Both the real act of grasping, such as grasping the telephone 
receiver, and the act of perception manifest the same 
originating relation to the world, which is why De ~Taelhens 
argues that The Structure of Behaviour and the Phenomenology 
of Perception are devoted to the same object. 4 
For he who grasps, whether he grasps with his hands or vrith his 
gaze, there is no numerical distinction between the grasp and 
the object grasped, just as there is no numerical distinction 
between the proximity of an object and the completeness of the 
grip of the gaze (1962:261). If we ask what is depth, or, what 
is my most original experience of depth, i.e. what is depth for 
me when I experience depth itself as opposed to images, signs or 
definitions of depth, the answer, Merleau-Ponty suggests, is 
that depth is the measure of the grip of my gaze. The "falling 
back" of the object in binocular perception, which is the 
emergence of its being a real object situated at a certain 
distance from me, is the gearing of the grip of my gaze on its 
object. In his discussion of Stratton's experiment, "Vision 
without Inversion", Merleau-Ponty tries to reveal the meaning 
and being of orientation, of upright and inverted. As with 
"falling back" my experience of upright and inverted cannot be 
explained in terms of the orientation of images or perceptual 
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data, nor can it be constituted by a pure last subject for whom 
space is one of its objects. The conclusion he comes to is that 
in our most original encounter with orientation, orientation 
expresses the hold our body has on its object or on its world. 
"Vhat counts for the orientation of the spectacle is 
not my body as it in fact is as a thing in objectj_ve 
space, but as a system of possible actions, a virtual 
body with its phenomenal 'place' defined by its task 
and situation." (1962:249/50) 
" the vertical and horizontal too are ultimately 
to be defined as the best hold our body can take upon 
the world." (1962:267) 
Similarly, speaking about the sizes of objects and their 
distances from me Merleau-Ponty says, 
"Vhen we say that an object is huge or tiny, nearby or 
far away, it is often without any comparison, even 
implicit, with any other object, or even with the size 
and objective position of our own body, but merely in 
relation to a certain 'scope' of our gestures, a 
certain 'hold' of the phenomenal body on its 
surroundings." (1962:266) 
This is not an anthropomorphism, it is not an association of 
kinesthetic and other experiences of a hold on my objects, with 
their size distance or orientation, so that we are still free to 
ask what distance, size and orientation are in themselves. Ve 
are in the process of trying to reveal our most authentic 
experience of reality, i.e. of anything in itself. Like distance 
orientation and size, the reality of the object expresses the 
fact that it holds itself aloof from me, that it is never fully 
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possessed, that it is an object grasped either by my gaze or my 
hand, rather than being an object for consciousness. If with the 
aid of the reduction we reflect on our experience of distance, 
size, orientation and ultimately reality, we will be lead back 
not to a constituting consciousness relating to itself~ but to 
an embodied subject defined by its grasping and clinging 
relation to its world. 
I am not primarily an "I think" but an "I can". I am more sure 
that I grasp, or that my grasp is beginning to slip, than I am 
sure that I have certain kinesthetic sensations or that I think 
that I grasp. To account therefore, for my experience of 
distance, size orientation etc., there is no necessity to 
explain how I come to know or experience myself as a grasping 
being in the world, because the grasping body is not an external 
instrument, but my mode of existence and because knowledge and 
experience will themselves be revealed as modes of grasping. I 
am a grip on the world and any loss of grip is a change in the 
scope 
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of my being. If we insist on asking how I come to know 
the grip of my gaze is loose or complete, we will once 
again be unfaithful to our experience of space, and instead of 
allowing this experience to teach us our fundamental mode of 
being in the world, we will be subjecting the experiencP. to the 
formal assumptions of "traditional thought". There is for me a 
difference between an object being close by or far away, being 
upright or inverted, being large or small etc., such that I am 
able to deal with space without relying on blind reflexes or 
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abstract formulae. Geometric proofs make sense to me, I can see 
at a glance that the cube must have six sides, that doubling the 
length of its sides will increase the volume eight times, 
without there being any act of consciousness, without the 
in telligi bili ty or essence of space being constituted or 
thought, 
back to 
because the essence and being of space cannot be traced 
the interiority of a subject, but to the grasping 
relation to the world in which I am incarnated. 
Once we accept that grasping is an original relation to the 
world, that I do not need kinesthetic and other information to 
enable me to infer whether my grasp for example is loose or 
approximate, we can see that the experience of "falling back" of 
"upright" "size" etc, is not an experience in the sense of 
providing me with a representation of a state of affairs , the 
experience is the gearing itself. Ve have in the experience the 
integration of consciousness into existence, the lived 
resolution of the contradiction of immanence and transcendence, 
of inside and outside turning about each other. Consequently, 
whether we attempt to reveal the grasping relation by reflecting 
on our own experience of grasping, i.e. from the inside, or 
whether we reflect on the grasping act of another, we will be 
led to the same object. 
It is with this act of grasping that we will compare the act of 
speaking, and it will therefore be useful at this stage, to 
summarize some of the consequences of this notion of the grasp 
176 
as a last relation to its world, in order to establish some 
points with which our comparisons can begin. 
If it is true that my perception of the proximity of the object 
must be re-integrated into the "complete grip", it means that we 
can no longer think of perception as providing us with contents 
or with phenomena that I could scrutinize, phenomena which would 
be left after the real world and all my practical concerns have 
been put into brackets. The grasp does not open up a world which 
is represented or thought but a world which is the pole of my 
grasping activity. 
"In the action of the hand which is raised towards an 
object is contained a reference to the object, not as 
an object represented, but as that highly specific 
thing towards which we project ourselves, near which we 
are in anticipation, and which we haunt." 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:138) 
"For the player in action the football field is not an 
'object' It is pervaded with lines of force (the 
'yard lines'; those which demarcate the 'penalty area') 
and articulated in sectors (for example, the 'openings' 
between the adversaries) which call for a certain mode 
of action and which initiate and guide the action as if 
the player were unaware of it. The field itself is not 
given to him, but present as the immanent term of his 
practical intentions; the player becomes one with it 
and feels the direction of the 'goal', for example, 
just as immediately as the vertical and the horizontal 
planes of his body." (Herleau-Ponty, 1967:168) 
To say that the grasping act is an original way of relating 
myself to the object is to say that the act does not require 
internal or external perceptions, acts of representation or acts 
of thought. Yithin the bounds of traditional thought movement is 
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either automatic and blind i.e. made up of a system of stimulus 
response mechanisms and determined by a pre-established network 
of nervous connections, or it is consciously executed by a free 
agent which can guide the movement, because it can represent to 
itself the position of its organs and the location of the object 
to be grasped. If I grasp the telephone receiver it is because 
through kinesthetic and visual images I know where my hand is 
and where the receiver is, and so I am able to guide the former 
towards the latter. But the most important thing that my 
experience of grasping teaches me is that the grasp, just like 
the experience of "the same man seen at a distance" or "the 
circular plate seen from an angle", demands the contradiction of 
immanence and transcendence. Through the grasping act J am in, 
and act in, the world itself without requiring images informing 
me of a state of affairs in an external world. The more I 
attempt to confine myself to my own private experience of 
grasping, such as to kinesthetic sensations and images of the 
object and of my hand, the more I find myself, as seen by the 
world, a grasping act in the world. In the grasp outside is 
inside and inside is outside. The act has its own outside 
without having to rely on images. 
"The background 
associated or 
itself, but is 
sustaining it 
1962: 110) 
to the movement is not a representation 
linked externally with the movement 
immanent in the movement inspiring and 
at every moment." (Merleau-Ponty, 
Goldstein's patient, Schneider, is able to grasp his nose and 
178 
scratch a painful spot on his body when it is clear from the 
rest of his behaviour that he is unable to represent to himself 
the objective location of his nose or of the spot 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:103). 
Because grasping is an original relation to the world it does 
not take place in the real world of space partes extra 
partes, 
"The whole operation takes place [Schneider scratching 
the spot where he has been stung by a mosquito) in the 
domain of the phenomenal; it does not run through the 
objective world ... " (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:106) 
nor does it take place in time understood as an infinite series 
of 'now' moments, a time which is infinitely divisible into 
smaller and smaller intervals. In the execution of a grasping 
act the subject does not have to execute a series of partial 
movements one after the other. 
"At each successive instant of a movement, the 
preceding instant is not lost sight of. It is, as it 
were, dovetailed into the present ... But the impending 
position is also covered by the present, and through it 
all those which will occur throughout the movement. 
Each instant of the movement embraces its whole span, 
and particularly the first which, being the active 
initiative, institutes the link between a here and a 
yonder, a now and a future which the remainder of the 
instants will merely develop." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:140) 
Being a last relation to its world it will be impossible to 
establish a numerical distinction between the grasping act and 
its goal. 
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"A patient, asked to point to some part of his body, 
his nose for example, can manage to do so if he is 
allowed to take hold of it. If the patient is set the 
task of interrupting the movement before its completion 
the action becomes impossible ... From the outset 
the grasping movement is magically at its completion; 
it can begin only by anticipating its end, since to 
disallow taking hold is sufficient to inhibit the 
action." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:103/4) 
The grasping movement can be from the outset at its completion 
because although it is not a constitutive act of consciousness, 
and although it has and is its outside, it does not take place 
in a space partes extra partes, or in objective time seen as 
an infinite series of 'now' moments. Because it is a last 
relation to its object, there is no numerical distinction 
between the outset and the conclusion. 
" the felt movements will be linked together by a 
practical intention which animates them, which makes of 
them a directed melody; and it becomes impossible to 
distinguish the goal and the means as separable 
elements ... " (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:173) 
The space separating my hand and the object and the time 
interval separating the onset and the conclusion of the act are 
not an "externality" they express merely the degree to which my 
grasp on the object is loose and approximate or complete 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:261). I do not have to represent to myself 
the location of the object or imagine the moment in which my arm 
will be sufficiently extended to allow my fingers to grasp it 
securely, from the beginning of the act I have that moment and 
that place "in hand". Consequently, although we are not speaking 
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about a blind reflex movement, there is no necessity for "motor 
images", i.e. a representation of the movement to be executed, a 
representation which would serve as a model. 
It is wrong to suggest that my ability to grasp the telephone 
receiver presupposes a perception of the spatial location of the 
telephone and the distance to be traversed by my hand. As we 
have seen our most original experience of distance is an 
experience of that which distinguishes a loose from a complete 
grip. Grasping cannot presuppose a perception of spatial 
locations and distance. Being on the same footing as perception 
it is that through which there is distance, orientation etc., 
which is why Merleau-Ponty says that the background of movement 
is not a representation associated or externally linked to the 
movement but is immanent in the movement itself (1962:110). 
But for the same reason it is wrong to suggest that if the 
grasping act is not a blind reflex, then the subject must 
represent to himself the action to be performed and the goal to 
be reached. Ye have seen above that if the past and the future 
were available to me only in the form of memories and 
anticipations occurring as images or representations in the 
present, I would have no original experience of past or future, 





if, in fact we form the idea of the future with 
of what we have seen, the fact remains that, in 
to pro-ject it ahead of us, we need in the first 
a sense of the future." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:414) 
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Nor on the other hand could I have an immediate openness to the 
future itself for then it would not be ahead of me and would not 
be future. Vhat makes the future real for me is that ultimately 
it eludes my full possession. I can "reach" the future only by 
outrunning myself and the present. Vhat makes it real is that it 
is the goal of a grasping, reaching relationship and not the 
object of an act of thought. 
"The future is not made up exclusively of guesswork and 
daydreams." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:416) 
Vithout having to think or anticipate the evening to come it 
exists for me, or "weighs" on me. If my present goes beyond 
itself and "bites" into the future (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:416) 
this is not because I think of the future or represent it to 
myself, it is because the goals of my gestures and more 
generally the goal of my existence as a task in the world, lie 
in the future. 
" I am already at the impending present as my 
gesture is already at its goal ... " (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:421) 
It is the gesture which subtends the future and the spatial 
distance of the object from me, it is therefore absurd to 
suggest that the gesture presupposes "motor images" of the 
gesture to be executed or the goal to be reached, or 





argues in various places that the relationship 
subjects perceiving the same world must be 
means of the analogy of binocular perception. If 
integrate speech into his general theory of we are to 
intercorporeality we must interpret binocular perception as a 
mode of grasping one identical world. 
Once we have accepted that vision is not to be understood as the 
intuition of images but as a gaze at grips with the world, it 
becomes possible to accept that two gazes, since their 
'outsides' place them in the same world, can work together as 





together realize one indivisible act of grasping. I 
one cube in binocular perception not because I think 
one cube, or because two images have through focussing 
superimposed. There is no way that volume can be 
contained in images, even if they are superimposed. I perceive 
one cube because my two eyes have ceased "to function each on 
its own account and are used as a single organ by one single 
gaze" (Merleau-Ponty,1962:232), making of my two eyes "the 
channels of one sole Cyclopean vision" (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968:141). The unity of the object is synonymous with this 
co-operation or synthesis of the two eyes as modes of grasping. 
The unity is neither reducible to an image nor is it a 
cogitatum, it is subtended by the focussing activity through 
which the organs are synthesized. 
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Merleau-Ponty refers to Aristotle's celebrated illusion in order 
to demonstrate the synthesis of the perceiving body. If the 
index finger is crossed over the third finger and a marble is 
placed so that it touches the outer side of the third finger and 
the inner side of the index finger, the subject has the illusion 
of perceiving two marbles. Merleau-Ponty argues that the 
illusion is due to a disturbance of the synthesis of the two 
fingers in a joint exploration of the marble. 
"Yhat makes the synthesis of the two tactile 
perceptions in one single object impossible .•. is that 
the right face of the middle finger and the left face 
of the index cannot combine in a joint exploration of 
the object, that the crossing of the fingers, being a 
movement which has to be imposed on them, lies outside 
the motor possibilities of the fingers themselves and 
cannot be aimed at in a project towards movement. The 
synthesis of the object is here effected, then, through 
the synthesis of one's own body ... it is literally the 
same thing to perceive one single marble, and to use 
two fingers as one single organ." (1962:205) 
Similarly, we can say that in the binocular perception of an 
object, it is literally the same thing to perceive one object, 
and to co-ordinate or focus the two eyes. 
"The identity of the thing through perceptual 
experience is only another aspect of the identity of 
one's own body throughout exploratory movements: thus 
they are the same kind as each other." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:185) 
Of course it would be impossible to speak of a synthesis of the 
body or of an identity of the body if the body is conceived as a 
physiological entity in Euclidean space, a space partes extra 
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partes. To say that the last subject is an 'I can' is to say 
that we have an ontology not of being but of doing. There is 
therefore no necessity to co-ordinate the parts of the body in a 
single exploratory or grasping movement, because the "part" 
derives its "being" from the role it plays in the total 
movement. If the two eyes participate in one grasping act, they 
form one organ without any co-ordinating mechanisms. 
If it is literally the same thing to perceive one object and to 
focus the eyes, focussing cannot be an activity in the world and 
in time, distinguishable from its goal. It must be the act of a 
last subject, it must like the grasp, be an original relation 
with its object, nevertheless although it is the act of a last 
subject, it is not the act of a constituting consciousness. 
"The movement of my eye towards the thing on which it 
is about to focus is not the displacement of an object 
in relation to another object, but progress towards 
reality." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:279) 
To speak of progress towards reality is to accept that 
reality is not possessed, is not a cogitatum and escapes me 
in some sense. It is not whatever I take it to be. Although 
it is the object itself that I see nevertheless I must 
learn to see it (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:4). Like the grasp, 
focussing is pro-spective, it can have the object "in hand" 
without completely possessing it. It too can have a loose 
and approximate grip, or a complete grip, it can possess at 
a distance. 
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"Suddenly I start to focus my eyes on the table which 
is not yet there, I begin to look into the distance 
while there is no depth, my body centres itself on an 
object which is still only potential, and so disposes 
its sensitive surfaces as to make it a present reality. 
the act of looking is indivisibly prospective, 
since the object is the final stage of my process of 
focussing ... " (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:239) 
There is therefore no sense of trial and error as there is in 
the mechanical focussing of the lens of a camera, and what has 
been lost in patients who are unable to focus or co-ordinate 
their eyes, is not a control of the muscles of the eye, but this 
pre-possession of the object which characterises the grasp. 
"In the case of people born blind and operated on for 
cataract, it is impossible to say, during the period 
following the operation, whether it is 
non-co-ordination of the eyes which hampers vision, or 
whether it is the confusion in the visual field which 
favours non-co-ordination whether they fail to see 
through failure to focus, or whether they fail to focus 
through not having anything to see." (Herleau-Ponty, 
1962:231) 
Two fingers can be used 'as one organ' and two eyes can become 
the 'channels of one sole Cyclopean vision' without any real 
co-ordination which would have to be automatic or consciously 
effected. The synthesis of the body refers to its being one 
original relationship with the world. It is impossible to say 
whether there is one object because the exploratory organs are 
synthesized, or whether the organs are synthesized because they 
subtend one indivisible world. 
Although we cannot start by putting the grasping act in the 
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world as one of its processes, although it is an original 
relation to the world, what characterizes it as a grasp and 
distinguishes it from an act of thinking or dreaming, and what 
distinguishes the real world from a cogitatum or a dreamt world, 
is that the world aimed at in the grasp, offers a resistance or 
an inertia, presupposes a certain engaging of myself, or an 
abandoning of myself to its beckoning, encroaches on me or 
seduces me in some way. 
Ve have seen that the act of focussing is not a process of trial 
and error, that it is pro-spective, that from the beginning it 
already has "in hand" the object on which it is going to focus. 
This implies, not only that the object precedes my consciousness 
of it, but that if I reach it there where it is, that I must 
adapt myself in some way. Even when my eyes focus as I look into 
the stereo-scope, it is as if my focussing is a response to a 
question put by the situation ... a response which is contained 
in the question, it is as if my focussing is taken possession of 
by the about to be seen three dimensional object. Certainly the 
unity of my body in its exploratory or focussing activity, is 
experienced as synonymous with the unity of my body in its 
exploratory or focussing activity, but it is as if there is a 
secret alliance between the object and the focussing. 
"All the more it is the case that in normal perception 
the significance of what is perceived appears to me as 
built into it and not constituted by me, and the gaze 
as a sort of knowledge machine, which takes things as 
they need to be taken in order to become a spectacle, 
or which divides them up in accordance with their 
natural articulations." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:264) 
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"The look, we said, envelopes, palpates, espouses the 
visible things. As though it were in a relation of 
pre-established harmony with them, as though it ~1ew 
them before knowing them ... so that finally one cannot 
say if it is the look or if it is the things that 
command. Vhat is this prepossession of the visible, 
this art of interrogating it according to its own 
wishes, this inspired exegesis? " (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968:133) 
I need to look in order to see, but it is only in the perception 
of ambiguous figures where I have some choice as to hmr I will 
look, and some choice as to whether I see two faces or a vase. 
In normal perception however the manner of looking is 
"recommended" or dictated by the phenomena 
" ... but, in a normal visual field, the segregation of 
planes and outlines is irresistible: for example, when 
I walk along an avenue, I cannot bring myself to see 
the spaces between the trees as things and the trees 
themselves as a background." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:263) 
"It is not we who perceive, it is the thing that 
perceives itself yonder ... " (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:185) 
"The visible about us seems to rest in itself. It is as 
though our v1s1on were formed in the heart of the 
visible." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:130) 
This encroaching of the world on me, or the irresistible aspect 
of the segregation of planes, is not perceived by me for this 
perception would in turn presuppose another "recommendation" 
from the phenomena. Similarly, if the grasp is an orig~nal way 
of relating to the object, it is not an act of thought because 
it is under the tutelage of the situation and the object to be 






the idea of Chiasm, that is: every relation with 
is simultaneously a taking and a being taken, the 
is held, it is inscribed and inscribed in the same 
that it takes hold of." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:266) 
" and to move one's body is to aim at things 
through it: it is to allow oneself to respond to their 
call, which is made upon it independently of any 
representation. Motility, then, is not, as it were, a 
handmaid of consciousness, transporting the body to 
that point in space of which we have formed a 
representation beforehand. In order that we may be able 
to move our body towards an object, the object must 
first exist for it, our body must not belong to the 
realm of the 'in-itself'. Objects no longer exist for 
the arm of the apraxic, and this is what causes it to 
remain immobile." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:139) 
Ve cannot say that in order for the object to exist for my body, 
it must actually exist, as if there were some more fundamental 
sense of exist (and as if the relationship between my body and 
the object were a relationship in the real world). Our 
investigation of the grasping relation to the world is meant to 
reveal the most original sense of the being of the world. Vhat 
makes the object real, is that it exists for my grasping 
intentions, that it exerts a remote attraction on my arm, that I 
am not free to approach the object as I wish, that the 
particular manner of grasping, or palpating with my gaze, is 
irresistible. If the object exerts a remote attraction on my 
arm it does not do so through its physical and chemical 
properties, nor do I guide my grasping act having understood the 
nature of the object from certain signs. The object, as the pole 
of my grasping does not affect me through a blind causality, nor 
does it offer me, as a mind, something to understand. If the 
segregation of the planes and outlines of my visual field are 
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irresistible, it is neither irresistible mechanically nor 
logically. Vhat we must reveal is not a freely constituted 
"irresistible", but an irresistible irresistible. Just as I 
cannot mundanize myself so I cannot, in complete freedom think 
of myself as constrained by the world. Ve must reveal an 
irresistible which limits the freedom of the last subject. The 
philosopher who attempts to reflect on the meaning of being must 
reveal the encroaching of the phenomena on his povrers of 
revelation or reflection. He must reveal his own 
enveloped-in-a-horizon-which-he-cannot-reveal. This means 
being 
that 
the problem of 
because being 
the being of the world can never be cleared up, 
cannot be profiled against an horizon of 




transparent to itself. It is of course contradictory 
of a philosophy that it overcome the problem of 
solipsism and that it captures the being of the world, and the 
being of the subject in the world, in a clear and distinct idea 
i.e. reduce them to cogitata of a perfectly self contained 
cogito. 
Vhat this does mean is that philosophy as the revelation and 
communication of essences from one thinking subject to another, 
becomes impossible. The philosopher who attempts to reflect on 
the meaning of being must reveal the encroaching of the 
phenomena on his act of revelation. He must embrace in thought 
his own being enveloped in an horizon which he does not embrace 
in thought. But if we can understand the project of philosophy, 
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not as a revelation of pure essences, but as speech, as that 
paradoxical form of grasping whose power of revelation and 
access to truth is synonymous with its being encroached on, and 
if communication is not the transfer of ideas but a mode of 
grasping the world itself, with others, philosophy and truth 
will be possible. All of which explains why the problem of 
language has become the central problem in phenomenology. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) To say therefore, as Merleau-Ponty does that I feel or know 
that part of the object is hidden from me, is to be misleading. 
"'When I see an object, I always feel that there is a 
portion of being beyond what I see at this moment, 
not only as regards visible being, but also as 
regards what is tangible or audible." (1962:216) 
"Doubtless I know that my present experience of this 
desk is not complete ... I know that 'the desk' is 
not reducible to the determinations with which it is 
presently clothed." (1967:186) 
It should be clear that 'feeling' and 'knowing' ca.nnot be 
taken as actual events in a psychological ego which 
correspond to an actual state of affairs. 
2) It is true of course that Husser! had recognised this 
aspect of the transcendent world long before the 5th 
meditation. In the 3rd meditation he points out that we can 
encounter the real objective world only through 'external 
experience' and that in external experience the synthesis 
of the object is always 'presumptive', that in every 
experience of a transcendent object there is always a 
"multiform horizon of unfulfilled anticipations". 
"The evidence pertaining to particular objects in a 
real objective world is 'external experience'; and 
we can see that, as a matter of essential necessity, 
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no other mode of self-presentation is conceivable in 
that case of such objects. But we can also see that, 
on the other hand, this kind of evidence has an 
essential 'onesidedness' - stated more precisely: a 
multiform horizon of unfulfilled anticipations 
(which, however are in need of fulfilment) and, 
accordingly, contents of a mere meaning, which refer 
us to corresponding potential evidences ... any such 
synthesis [of a transcendent object] must always 
involve unfulfilled, expectant and accompanying 
meanings. At the same time there always remains the 
open possibility that the belief in being, which 
extends into the anticipation, will not be 
fulfilled, that what is appearing in the mode 'it 
itself' nevertheless does not exist or is 
different." (1969:61/2) 
It should be clear that Husserl is not returning to a form of 
real1sm where we only make hypotheses about the possibility of 
an actually existing object because he goes on to say, 
"That the being of the world "transcends" 
consciousness in this fashion ... in no wise alters 
the fact that it is conscious life alone, wherein 
everything transcendent becomes constituted, as 
something inseparable from consciousness " 
(1969:62) 
Husserl is merely explicating the act in which a 
transcendent object is constituted. The object is 
constituted as that which is given in "external 
experience", as that which is experienced as having 
unfulfilled, expectant and accompanying meanings. 
Transcendent objects are constituted as objects which are 
experienced with the open possibility that they will prove 
to be illusions. But who expects and anticipates the 
accompanying meanings? Yhose belief in being could remain 
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unfulfilled? Clearly it is not the last subject, the 
transcendental ego. Ultimately, since nothing escapes me, 
there can be for me no transcendent world. 
3) Bender and Mallin appear to have adopted an entirely 
different interpretation of the relation between Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty. 
"In Husserl's view after the bracketing we are able 
to grasp the 'essences of the acts of consciousness 
which appear before us in the stream of pure 
consciousness; this 'intuition of essences' 
(Vesenschau) is the so-called 'eidetic reduction'. 
From Merleau-Ponty's point of view, however, the 
epoche does nothing but destroy the unity of lived 
existence, the non-duality of subjectivity and 
world, which is what perception is The 
Husserlian epoche, for Merleau-Ponty, makes it 
impossible to describe the immediate unity of 
existence and world. As Mallin puts it, paraphrasing 
Merleau-Ponty, it is misleading even to speak of a 
contact between two sides, one 'subjective' and the 
other 'objective' noetic and noematic, for at this 
basic level there is absolutely no distinction. In 
his later works, [Merleau-Ponty] describes this bond 
better as 'flesh and visibility'." (Bender, 
1983:183) 
I have presented Husserl's reduction as a destruction of 
the duality of subject and object. The object is reduced to 
a cogitatum, and subject and world "belong together 
essentially, they are also concretely one" (Husserl, 
1969:84) because consciousness constitutes its world. 
"If my consciousness 
the world which it 
separate them and 
discrepancy between 
1962:238) 
were at present constituting 
perceives, no distance would 
there would be no possible 
them " (Merleau-Ponty, 
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Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand preserves a certain kind 
of discrepancy, without adopting the dualism of the natural 
attitude, Merleau-Ponty must then make sense of the 
elusiveness of reality, of its being snatched from my 
grasp. Without this discrepancy between the subject and the 
world, the notions of "awakening to the world", and 
consciousness "moving to where things are", "bursting 
outwards", the notion of "being beyond oneself", would all 
be unthinkable. 
4) "If it is true, as M.Merleau-Ponty maintains, that 
the natural experience of man situates him from the 
beginning in a world of things and consists for 
him in orienting himself among them and taking a 
stand, to describe a man's behaviour and his 
perception of things is to devote oneself to the 
same object". (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:xxiv/v) 
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BEING-AMONGST-OTHERS AND LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOUR 
As we have seen the problem of the existence of other subjects 
is no longer irresolvable because access to the world and the 
possibility of truth, no longer presuppose that I am a pure 
constituting consciousness. Vhenever I reflect on my access to 
the world and my experience of truth and certainty, I find that 
I am not a self-contained transparent realm of thought, into 
which nothing can enter and from which nothing can leave, but 
rather a being which constantly assumes its outside, and which 
constantly leaves itself, so that whenever, in an act of 
reflection, I attempt to re-enter myself to find the source of 
the being and meaning of the world, my reflective act is "rent 
by an inverse movement" which throws me outside myself. Every 
act of perception is synonymous with the world's perception of 
me so that as a perceiving subject, I am my outside. In the 
experience, for example, of "the circular plate seen from an 
angle", the possibility of another subject perceiving me and 
perceiving my perception is already there. In the perception of 
the plate my being for myself and my being for others is not 
divisible into two juxtaposed perspectives. It is genuinely I 
that the other sees, I genuinely am the exterior that I present 
to others (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:xvii). 
"If I experience the inhering of my consciousness in 
its body and its world, the perception of other people 
and the plurality of consciousnesses no longer present 
any difficulty." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:351) 
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If it is literally the same thing to use two fingers as one 
organ of grasping and to perceive one indivisible marble, then 
provided others have access to this use of two fingers as one, 
they will have access to the unity I perceive. 
"The mental we have said is reducible to the structure 
of behaviour. Since this structure is visible from the 
outside and for the spectator at the same time as from 
within and for the actor, another person is in 
principle accessible to me as I am to myself." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1967:221) 
"Through phenomenological reflection I discover vision, 
not as a 'thinking about seeing', to use Descartes's 
expression, but as a gaze at grips with a visible world 
and that is why for me there can be another's gaze; 
that expressive instrument called a face can carry an 
existence, as my own existence is carried by my body 
that knowledge - acquiring apparatus." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:351) 
"The experience that I make of my hold on the world is 
what makes me capable of perceiving another myself ... " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973:137) 
Vhat needs to be described now is this particularly intense form 
of the contradiction of immanence and transcendence, the turning 
about each other of my being for myself and my being for others, 
through which there can be another's gaze, through which I 
become awake to the existence of others and they awake to me, so 
that my being for myself and the other's being for me, and the 
other's being for himself and my being for him, are not distinct 
perspectives juxtaposed in the world, so that we are not 
distinct consciousnesses existing parallel to each other, but 
subjects which genuinely engage each other, become embroiled 
with each other, pass into each other and form one single wake 
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of public existence (Merleau-Ponty, 1964(b): 28). ~Te must 
describe the movement through which I am projected beyond my own 
perspective into the perspective the other has, without his 
perspective and the projecting becoming part of my persp~ctive. 
Ve must describe how the other can be both present to me and yet 
hold himself aloof, (mir fremde), how there can be an 
"aspiration" towards the other without this aspiration being one 
of my objects. Merleau-Ponty describes this paradoxical movement 
as follows, 
"No sooner has my gaze fallen upon a living body in 
process of acting than the objects surrounding it 
immediately take on a fresh layer of significance: 
... Round about the perceived body a vortex forms, 
towards which my world is drawn and, so to speak, 
sucked in ... Already the other body has ceased to be a 
mere fragment of the world, and become the theatre of a 
certain process of elaboration, and, as as it were, a 









not to be found in the things, he is 
and he is not I ... The other is 
He slips into my perception from 
"It is not sufficiently noted that the other is never 
present face to face .•. The other, in my eyes, is thus 
always on the margin of what I see and hear, he is on 
this side of me, he is beside or behind me, but he is 
not in that place that my look flattens and empties of 
any 'interior'." (1973:133) 
Clearly these descriptions must be taken literally. If 
Merleau-Ponty says that my world is "drawn towards" or "sucked 
into" the vortex, that the body of the other becomes the theatre 
or a "view" of the world, he is not simply offering a 
description of impressions or subjective experiences which hide 
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a multitude of unconscious processes through which the inner 
life of the other is inferred from his behaviour, so that in 
witnessing his behaviour I have the irresistible but false 
impression that I actually merge with his view of the world. The 
relations with others that Merleau-Ponty is describing, are 
those relations through which there are "subjective 
impressions" and an "objective world". He who insists that any 
experience must be an event in my psyche, has already 
dogmatically assumed that all subjects are private 
consciousnesses existing distinct from and parallel to, one 
another in the real world, such that any sense of sharing the 
world with others, of being sucked into the perspective another 
has, or of the other slipping into my perspective from behind, 
can only be an impression I have, an impression produced by 
conscious or unconscious inferences from the other's overt 
behaviour, inferences that could be described as raUonal or 
irrational. But we have seen above that I cannot begin by 
placing the multitude of consciousnesses as real centres in the 
real world because my original experience of real as opposed to 
subjective, and the only meaning that real can have for me, is 
that it exists "for us", i.e. it exists for subjects which can 
be drawn into each other's perspectives. My relationship with 
others therefore precedes the emergence of the real world. 
Furthermore it would not even be possible to speak of an 
impression being false or true or to speak of inferences being 
rational or irrational, for my relations with others precedes 
the distinctions of false and true, of rational and irrational. 
199 
To say that there is rationality is to say that perspectives 
blend, perceptions confirm each other and that my own 
experiences and those of other people "intersect and engage each 
other like gears" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: xix-xx). 
"Our experience of the true, when it is not immediately 
reducible to that of the thing we see, is at first not 
distinct from the tensions that arise between others 
and ourselves, and from their resolution." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968:12) 
Ve will discover our original relationships with others 
therefore only by putting the real world and rationality into 
parentheses. But if we must put into parentheses the absurd idea 
of a world existing in-itself, must we follow Husser! and reduce 
everything to what it is for me. If my being drawn towards the 
vortex, if the other's slipping into my perspective from behind, 
are purely phenomena for me, it would not be I who is drawn, 
and the other would not slip into my perspective, for I would 
be the self contained consciousness of these phenomena, and my 
being with others would be an object of thought. 
"It is as false to place ourselves in society as an 
object among other objects, as it is to place society 
within ourselves as an object of thought, and in both 
cases the mistake lies in treating the social as an 
object." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:362) 
For Merleau-Ponty, these relationships of being drawn into, of 
slipping into from behind, of intersecting and engaging like 
gears, are, like the relationship of grasping, both originating 
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and "real", both naturans and naturata. They are last 
relationships with others, yet others are not cogitata. Others 
are, that towards which I am "drawn", that with which I am 
engaged. 
"Our relation with the social is, like our relationship 
to the world, deeper than any express perception or any 
judgement ... Ve must return to the social with which we 
are in contact by the mere fact of existing." 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:362) 
If I perform the reduction I will not be lead back to a pure 
consciousness of others or of being "drawn" or engaging others, 
or of others slipping into my perspective from behind. These 
relations will always remain out of reach of the reflecting act 
for they precede my contact with myself, they precede the act of 
reflection. 
"The passage to intersubjectivity is contradictory only 
with regard to an insufficient reduction, Husserl was 
right to say. But a sufficient reduction leads beyond 
the alleged transcendental "immanence", it leads to the 
absolute spirit understood as Veltlichkeit, to Geist as 
Ineinander of the spontaneities, itself founded on the 
aesthesiological Ineinander and on the spere of life as 
sphere of Einfuhlung and intercorporeity " 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1968:172) 
The question of course is how this being "drawn" into the 
vortex, this Ineinander of spontaneities, this EinfUhlung 
and intercorporeity can be something I am more sure about than 
the fact that I think? and why the reduction does not lead 
beyond this being-amongst-others to an awareness of 
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being-amongst-others, i.e. to transcendental immanence? As we 
have pointed out, on various occasions throughout his vrritings 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that we compare these original relations 
with others, which precede both the real world and acts of 
thought, with the relationship between the two eyes in the act 
of focussing in binocular vision. 
"But we have learned in individual perception not to 
conceive our perspective views as independent of each 
other; we know that they slip into each other and are 
brought together finally in the thing. In the same vay 
we must learn to find the communication between one 
consciousness and another in one and the same world." 
(1962:353) 
Binocular perception cannot be explained as the imposition of 
one monocular image on another, and it is equally inconceivable 
that two cogitata of two thinking monads, or two perceptual 
experiences could engage each other like gears, or could be 
drawn into each other. Binocular perception cannot be described 
as the constitution of the idea, or the formulation of the 
hypothesis that both eyes perceive the same world. Similarly, we 
can never reduce the worlds being "for us", to an hypothesis, or 
a cogitatum. The unity of Paul's world and my world is not my 
cogitatum. The miracle of binocular perception lies in its power 
of opening me up to a world that transcends me. Similarly, 
the intercorporeity, the relations of "slipping into ", or 
"being drawn into" situate me in a common world, with others, a 
world which is "for us", without this "for us" being grounded in 
an experience or thought of my own. 
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For as long as consciousness and perception are taken as powers 
of opening us to contents, whether these are cogitata or 
perceptual data, it will be inconceivable that my perception can 
be drawn into the perspective another has of the world, or that 
our experiences can engage each other like gears. But we have 
rejected this notion of consciousness and perception and we have 
seen that the experiences of "falling back", of "upright", 
"inverted", of "large" and "small", are not reducible to the 
intuition of perceptual data or the constitution of ideas. The 
experiences merge with the actual gearing of my grip on the 
object. Similarly, just as it can be literally the same thing to 
perceive one single marble and to use two fingers as one single 
organ, so it can be literally the same thing for Paul and I 
together to perceive one and the same world, and for our 
originating gestures directed towards the world to comprise one 
integrated exploratory grasp. 
"Henceforth, as the parts of my body together comprise 
a system, so my body and the other person's are one 
whole, two sides of one and the same phenomenon ... Ve 
have a dual being, where the other is for me no longer 
a mere bit of behaviour in my transcendental field, nor 
I in his; we are collaborators for each other in 
consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into 
each other and we co-exist through a common world." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:354) 
If we insist on asking how I know or experience the fact that 
our bodies form one intercorporeal system, or that the world 
exists "for us", we will be unfaithful to the phenomenon. 
Knowing, or thinking and experiencing are not last 
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relationships, I am not in essence a centre of thought or 
experience. The last relationship to the world is that of the 
intercorporeal grasp. There is a difference for me between my 
private world and the world existing for us, such that I 
understand the distinction Descartes begins with, but this 
difference cannot be discovered by penetrating myself in an act 
of reflection. Any attempt to reflect on this difference will be 
rent by an inverse movement throwing me beyond myself, beyond 
the alleged transcendental immanence to the sphere of 
EinfUhlung and intercorporeality. There is a difference for me 
between my thought of the existence of the world and the 
existence of the world itself, because there is a difference 
"for us", and any attempt to represent this difference as one of 
my "contents", as a cogitatum or experience misconstrues it. 
"The communication makes us witnesses of one sole 
world, as the synergy of our eyes suspends them on one 
unique thing. But in both cases, the certitude, 
entirely irresistible as it may be, remains absolutely 
obscure, we can live it, we can neither think it nor 
formulate it nor set it up in theses. Every attempt at 
elucidation brings us back to the dilemmas. And it is 
this unjustifiable certitude of a sensible world common 
to us that is the seat of truth within us." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968:11) 
There is one particular form of behaviour directed towards its 
world, one particular form of grasping, which is eminently 
suited to this joint or synergic grasping of a world by me and 
others, and that is linguistic behaviour. Almost everything 
Merleau-Ponty has said about language, and everything we will 
demonstrate in our reflection on aphasic speech can be seen to 
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establish and develop this fundamental insight. An unbiased 
reflection on the production and perception of speech will be a 
reflection on the movement through which I am drawn into the 
view another has of the world, and through which the other slips 
into my perspective "from behind". It will reveal speech as that 
particular form of grasping the world, in which my body and the 
body of another comprise one whole, one indivisible grasping of 
one indivisible world. An unbiased description of our speaking 
will be a description of the engaging and intersecting of our 
experiences. It is in language that we are witnesses of one sole 
world, that there is this unjustifiable certitude of a world 
common to us, so that ultimately linguistic behaviour is the 
seat of truth. 
"I am dealing with a stranger who has not yet uttered a 
word, I may well believe that he is an inhabitant of 
another world in which my own thoughts and actions are 
unworthy of a place. But let him utter a word, or even 
make a gesture of impatience, and already he ceases to 
transcend me: that, then, is his voice, those are his 
thoughts and that is the realm that I thought 
inaccessible." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:361) 
"Vhether speaking or listening, I project myself into 
the other person, I introduce him into my own self ... 
Rather than imprisoning it, language is like a magic 
machine for transporting the "I" into the other 
person's perspective." (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:19) 
"In speech we realize the impossible agreement between 
two rival totalities not because speech forces us back 
upon ourselves to discover some unique spirit in which 
we participate but because speech concerns us, catches 
us indirectly, seduces us, trails us along, transforms 
us into the other and him into us, abolishes the limit 
between mine and not mine, and ends the alternative 
between what has sense for me and what is non-sense for 
me, between me as subject and the other as object." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973:145) 
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Our reflections on speech must enable us to demonstrate that 
this accessibility, this introducing of the other into myself, 
this transporting of the "I" into the other person's 
perspective, this abolishing of the limit between mine and not 
mine, is not simply an impression that would hide a system of 
conscious or unconscious processes through which I as a subject 
existing in parallel, but distinct from another, am able to 
infer from the speech of this other, his perspectives, his 
private thoughts and experiences, to such an extent that I am 
left with the impression that I am transported into the 
perspective of the other, that the limit between "mine" and "not 
mine" has been abolished. Ye must show that the power of this 
"magic machine" does not presuppose acts of thought or 
interpretation, or any "experiences". Ye must show that it is 
literally true that speech transports the "I" into the 
perspective of the other, that it abolishes the limit between 
mine and not mine. The social we must return to is certainly the 
social that I have contact with by the mere fact of existing, 
but it is as speech that I exist. Ye must show that long before 
existing as substance or as thought I exist as speech. 
SPEECH, AN ORIGINAL RELATION TO THE YORLD 
If speech is to be revealed as a manner of existing, and more 
particularly as a manner of co-existing, if the comparison 
between linguistic behaviour and three dimensional binocular 
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perception is to be pursued, we will have to show that speech, 
whether mine or that of the other, is an original relation to 
its world. Like the grasping subject, the speaking subject is a 
last subject and grasps its world, without the assistance of 
images or thoughts. 
For example, just as the grasping act does not presuppose a 
representation of the object or of the spatial location of the 
object, so the act of naming does not presuppose a perception or 
recognition of the object to be named. The plunge into speech is 
from the subject's point of view an original way of relating 
himself to the object and is on the same footing as 
perception. 1 Naming the object is as immediate or fundamental 
as seeing it or recognizing it, which is why Merleau-Ponty 
argues that speech "makes itself a gaze of the mind, intuitus 
aentis .•• " (1968: 155). 
"The denomination of objects does not follow upon 
recognition; it is itself recognition. Vhen I fix my 
eyes on an object in the half-light, and say: 'It is a 
brush', there is not in my mind the concept of a brush, 
under which I subsume the object, and which moreover is 
linked by frequent association with the word 'brush', 
but the word bears the meaning, and, by imposing it on 
the object, I am conscious of reaching that object. As 
has often been said for the child the thing is not 
known until it is named, the name is the essence of the 
thing and resides in it on the same footing as its 
colour and its form." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:177/8) 
"The reason why the thematization of the signified does 
not precede speech is that it is the result of it." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1974:87) 
"It is not because two objects resemble each other that 
they are designated by the same word; on the contrary, 
it is because they are designated by the same word and 
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thus participate in the same verbal and affective 
category that they are perceived as similar. Thus, even 
when it is addressed to natural objects, nascent 
perception is still related to them through certain 
artifacts, the words; " (Herleau-Ponty, 1967:167/8) 
"It always appears to us that the operations of 
experience codified in our language follow the very 
articulations of being, because it is through them that 
we relate to being." 2 (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:26) 
"For words and language are not wrappings in which 
things are packed for the commerce of those who write 
and speak. It is in the word, in language, that things 
first come to be and are." (Heidegger, Einfuhlung in 
die Hetaphysik;11) (Quoted by Sallis, 1973:112) 
For as long as the speech act in which the word is uttered and 
the object named are taken as real the descriptions given above 
can only refer to subjective impressions. For as long as the 
reduction is not carried out we will be able to establish a 
distinction between the word and the object and the descriptions 
can refer only to the effect of language on the psyche, the 
power of language to direct our attention to certain aspects of 
the object and to give us the illusion of "reaching the object 
itself". 
But if I perform the reduction and put the existence of the 
world into brackets and accept that speaking is a last relation 
to the world, I will find that the act of naming the brush 
ceases to be a real articulatory process or a stream of sounds 
in the real world, and becomes the emergence of the object 
itself. Like the transcendental ego, speech cannot be approached 
purely from the outside. The speaker is a last subject and our 
only access to authentic speech is from within. 
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"If language is comparable to that point in the eye of 
which physiologists speak as what helps us to see 
everything, according to the evidence it cannot see 
itself and cannot be observed. If language hides from 
anyone who seeks it and surrenders to anyone who 
renounces it, then one cannot look at in the face " 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1973:116) 
"Speech in use really undergoes 'a metamorphosis 
through which words cease to be accessible to our 
senses and lose their weight, their noise, their lines, 
their space (to become thoughts) ... '" (Herleau-Ponty, 
1973:116) 
Just as the grasp is not a physical process in the world so 
naming the object cannot be reduced to a process of articulating 
the muscles of phonation to produce sounds. Naming the object is 
on "this side" of my relationship with the world and makes the 
object exist for me in a certain way. 
"For pre-scientific thinking, naming an object is 
causing it to exist or changing it: God creates beings 
by naming them and magic operates upon them by speaking 
of them." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:178) 
"The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it 
contains its meaning in the same way as the gesture 
contains its .•. The spoken word is a gesture, and its 
meaning, a world The gesture which I witness 
outlines an intentional object The meaning of a 
gesture thus 'understood' is not behind it, it is 
intermingled with the structure of the world outlined 
by the gesture ... The linguistic gesture like all the 
rest, delineates its own meaning ... It would then be 
found that the words, vowels and phonemes are so many 
ways of 'singing' the world." (Herleau-Ponty, 
1962: 183/7) 
Clearly for Merleau-Ponty these relationships of "causing to 
exist" "containing" "outlining" "delineating" and "singing" are 
original. Like the relationships of "clinging", of being 
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"engrossed" in the road itself, and of "grasping the object with 
my gaze", they must be taken literally. If we say that speech 
delineates or sings the world, this is not to be taken as a 
poetic description of a subjective impression which would hide a 
real state of affairs, such as a system of unconscious processes 
through which speech "calls to mind" a certain idea of the 
world. Our most original experience of "a real state of 
affairs", is the experience of being a "we subject", and it is 
through speech that we bring into existence, or become situated 
with respect to, a world "for us". If I reflect in an unbiased 
manner on the moment in which I utter, "its a brush", I will 
find that just as "upright" and "falling back", are neither 
aspects of images nor thoughts but the gearing of my gaze, so 
the brush that I name is for me neither represented or thought 
about, but is indistinguishable from the act of naming, 
indistinguishable from the adjustment of my power of holding or 
subtending a world "for us". Just as the grasping act is not a 
physical process and is not experienced by me as a series of 
kinesthetic sensations, so the speech act is not experienced as 
a series of kinesthetic sensations in the organs of phonation, 
but experienced as the emergence of the brush itself, as that 
towards which my speech reaches out. 
Ve have said that the plunge into speech is from the subject's 
point of view an original way of relating himself to the object, 
and is on the same footing as perception. Clearly it is not with 
the empiricist model of perception that we are comparing speech, 
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for speech can grasp "objects" which are not present (in the 
realist sense) or objects which don't exist, like unicorns. It 
is with perception as a last relation to the world that we are 
comparing speech. Neither the speech not the object it grasps 
can be reduced to objects in the real world, objects of a pure 
consciousness. The existence or presence, or the non-existence 
or absence of the object is itself subtended by the speech act. 
The sense in which unicorns, for example, could be made to exist 
in authentic speech, such as in great literature and poetry (the 
existence for example of Hallarme's faun in L'Apres - midi d'un 
Faune), reminds us of the way a great actor can bring into 
existence the character he portrays. 
"In the same way the actress becomes invisible, and it 
is Phaedra who appears. The meaning swallows up the 
signs, and Phaedra has so completely taken possession 
of Berma that her passion as Phaedra appears the 
apotheosis of ease and naturalness. Aesthetic 
expression confers on what it expresses an existence in 
itself, installs it in nature as a thing perceived and 
accessible to all, or conversely plucks the signs 
themselves the person of the actor, or the colours 
and canvass of the painter from their empirical 
existence and bears them off into another world." 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:183) 
Like the imagination, speech can put us into the pseudo-presence 
of a thing, but this does not imply that it puts us into the 
absolute presence of a pseudo-thing like an image or an idea. 
"'When I imagine Peter absent, I am not aware of 
contemplating an image of Peter numerically distinct 
from Peter himself." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:181) 
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It will be necessary then to recognize this pseudo-presence as 
itself an original relation to the object, i.e. one which is not 
reducible to images or ideas. Similarly speech is an original 
way of reaching back to a past event or is an original manner of 
opening up to the future, which means that as a speaker I can 
relate to the past or future event without images, memories or 
thoughts of these events and without having to think or 
recognize the fact that the event referred to is in the past or 
the future. The grammatical structures, which we call the past 
and future tense forms of the verb, are not signs appearing in 
the present, signs to be decoded. Ye cannot reduce the 
perception or production of speech to events in the present, 
which would require of us to "think" about the past or future. 
It is only through speaking or perceiving speech that I can 
relate to the temporal dimensions expressed in speech. Speech is 
that paradoxical synthesis of "from the inside" and "from the 
outside", a constituted constituter. Because it is a grasp of 
the past and future events themselves, there where they are, it 
must itself be in time, and yet, since it is a last relationship 
past and future exist for me because I grasp them. 
grammatical structures of past, present and The objective 
future, like the distorted retinal image, exist neither for the 
the perceiver, they are the artificial product of speaker nor 
disengaging ourselves from the act in order to treat i 1~ as the 
object of a pure consciousness, forgetting, that it is speech 
which gives us the illusion of a pure consciousness. 
212 
What Merleau-Ponty has said about the relationship between 
speech and perception in the example of naming the brush he has 
also said about the relationship between speech and thought. 
If speech is an original relation with the word, then it does 
not presuppose acts of thought. It does not presuppose, either 
for the speaker or for his audience, an idea or a representation 
of what is to be said or of what is being said. 
"The orator does not think before speaking, nor even 
while speaking: his speech is his thought. In the same 
way the listener does not form concepts on the basis of 
signs. The orator's "thought" is empty while he is 
speaking and, when a text is read to us, provided that 
it is read with expression, we have no thought marginal 
to the text itself, for the words fully occupy our mind 
and exactly fulfil our expectations, and we feel the 
necessity of speech." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:180) 
If speech is an original relation to its world and if, as 
Merleau-Ponty says, speech for the orator is his thought, or 
thinking can be "in the throat", then this thinking must not be 
equated with the thinking of a psychological ego, i.e. with a 
contingent process which only duplicates or mirrors a situation 
or an object in the world. It is not with thinking in the 
psychological sense, that Merleau-Ponty equates the orator's 
speech, but with thinking in the transcendental sense, vrith the 
thinking of a last subject, which is indistinguishable from the 
emergence of the world itself. 
Clearly, just as we distinguished between the transcendental and 
psychological ego's we must distinguish between authentic and 
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inauthentic speech. There are of course occasions in which the 





If I repeat words or sentences as part of a game, or if 
speech I attempt to deceive others, my speech will be the 
I 
have 
relate to, rather than my access to an object. Ve 
to show that authentic speech does not presuppose the 
ability to pronounce words and sentences as objects, and that 
our ability to understand authentic speech does not presuppose 
an ability to hear the words as a series of sounds. 
In our approach to speech and linguistic behaviour, we cannot 
begin with the distinctions made in the natural attitude, the 
distinctions between images, thoughts and reality. The 
ontological 
which is 
status of the world which is grasped in speech or 
made 
thought. Vi thin 
to exist through speech cannot be constituted in 
the bounds of the natural attitude there are 
only two modes of being, the being of the thing, or the being of 
thought. It should be clear that if speech is an original 
relation, if speech brings a world into existence for us, or if 
it is able to reach back to the past event itself without 
images, then it is not simply a power of evoking thoughts, nor 
on th other hand is it a magician like production of substance. 
Speech is not one of the processes in the world; nor is it 
equivalent to the act of a constituting consciousness. The mode 
of existence of the speech act and the mode of existence of the 
object grasped in speech, can only be approached from within 
speech. 
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"A story is told in a children's book of the 
disappointment of a small boy who put on his 
grandmother's spectacles and took up her book in the 
expectation of being able himself to find in it the 
stories which she used to tell him. The tale ends with 
these words: 'Yell, what a fraud! Yhere's the story? I 
can see nothing but black and white? For the child the 
'story' and the thing expressed are not 'ideas' or 
'meanings', nor are speaking or reading 'intellectual 
operations'. The story is a world which there must be 
some way of magically calling up by putting on 
spectacles and leaning over a book. The power possessed 
by language of bringing the thing expressed into 
existence, of opening up to thought new ways, new 
dimensions and new landscapes, is, in the last analysis 
as obscure for the adult as for the child." 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:401) 
Herleau-Ponty often speaks of the meaning or significance of a 
gesture or of a word, (1962:183/7) but this meaning or 
signification must not be taken to imply a cognitive act. The 
meaning is a world (1962:184) and it is the speech act itself 
that has this world "in hand", that strains towards it, 
delineates or sings it. Consequently there is no necessity for 
either speaker or audience to have the meaning "in mind". 
"Yhat then does language express, if it does not 
express thoughts? It presents or rather it is the 
subject's taking up of a position in the world of his 
meanings. The term 'world' here is not a manner of 
speaking: it means that the 'mental' or cultural life 
borrows its structures from natural life and that the 
thinking subject must have its basis in the subject 
incarnate." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:193) 
To say that the orator's speech is his thought is to say that he 
has no privileged access to, or no better idea of what he is 
expressing, than his audience. 
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"Even we who speak do not necessarily know better than 
those who listen to us what we are expressing." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1974:88) 
" my spoken words surprise me myself and teach me 
my thoughts." (Merleau-Ponty, 1974:85) 
"One does not know what one is saying, one knows after 
one has said it". (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:46) 
" one speaks not only of what one knows, so as to 
set out a display of it - but also of what one does not 
know, in order to know it " (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968: 102) 
It is wrong to insist that speaking and understanding speech 
presuppose acts of consciousness, acts in which the ideas 
expressed are formulated or entertained in the mind. Speech is 
not simply an external representation of an internal cognitive 
act, or a representation of an experience. The ideas expressed 
in speech cannot be grasped in any way other than through the 
speaking gesture. Ye will attempt to show, for example, that 
children are able to use correctly and understand, tense 
grammar, long before they are able to grasp the idea of past, 
present and future. 
"Language has, therefore a peculiar signification which 
is the more evident the more we surrender ourselves to 
it, and the less equivocal the less we think of it. 
This signification resists any direct seizure but is 
docile to the incantation of language." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1973:116) 
If I attempt to reflect in an unbiased way on my experience of 
speaking, I will not be led back to a thinking subject which has 
an immediate relation to its cogitata, on the contrary, the 
movement of return into myself will be "rent by an inverse 
• 
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movement which it elicits". The impossibility of a complete 
reduction, will testify that I am a subject, 
" ... who has no access to any truth nor to any thought 
with a claim to universality except through the 
practice of his language in a definite linguistic 
situation." (Herleau-Ponty, 1974:266) 
Yhat Herleau-Ponty argues and what we will attempt to 
demonstrate is that this illusion we have of an inner life, of 
embracing in thought a pure essence, has been produced by 
language. 
"The wonderful thing about language is that it promotes 
its own oblivion: my eyes follow the lines on the 
paper, and from the moment I am caught up in their 
meaning, I lose sight of them." (Herleau-Ponty, 
1962:401) 
" ... Expression fades out before what is expressed ••• 
This certainty which we enjoy of reaching, beyond 
expression, a truth separable from it and of which 
expression is merely the garment and contingent 
manifestation, has been implanted in us precisely by 
language." (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:401) 
If speech is an original relation to its world then the speech 
act is not one of the processes in the world and it is not 
necessary to "control" the speech organs. In fact, if it were 
conceivable that I could "control" the speech organs, it would 
mean that they existed as things in the world. The genuine 
original relation would not be between speech and its object, 
but between a thinking subject and its speech organs. 
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Vithin the bounds of traditional thought, a speech act is either 
made up of automatisms, or it is a consciously executed act, 
presupposing kinesthetic information and verbal images, or 
representations of the verbal act to be executed. The 
kinesthetic information would give me, at every moment the 
degree to which muscles of the organs of phonation are 
contracted or extended, enabling me to control them, while the 
verbal image, would serve as the pattern to be copied. Our 
reflections on aphasic speech will enable us to recognize that 
normal speech does not presuppose kinesthetic information or 
verbal images, just as Merleau-Ponty's reflections on 
Schneider's syndrome, enabled him to show that the grasping act 
does not presuppose a motor image of the act to be executed. 
"Vhen I am actually speaking I do not first figure the 
movements involved." (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:19) 
"Speaking subject: it is the subject of a praxis. It 
does not hold before itself the words said and 
understood as objects of thought or ideates. It 
possesses them only by a Vorhabe which is of the same 
type as the Vorhabe of place by my body that betakes 
itself unto that place." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:201) 
"The speaking subject does not think of the sense of 
what he is saying, nor does he visualize the words he 
is using. To know a word or a language is ... not to be 
able to bring into play any pre - established nervous 
network. But neither is it to retain some 'pure 
recollection' of the word, some faded perception ... I 
do not need to visualize the word in order to pronounce 
it." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:180) 
"To speak, as we have seen, is not to call up verbal 
images and articulate words in accordance with the 
imagined model. By undertaking a critical examination 
of the verbal image, and showing that the speahng 
subject plunges into speech without imagining the words 
he is about to utter, modern psychology eliminates the 
word as a representation, or as an object for 
consciousness, and reveals a motor presence of the word 
which is not the knowledge of the word." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:403) 
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"In the same manner, the sentence of a speaker must be 
organized all by itself, as it were, as happens in fact 
in the normal use of language in which an awareness of 
the means of expression for themselves, ~he 
contemplation of verbal images', is already a 
pathological phenomenon." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:87) 
But to say that the sentence "must be organized all by itself", 
without the contemplation of verbal images, is not to say that 
the execution is automatic or a reflex. 
If speech is an original relation to the world then the speech 
organs cannot be conceived as an external instrument, as 
extended matter, but as the living envelope of my intentional 
grasping of the world. It is not with the objective, 
physiological body that I speak and I do not have to execute a 
series of articulemes in accordance with an objectively 
definable grammatical structure. The act of speaking is not the 
movement of the organs of phonation in space, but is like the 
movements of the eyes in focussing, progress towards 
reality. Ve will be obliged to introduce automatisms, or pre -
established nerve connections, only if we maintain the natural 
attitude thesis of speech being a physical process in the 
objective world and the organs of speech being defined as 
physiological entities. 
"Thus thinking can be 'in the throat,' as the children 
questioned by Piaget say it is, without any 
contradiction or confusion of the extended and the non 
extended, because the throat is not yet an ensemble 
of vibrating cords capable of producing the sonorous 
phenomena of language." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:189) 
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As we have argued above the grammatical forms of past, present 
and future, exist as objective structures neither for the 
speaker nor for his audience. The man standing twenty meters 
away, we said, is perceived as neither smaller nor the same size 
as when he is standing close by. He is perceived as "the same 
man seen from a distance". \le must now recognize that if we 
compared authentic speech acts, one delineating an event in the 
present 
would 
and the other, the same event in the past, the two acts 
be neither the same, nor different, they would be 
incomparable. The second would be "the-same-event-sunken-into-
the past", grasped from the present. 
There is no necessity for the past grammatical forms to be 
actualized either consciously or automatically, and there is no 
necessity for them to be perceived and understood, whether 
consciously or unconsciously. It is enough that in my speaking I 
reach back to the past event. If thinking can be "in the throat" 
then, like the eye, in space, speech is a power of reaching 
through layers of time to where its object is. For the speaker, 
the time separating the present from the past is not an 
externality but a measure of this reaching, and pronouncing the 
past grammatical structure is not to execute movements, in space 
and in the present, it is to reach back. My most original 
relation to this "past", is not to think it, or represent it to 
myself in some or other way but to grasp it in speaking. For the 
child, learning to use the past and future grammatical forms is 
indistinguishable from situating himself with respect to past 
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and future temporal dimensions, which he does not grasp in 
thought but which are dimensions of his co-existence Speech like 
grasping, presents us with the paradox of immanence and 
transcendence. Vhile it opens up to its world it nevertheless 
has and is an outside, and is therefore accessible to others. 
Even though it is accessible to others we cannot establish a 
numerical distinction between the act and the object grasped. 
This means that although it has an outside it is not a process 
taking place in objective time and cannot therefore be divided 
into separate articulemes, or into separate phonemes. It is 
literally the same thing to grasp in speech one indivisible 
signification, and to use the articulemes as one indivisible 
verbal act. 
" ... the significance is what comes to 
to gather up the multiplicity of 
physiological, linguistic means of 
contract them into one sole act, as the 
complete the aesthesiological body." 
1968:154) 
seal, to close, 
the physical, 
elocution, to 
vision comes to 
(Merleau-Ponry, 
Ve must substitute for the ontology of being, an ontology of 
grasping, so that just as two fingers or two eyes can become one 
indivisible organ of grasping, so the various articulemes can 
become one indivisible verbal act, without there having to be 
mechanisms which would co-ordinate them. In the execution of the 
verbal act each articuleme embraces the entire act. As I speak 
the preceding articulemes are not lost sight of, they are 
dovetailed into the present. From the outset the speech act is 
at its goal. Since the speech act is accessible to others, what 
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we have said of articulemes, we can say of phonemes. 
Certainly speech is not thought and it does not constitute its 
meaning or its object. Speech only possesses its object at a 
distance. The relationship between the speech act and its object 
is not the relationship of the binding to the bound. Although we 
cannot establish a numerical distinction between the two, the 
signification that my speaking grasps, always eludes it, is 
never possessed by it. My speaking "strains towards" it rather 
than embracing it fully. 
" the spoken word (the one I utter or the one I 
hear) is pregnant with a meaning which can be read in 
the very texture of the linguistic gesture ... and yet 
it is never contained in that gesture, every expression 
always appearing to me as a trace, no idea being given 
to me except in transparency, and every attempt to 
close our hand on the thought which dwells in the 
spoken word leaving only a bit of verbal material in 
our fingers." (Merleau-Ponty, 1974:86) 
"Thus signification resists any direct seizure 
docile to the incantation of language. It is 
there when we start to evoke it but always a bit 






"Ideas that are too much possessed are no longer ideas; 
I no longer think anything when I speak of them, as if 
it were essential to the essence that it be for 
tomorrow, as if it were only a tacking thread in the 
fabric of the words." (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:119) 
Speaking and understanding speech is not constituting or 
dreaming because the world to be delineated, or subtended, the 
past and future to be reached, are always "already there". Like 
the grasping act, the speech act projects itself towards a 
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world, aims at a world. To speak is to allow one-self to 
respond to a call which is made upon one's speech independently 
of any representation. In order that I may express something, or 
aim at something in speech, the "object" must first of all exist 
for my speaking. In order for me to use the past tense grammar 
in authentic speech, the past must exist for my speaking. Just 
as Merleau-Ponty shows that objects no longer exist for the arm 
of the apraxic, we will show that motor forms of aphasia are 
neither due to a mental deficiency or to motor disturbances of 
the speech organs, but due to the fact that the world of objects 
which speech aims at no longer exists, or has been severely 
diminished for the aphasic's speech. For the non-aphasic the 
state of affairs to be expressed exerts an irresistible 
attraction, sets a muddled problem for his speech to solve. 
"Schneider never feels the need to speak; his 
experience never tends towards speech, it never 
suggests a question to him, it never ceases to have 
that kind of self-evidence and self-sufficiency of 
reality which stifles any interrogation, any reference 
to the possible, any wonder, any improvisation." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:196) 
For the non-aphasic on the other hand, 
"Signification arouses speech as the world arouses my 
body by a mute presence which awakens my intentions 
without deploying itself before them. In me as well as 
in the listener who finds it in hearing me, the 
significative intention is at the moment no more 
than a determinate gap to be filled by words " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1974:86) 
223 
Speech is not the handmaid of consciousness, it is the 
maturation of the situation. Just as the visible takes hold of 
the look, so the signification to be grasped takes possession of 
my speech. This "mute presence" of the signification to my 
speech, this attraction at a distance, resembles for 
Merleau-Ponty the presence of the entire musical composition, 
not to the thoughts of the musician performing it, but to his 
playing. 
"The performer is no longer producing or reprodudng 
the sonata: he feels himself, and the others feel him 
to be at the service of the sonata; the sonata sings 
through him or cries out so suddenly that he must 'dash 
on his bow' to follow it." (1968:151) 
But it is not so much that my speech is at the service of the 
signification, but that our speech is at the service of a 
truth for us. The "object" exerts an irresistible attraction, 
or is present to our speaking, rather than to his or my 
speaking. My speech merges with the speech of the other to form 
one indivisible whole so that, not only is it impossible to tell 
whether I speak or whether it is the situation that speaks 
through me, but it is also impossible to tell whether I speak or 
the other. 
"In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted 
between the other person and myself a common ground; my 
thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my 
words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by 
the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into 
a shared operation of which neither of us is the 
creator." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:354) 
"Speaking is not just my own initiative, listening is 
not submitting to the initiative of the other, because 
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as speaking subjects we are continuing, we are resuming 
a common effort more ancient than we, upon which we are 
grafted to one another and which is the manifestation 
of truth." (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 144) 
In the dialogue our behaviours concord, reinforce, echo each 
other so that ultimately they comprise one indivisible act of 
grasping, so that there is no necessity for any mechanisms 
responsible for the co-ordinating reciprocity. There are no 
causal relations between his behaviour and mine and no acts of 
interpretation, there is only one common signification. It is 
literally the same thing for both of us to be directed towards 
one unique world and for our speaking and listening to become 
one indivisible grasping act. This means that the distinction 
between speaking and listening, in the dialogue, becomes 
blurred, just as in binocular vision we can no longer 
distinguish the contributions made by left and right eyes taken 
separately. 
"Speaking and listening, action and perception, are 
quite distinct operations for me only when I reflect 
upon them." (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:18/19) 
Certainly if I am genuinely to be drawn into the other's 
perspective or if he can slip into mine from behind, we cannot 
begin with the assumptions of the natural attitude viz. that we 
are numerically distinguishable monads, each confined to his own 
perspective. Speech manifests that circular relation to the 
world which we have found in perception. The more carefully I 
attempt to confine myself in my reflections to my own experience 
225 
of speaking the more I discover myself as my audience. Speech 
demands the contradiction of my being for myself and my being 
for others. 
In our reflections on language we will have to show that the 
distinctions between myself and the other, between speaking and 
listening, between being active and passive, are in a certain 
sense secondary. Merleau-Ponty refers to hallucinations which 
affect the experience of speaking and listening which Fould be 
incomprehensible if the distinction between myself and the 
other, between speaking and listening were fundamental 
"Certain sick people believe that someone else is 
talking inside their head or in their body, or that 
someone else is talking when it is they themselves who 
are pronouncing or at least mouthing the words. 
'Whatever one's view of the relation between healthy and 
pathological behaviour, speech must, in its normal 
functioning, be of such a nature that disorders in it 
are always possible. There must be something in the 
very heart of speech which makes it susceptible to 
these pathologies." (1973:17) 
"If the patient hears voices in his head, this is 
because he does not absolutely distinguish himself from 
others and because, for example, when he speaks, he can 
just as well believe that someone else is speaking. The 
patient, says Vallon, has the impression of being 
'without boundaries' in relation to the other, and this 
is what makes his acts, his speech, and his thoughts 
appear to him to belong to others or to be imposed by 
others Lagache thinks that the question 'How can we 
understand a subject who believes that he is hearing 
when it is he who is speaking?' can be answered only if 
one conceives language to be a kind of 'we-operation' 
(operation a' deux]. There is a sort of indistinction 
between the act of speaking and the act of hearing ... 
In a dialogue, the participants occupy both poles at 
once, and it is this that explains why the phenomenon 
of 'speaking' can pass into that of 'hearing'. It is 
the primordial unity that reappears in pathological 
cases Vhat this observation reveals when we rid 
ourselves of sensationalist prejudices, says Vallon, is 
226 
the 'inability to distinguish the active from the 
passive' myself from the other." (1964:134) 
Yhat is important here is that if the distinctions between 
speaking and listening are secondary, if we can speak of a 
'we-operation', then, whatever we have said about the relation 
between the speaker and his speech we can say about the listener 
and the speech he hears. For the orator, we said, his speech is 
his thought. There is no thought marginal to his speaking. He 
doesn't need to think about what he wishes to say, nor does he 
need to listen to his own speech to be sure that it expresses 
what he had intended. He can be sure that he means what he says 
without having to compare his uttered speech with his 
'intentions'. The orator's speech is not an object for him. He 
is his speech, and in speaking he establishes an original 
relation to the signification. Speaking is a last relationship. 
For the listener, the orators's speech is also a last relation 
to its world, it is not an object for him and there is no need 
to perceive it or understand it because there is no 
numerical distinction between the act and the object it grasps. 
It is enough that he becomes drawn into this "we-operation" in 
order for him to open up to the signification itself, the 
identical signification that the speaker grasps in his speech. 
"Yhen I am listening, it is not necessary that I have 
an auditory perception of the articulated sounds but 
that the conversation pronounces itself within me. It 
summons me and grips me; it envelops and inhabits me to 
the point that I cannot tell what comes from me and 
what from it." (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:19) 
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Like the orator, the listener has a last relation vrith the 
signification grasped. This means that there is for me as a 
listener, no necessity to verify my access to the signification. 
Being a last relation, we cannot establish a numerical 
distinction between the signification 
signification grasped by the listener. 
itself, and the 





are secondary, if the notion of a "we-operation" is 
a manner of speaking, our reflections on language and 
behaviour will oblige us to give up the ontology of 
adopt an ontology of acts, so that in the dialogue, 
our reciprocity can become one act of grasping and so one 
'Cyclopean vision', without the necessity of causal mechanisms 
or acts of understanding. 
228 
FOOTNOTES 
1) "For phenomenology, however language is not an 
object but a mediation, that is to say, it is that 
by which and through which we move towards reality 
(whatever it may be). For phenomenology, language 
consists in saying something about something: it 
thereby escapes towards what it says; it goes beyond 
itself and dissolves in its intentional movement of 
reference." (Ricoeur, 1967:16) 
Merleau-Ponty points out that this approach to language is 
already present in many of Husserl's writings 
"In more recent writings, on the other hand, 
language appears as an original way of intending 
certain objects, as thought's body ... " (1974:81) 
"In Formal and Transcendental Logic, 
during his lifetime, he already expressly 
that to speak is not at all to translate 
into words. It is rather to see a certain 





2) "It may seem that our friends, being who they are, 
could not be called by any other names, that in 
naming them we simply deciphered what was required 
by eyes that colour, a face like that, that walk -
though some are misnamed and all their lives carry a 
false name or pseudonym (like a wig or mask). In the 
same way, an expression and what it expresses 
strangely alternate and, through a sort of false 
recognition, make us feel that the word has 
inhabited the thing from all eternity." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973:6) 
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PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE SCIENCES OF LANGUAGE 
The notion of the speaking subject that we have been led to in 
this comparison with the grasping subject, shares in all the 
contradictions of 
world yet it 
the 
is 
latter. Speech is a last relation to its 
accessible to others, it demands the 
contradiction of immanence and transcendence. In my speech my 
access to the world and the access of others to me are 
indistinguishable. The object which speech grasps is neither 
real nor is it a cogitatum. There is no numerical distinction 
between speech and the object it grasps, yet my speech is 
irresistibly beckoned by it. Speech makes its object exist and 
yet the object precedes it and transcends it. Can a philosophy 
take as fundamental notions, notions which involve such 
irresolvable contradictions? Vhy is this entire enterprise not 
reductio ad absurdum argument show~ng the 
overcoming Husserl's problem of accounring for 
other subjects, or the impossibility of a 
ultimately a 
impossibility of 
the existence of 
philosophy which attempts to 
while remaining committed 
solve 
to an 
the problem of solipsism 
informal intelligibility? 
Merleau-Ponty's reply would be that in his description of the 
grasp and its relation to the world, (made possible through an 
analysis of Schneider's syndrome), we must discover a broader 
concept of rationality, a new and more radical manner of 
understanding and reflecting, than is possible within the bounds 
of traditional thought. 
The 
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"It will perhaps be maintained that a philosophy cannot 
be centred around a contradiction, and that all our 
descriptions, since they ultimately defy thought, are 
quite meaningless. The objection would be valid if we 
were content to lay bare, under the term phenomenon or 
phenomenological field, a layer of prelogical or 
magical experiences. For in that case we should have to 
choose between believing the descriptions and 
abandoning thought, or knowing what we are talking 
about and abandoning our descriptions. These 
descriptions need to provide us with an opportunity of 
defining a variety of comprehension and reflection 
altogether more radical than objective thought." 
(1962:365) 
contradictions of the speaking subject and its 
relations to the world and others cannot be resolved in 
thought. Nor is it a question of simply labelling or 
defining the speaking subject as that which demands the 
contradiction of immanence and transcendence. It is not a 
question of turning notions like 'body consciousness' or 
'being-beyond-oneself' into formal concepts and then 
proceeding by a mechanical manipulation of these terms. 
Nor, on the other hand is it a question of relying on a 
power of pure intuition which would enable us to grasp the 
resolution of these contradictions. It would be 
contradictory for a phenomenological philosopher to achieve 
an unambiguous, untrammeled reflection on his rootedness in 
the world. Merleau-Ponty was critical of philosophers Hke 
Scheler and Heidegger who on the one hand, assert that man 
is a being-in-the-world and that he is unable to withdraw 
from the world in order to be conscious of himself and his 
relation to the world, and yet on the other hand, assume 
for the reflecting philosopher an unconditional 
231 
philosophical intuition. 
"Scheler expresses the curious juxtaposition of a 
philosophy which on the one hand seeks 'alogical 
essences' and on the other hand conceives of itself as 
having an unconditioned power of arriving at the truth. 
This comment also applies to Heidegger, who devotes 
himself to the description of being in the world. One 
might expect, therefore, that the philosopher who finds 
himself thrown into the world might also find some 
difficulty in arriving at an adequate state of 
knowledge. But Heidegger defines the attitude of the 
philosopher without recognizing any restriction on the 
absolute power of philosophical thought." (1964:94) 
For Merleau-Ponty, 
language, rests on language ... that 
can be known only from within, through 
open upon the things, called forth by the 
silence, and continues an effort of 







It is because philosophy is not based on a pure intuition or 
pure thought that it can grasp or open up to a world that could 
not be embraced in thought. While a notion like the subject 
demanding the contradiction of immanence and transcendence, 
being simultaneously natura naturans and natura naturatus, 
cannot be resolved in thought, it is "docile to the incantation 
of language". The philosopher's writing is not a recording of 
the intuitions he has been led to through the reduction. His 
writing is the performance of the reduction and is his 
reflection. Reflection is thus no longer a private withdrawal 
into the self. It is not possible to distinguish between 
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Merleau-Ponty's analyses and the essences he wishes to reveal. 
For the phenomenological philosopher himself his speech is not 
the handmaid of consciousness, it teaches him what he wanted to 
say. 
"This book, once begun, is not a certain set of ideas; 
it constitutes for me an open situation, for which I 
could not possibly provide any complex formula, and in 
which I struggle blindly on until, miraculously, 
thoughts and words become organized by themselves." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:369) 
Even though I may be sure that I have understood the notton of a 
body consciousness, whenever I withdraw into myself to reflect 
on this "understanding" I find that I am thrown beyond myself 
into speech. My only way of representing to myself the essence 
of the body consciousness is by taking up the cases 
Merleau-Ponty considers, or similar ones, and dealing with them 
in an analogous way. In this way we will attempt to reflect on 
the paradoxical existence of a speaking subject and his being 
amongst others, in a discussion of the various forms of aphasia. 
But if phenomenological reflection and speech cannot be 
distinguished does this not imply that we have returned to 
formalism and given up the pursuit of the informal essence? If 
my speech is my reflection, will the essence I reveal be genuine 
essences or merely concepts rooted in language (Merleau-Ponty, 
1974:259), if the philosophers speech is his thought, hov can he 
avoid installing himself in the order of things said, how can he 
avoid "word-meanings", avoid providing a verbal substitute for 
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the world we see? 
Like our inherence in the world and in history, speech both cuts 
us off from the world and opens up to the world. It will be a 
source of error and inauthenticity for as long as truth is 
defined in terms of the absolute relation between consciousness 
and its object, but we have seen a new concept of being in 
truth, one which does not presuppose that I am a pure 
constituting consciousness. Ve have seen that my most original 
experience of truth is an experience of having an outside and 
waking up to a world which is already there, which surrounds me, 
transcends me and presupposes that in some way I am ahrays cut 
off from it and only 'strain' towards it. In the same way, 
authentic speech, while it is not the handmaid of consciousness, 
grasps a world that transcends it, that lies beyond the world of 
things said. Unlike the definition and the formal system of 
symbols, authentic speech is a response to a truth that exerts 
on it an 'attraction at a distance'. If we wish to break with 
the world of pre-constituted speech, the world in which we are 
confined to what 'one says', we need a speech which is supple 
enough to allow it to be taken possession of by this 
signification which transcends it, just as the perceived object 
takes possession of the gaze, a speech therefore, which would 
allow things to speak for themselves. 
"It would be a language of which he [the philosopher] 
would not be the organizer, words he would not 
assemble, that would combine through him by virtue of a 
natural intertwining ... " (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:125) 
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Particularly in the Phenomenology of Perception and The 
Structure of Behaviour, Merleau-Ponty reveals a method of 
taking up Husserl's thought without simply repeating what he has 
said. By bringing the Husserlian project, the idea of the 
reduction, the idea of the informal essence, into contact with 
the sciences of human behaviour, he was able to delineate 
notions, such as the notion of the incarnate subject and its 
world, which couldn't be resolved in thought, or intuited in a 
withdrawal into the self. 1 This implies that phenomenology 
does not precede the behavioural sciences. It is not as if we 
must first of all discover through reflection on ourselves, the 
informal essences on which the intelligibility of these sciences 
rests. Unlike for Scheler and Heidegger, for Merleau-Ponty there 
is an interdependence between phenomenology and the behavioural 
sciences. 
" when Scheler defines intuition of essence in his 
famous book on Ethics, he says that we may know an 
essence without the slightest intervention of physical, 
physiological, psychological or historical factors 
arising from our individuality. He maintains that, in 
seeing the 'unities of ideal meaning', there is no need 
to pay any attention to these factors of peculiarity 
at the beginning of Sein und Zeit, he [Heidegger] 
said that the task of philosophy is to explore the 
natural concept of the world, independently of science, 
by the primordial experience we have of it. To 
determine the structure of that natural world, he adds, 
it is not at all necessary to have recourse to 
ethnology or to psychology. Those disciplines 
presuppose a philosophical knowledge of the natural 
world and one can never find the principle which will 
enable us to order psychological or ethnographical 
facts by making inductions from these facts. In order 
to do this, the spirit itself must first possess the 
principle." (1964:93/4) 
Merleau-Ponty argues 
matured, the relation 
be one of opposition 
philosophy. Husserl 
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that even for Husserl, as his thought 
between philosophy and science ceased to 
or one of the absolute priority of 
too recognized a relationship of 
interdependence and reciprocity. 
does not precede the science of 
discover the informal essences 
This means that phenomenology 
neurolinguistics. We cannot 
of speaking listening, and 
understanding in some pure reflection on ourselves; a reflection 
owing nothing to our historical and social situation and owing 
nothing to the state of neurolinguistics and aphasiology. As in 
binocular perception we can be thrown into a three dimensional 
world which is neither an object of thought nor a 
superimposition of monocular images, so in taking up the basic 
problems of neurolinguistics and bringing them into the context 
of Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological philosophy, we 
can, through our analyses, be awakened to a world of 
signification which could neither 
intuition, nor conceived within the 
neurolinguistics itself. 
be grasped in a pure 
scientific standpoint of 




Many of his works such as The Vorking 
Aphasia and Basic Problems of 
come to occupy a central position in 
contemporary discourse on aphasia and have become the standard 
texts in teaching programs on speech pathology. This reputation 
seems to be due, not only to his meticulous attention to detail, 
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but also to his attempt to take into account the contributions 
made by both intellectualists like Goldstein and Jackson and 
atomists like Broca and Vernicke. 
Luria presents his investigations, conclusions and theories 
within the traditional scientific framework. He appears to 
accept the naturalistic assumption of a clear dichotomy of the 
body and the mind, of a physiological realm and a psychological 
realm. Ve will attempt to demonstrate that the phenomena Luria 
reveals and many of the expressions he adopts in his 
explanations are incompatible with this naturalistic dichotomy. 
Ve will try to show how an unbiased account of the various forms 
of aphasia bring out by contrast, certain features of normal 
speech and speech perception which corroborate the theory of 
language we have been lead to. Ve will see also that our 
descriptions and analyses provide us with an opportunity of 
defining a variety of comprehension and reflection altogether 
more radical than objective thought (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:365). 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) Ve disagree therefore with Spiegelberg who suggests that 
Merleau-Ponty had reached an understanding of his position 
before his critical discussions of the traditional views. He 
suggests that it would be possible to isolate his 
"phenomenological insights" from the context of his discursive 
arguments. 
"Most of the presentation of his own position takes 
the form of simple assertions of findings that he 
seems to have made long before. Rarely does he carry 
out the analysis before our very eyes or invite us 
to look with him at the phenomena by a methodical 
and painstaking investigation. Instead, he gives us 
his results ready-made leaving it to us to do our 
own verifying. These results are usually imbedded in 
the context of a discursive argument without being 
identified as new and original intuitions. Hence if 
one wants to isolate his most original 
phenomenological insights, it is necessary to 
extricate them from the context which is not made 
any easier by the often inordinately long paragraphs 
of his texts". (1969:559) 
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APHASIAS AFFECTING THE PERCEPTION AND UNDERSTANDING OF SPEECH 
Luria identifies and distinguishes between two main forms of 
aphasia affecting the perception and understanding of speech. 
They are Semantic aphasia and Sensory (or Acoustico-Gnostic) 
aphasia. He lists and describes other forms (1976:202/29) but we 
will attempt to show that these can be dealt with as forms of 
Semantic aphasia once its true nature has been established. 
SEMANTIC APHASIA 
In many forms of aphasia, but particularly in the syndromes 
Luria describes as semantic aphasia patients are able to 
understand simple phrases, but are unable to cope with complex 
constructions, particularly those constructions which relate 
various parts of a sentence to one another. 
"The patients of this group (i.e. those suffering from 
"semantic aphasia") have definite difficulty in 
understanding sentences with a complex system of 
subordinate or relative clauses, especially sentences 
containing the relative pronoun "which" or still more, 
prepositions and copulatives such as "despite", 
"instead of", and so on However, the greatest 
difficulty of all, and one which is virtuaJ.ly 
insurmountable, occurs whenever these patients are 
confronted with constructions expressing the relations 
of one object with another and, in particular, 
reversible constructions of the type we have already 
discussed ("the father's brother" "the brother's 
father"), constructions expressing spatial or temporal 
relations ("a circular under a square" and "a square 
under a circle", "Peter went in front of John" and 
"John went in front of Peter", "summer before spring" 
or "spring before summer") ... and in particular, all 
comparative constructions ("an elephant is bigger than 
a fly" and "a fly is bigger than an elephant; and, more 
especially, "Olga is fairer than Sonya but darker than 
Kate"). In all such cases the patients of this group 
easily understand the individual lexical elements of 
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the construction (nouns, verbs, adjectives, and even 
copulatives), but all these elements remain isolated 
and are not united into the essential logical-grammat-
ical systems Having listened to the expression "a 
cross below a circle" or "an elephant is bigger than a 
fly", such a patient will be unable to decode the 
expression or relationship and will helplessly exclaim: 
"Vha t can it be . . . a cross . . . and a square . . . and 
below but I can't put them together ... " or "an 
elephant well of course an elephant is big ... and 
the fly of course it is small ... and so you see 
"an elephant is bigger than a fly" ... or "a fly is 
bigger than an elephant" ... something must be right-
I can't make head or tail of it" (Luria, 1976:197/8). 
How are we to understand the above deficiencies? If the patient 
is able to understand the individual parts of the sentence, but 
is unable to put them together, it would seem that understanding 
a complex sentence consists of at least two distinct operations; 
grasping the meanings of the individual parts of the sentence 
and grasping the relationships between them and so grasping the 
general meaning of the sentence as a whole. In the semantic 
aphasic it would appear that while the former operation has 
remained intact (in contrast to the sensory aphasic), the latter 
operation has been disrupted. If the patient is unable to grasp 
relationships such as bigger than, below etc., the syndrome 
would seem to be due to a weakness of the understanding. The 
aphasic appears to have lost the concept of 'bigger than' and 
this is why he is unable to relate the elephant and the fly or 
why he is unable to subsume elephant and fly under the concept 
of one thing being bigger than another. 
But explanations of this kind accord very little with the entire 
clinical picture which these patients present. Luria points out 
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that in spite of their aphasia, these patients are able to 
arrive at the general meaning of complex constructions by 
"guessing" the possible links between the fragments of a text 
presented to them. 
"The patients of this group can still make active 
efforts to grasp the general meaning of verbal 
communication. They can still obtain guidance from the 
intonational and melodic (prosodic) organization of 
expression and they steadfastly attempt to 
reconstruct the general meaning of a text; indeed they 
may have partial success as a result of their efforts 
to join together the fragments of a semantic text as 
they come to them, by guessing possible links between 
them, avoiding distraction by irrelevant associations, 
never going beyond the bounds of the context, and 
attempting to use this context as a means of 
compensating for their primary speech defects. 





feature which enables the patients _of this 
create hypotheses regarding the general 
a fragment, although they can never be 
sure that they have understood the meaning 
(Luria, 1976:198) 
Rather than presenting a picture of intellectual deficiency 
these patients show remarkable intellectual ability and it is 
quite clear that 'concepts' have not been lost, since without 
the concept "bigger than" the 'hypothesis' or the 'guess' would 
be impossible. On the contrary, what characterises these 
patients, and what distinguishes them from the non-aphasic is 
that their only possibility of understanding the sentence is 
through such an intellectual operation. The aphasic goes about 
deciphering a given sentence in the same way that the student of 
a foreign language translates a difficult text. Given the 
meanings of the individual words, both are obliged to invent a 
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series of hypotheses about the meaning of the whole and then to 
cross-check each hypothesis with the given words. 
The procedures carried out by the patient contrast with, and by 
so doing throw into relief, the spontaneous and direct access of 
normal perception in which the meaning of the expression as a 
whole is immediately grasped. The sentence as a whole expresses 
one indivisible meaning embodied in the sentence as an 
indivisible gestalt. The words do not have to be perceived or 
deciphered individually. 
Ve can say of the patient, what Herleau-Ponty says of Schneider, 
"The thought of others will never be present to him, 
since he has no immediate experience of it. The words 
of others are for him signs which have to be severally 
deciphered, instead of being, as with the normal 
subject, the transparent envelope of a meaning within 
which he might live. Like events, words are for the 
patient not the theme of an act of drawing together or 
projecting, but merely the occasion for a methodical 
interpretation." (1962:133) 
The procedures carried out by these patients remind us of the 
procedures we argued, could be used to compensate for a lack of 
intuitive insight into the way the volume of a cube would change 
if the length of its sides was doubled. Ve could compensate 
through a series of steps in which we blindly adhere to the 
formula for the volume of a cube, and the rules for the 
manipulation of symbols (see above pages 23/4). 
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Luria cites some of the procedures used by patients to arrive at 
an understanding of constructions like 'the elephant is bigger 
than a fly'. 
"I have seen patients with lesions of the left 
parieto-occipital cortex who could not grasp the 
meaning of such constructions over a period of 26 years 
and who eventually succeeded in decoding them only 
by an extended series of consecutive operations. For 
example, given the sentence "Slon bol'she mukhi" (an 
elephant is bigger than a fly), they say: "Slon 
(elephant) it is big ... "and so "bol'she mukhi" 
that means it is bigger, and the fly is smaller •.. 
the elephant is •.• bol'she, chem mukha ... that means 
that an elephant is ..• bol'she chem mukha (bigger than 
a fly)" and so on" (Luria, 1976:198). 
Basil Haigh, the translator of Luria's Basic Problems of 
Neurolinguistics, suggests that the basic principle underlying 
the use of these operations, is the substitution of one form of 
expressing a relation of comparison, in which 'chem" and the 
nominative case is used for another in which the genitive only 
is used. 
"Part of the difficulty is that in Russian the subject 
of comparison is expressed in the genitive case as a 
rule: slon (elephant, nom. sing.) bol'she (bigger" 
mukhi (than a fly, gen. sing. of mukha). "Mukhi" could 
also be nom or ace. pl., which adds to the confusion. 
The patient overcomes his difficulty by using the 
alternative construction which is similar to the 
English: slon bol'she chem (than) mukha (nom. sing)." 
Luria, 1976:228-229) 
Surely this explanation is unacceptable. Firstly, it does not 
take into account the other constructions which the patient is 
unable to understand, and secondly, if it were simply a question 
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of substituting one form of making the comparison with another 
this would surely have be recognized by Luria especially since 
he had studied the patient's syndrome for 26 years, and Luria 
would simply have described the syndrome as an inability to 
understand the use of the genitive in making comparisons. 
It appears rather that the procedures of the patient do not 
merely lead him through a reformulation of the expression to 
one which he is able to grasp in one indivisible act. On the 
contrary, the entire series of consecutive operations appears to 
be the patient's act of grasping, and resembles the processes 
through which Schneider comes to recognize the pen 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 13112) (see above pages 27/8). The 
patient's understanding advances 'pari passu', each part of the 
expression suggests certain associations. From "the elephant", 
the patient moves to "the elephant it is big", and from 
"big", he moves to "bigger", from "fly" he moves to "the fly 
it is small", etc. The patient proceeds blindly, using his 
knowledge of the world or simply exploiting associations between 
the words elephant and big, big and bigger, fly and small etc. 
This is evident from the fact that patients have more difficulty 
understanding expressions where they are unable to exploit this 
knowledge of the world or these associations between words. 
Luria explains the difference between the two types of 
expressions as follows: 
Two sentences expressing spatial relationships: (27a) 
"A picture hangs above the bed" (27b) "A circle 
above a square" are absolutely identical in their 
grammatical structure. However, in the first of them 
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the position of the picture is prompted by the 
listener's practical experience and the sentence has an 
unambiguous meaning which can be guessed without any 
special analysis of the formal construction; in the 
second case the spatial arrangement of the objects is 
not given by previous experience and decoding of the 
sentence as a whole depends on analysis of its 
grammatical construction." (Luria, 1976:169) 
In contrast, for the non-aphasic, the sentence 'speaks' and is 
significant, the arrangement of sounds "straight away 'means' 
something, whereas in the patient the meaning has to be brought 
in from elsewhere by a veritable act of interpretation" 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:131). 
Luria says that these patients have partial success in 
reconstructing the general meaning of a text by guessing the 
possible links between the parts of a sentence .•. "as a means 
of compensating for their primary speech defects". But what 
are these primary speech defects? The patient understands 'the 
elephant'; 'bigger than' and 'the fly' and with this 
understanding of the elements and by 'obtaining guidance from 
the intonational and melodic organization of expression' and by 
'avoiding distraction by irrelevant associations' etc., he is 
able to guess the meaning or produce an hypothesis about the 
meaning of the expression. Is Luria suggesting that for the 
non-aphasic there is some other way of arriving at the 'overall 
meaning'? Could he be suggesting that in the non aphasic the 
production of hypotheses takes place instantaneously and 
unconsciously and that the aphasic, having lost this unconscious 
automatic decoding function must carry out the process 
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consciously. But such an explanation relies on a rather bizarre 
account of normal perception and understanding of speech. If the 
process of understanding speech were automatic or unconscious I 
would never be sure whether the meaning I grasped was the 
meaning of the sentence or whether it was simply an idea 
produced in me by some irrelevant aspect of the sentence. 
Listening to someone speak would be like those experiences we 
have in dreams where someone speaks and the ideas they express 
somehow fill the mind without us having heard what was said. 
The explanation is incompatible with the syndrome. Luria points 
out that these patients who produce hypotheses are never 
completely sure that they have arrived at the correct 
interpretation. How is it possible then that the non-aphasic, 
who is not conscious of the rationality of his associations, 
since they are 'automatic', or for whom the hypothesis 
production is unconscious and for whom therefore, there is no 
guarantee that "irrelevant associations" have been avoided or 
that intonational and melodic information has been used 
correctly, how is it possible that he is confident that he has 
understood the meaning of the speech, while the aphasic, who 
performs all the required functions consciously and is therefore 
aware of the rationality of each step taken, is not confident? 
Ve cannot argue that the sense of certainty or confidence is 
'associated' or 'produced' only under certain circumstances such 
as when speech 
attempt to deal 
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is decoded unconsciously and automatically. Any 
with the sense of certainty in this way 
introduces all the difficulties attached to psychologism 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964:44) (see above pages 41/56). It would 
deprive the theorist and his audience of the right to accept as 
true any argument or statement which presents itself as 
self-evident. 
The certainty or confidence of the non-aphasic suggests that he 
has another, more immediate relation to the meaning of the 
sentence, one which does not presuppose the association of ideas 
or the production of hypotheses. For as long as we remain with 
the assumptions of the natural attitude, as long as we begin by 
placing the speaker and perceiver in the world as two oistinct 
and parallel consciousnesses, any such immediate relation would 
be unthinkable. 
If my interpretation of the other's speech were based on an 
association of ideas or the production of hypotheses, I would 
never be sure of having reached the correct interpretation. I 
would ceaselessly be taking apart misleading associations, 
reintroducing parts of the sentence I had excluded in the first 
place, or reconsidering the intonational and melodic 
organization of the sentence. But this does not happen. The 
speech I hear does not await my acts of interpretation, it is 
meaningful immediately and all the parts and intonations have 
always already been taken into account. My greatest attempts at 
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being impartial in the construction of the hypotheses would 
never provide me with anything more than my 'opinion' about the 
possible meaning of the sentence (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:355) (See 
above page 75). 
The assumptions of the natural attitude will never enable us to 
understand this 'perceptual faith' for, placing the perceiver 
in the world, it will always transform it into a belief, i.e. 
something for which there can be reasons or proofs. Even though 
I sometimes make mistakes and my interpretation is not always 
perfect yet my certainty lies beyond proofs. 
"The methods of proof and of cognition invented by 
a thought already established in the world, the 
concepts of object and subject it introduces, do 
not enable us to understand what the perceptual faith 
is, precisely because it is a faith, that is, an 
adherence that knows itself to be beyond proofs, not 
necessary, interwoven with incredulity, at each instant 
menaced by non-faith." (Herleau-Ponty, 1968:28) 
To speak and to understand speech is to be thrown beyond one's 
own sphere of private thoughts and hypotheses, it is to have an 
openness onto others and onto speech which is pregnant with its 
meaning. 
LURIA'S NOTION OF SIMULTANEOUS SURVEYABILITY 
If understanding a sentence involves the production of an 
hypothesis about its overall meaning, then it is clear that all 
the parts of the sentence need to be taken into account. If the 
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sentence is perceived as it is pronounced, the parts of the 
sentence will succeed each other and the perceiver will need to 
recall the earlier parts to be considered with those that 
follow. If the entire sentence cannot be surveyed simultaneously 
in this way, the formation of an appropriate hypothesis will be 
impossible. This would mean that semantic aphasia was not due to 
a loss of concepts, but due to an inability to bring about a 
simultaneous presentation of all the parts of the sentence to 
the scrutiny of the hypothesis producing function. This is the 
explanation Luria himself prefers: 
"The tertiary (parieto-temporo-occipital, or parieto 
occipital) posterior zones of the cortex in man ••• 
play an important role in the analysis of incoming 
external information. They combine successively 
arriving visual, tactile, auditory and vestibular 
stimuli into a single simultaneous scheme, i.e. they 
carry out simultaneous (spatial) synthesis of this 
information. That is why a lesion of the cortical 
zones, while not disturbing the perception of isolated 
stimuli, prevents their simultaneous synthesis and, as 
Bead (1926) and Potzl (1928) pointed out many years 
ago, it produces the picture of "simultaneous" or 
spatial agnosia and apraxia. 
Naturally this inability to fit incoming impressions 
into a single simultaneous, spatial scheme (or, as 
Potzl expressed it - the loss of ability to switch from 
the process of successive survey to the function of 
simultaneous surveyability) - is bound to be reflected 
in the analysis of verbal information •.• the patient 
begins to have great difficulty in fitting incoming 
lexical elements into a single simultaneously 
surveyable logical-grammatical (quasi-spatial) 
structure." (Luria, 1976:196) 
It is not clear from the above however whether semantic aphasia 
is due to a restriction of something equivalent to a short term 
memory, or whether it is a limitation of the actual quantity of 
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auditory sensations that can be combined or included in one 
simultaneous spatial scheme. Nevertheless neither interpretation 
seems possible. 
The syndrome cannot be due to a loss of short term memory, for 
the difficulties of the patient are not overcome even when the 
entire expression is given in its printed form where all parts 
are presented simultaneously and where the patient is free to 
read and re-read the text as often as he wishes. 1 
Could we argue that the cause of the aphasia is an actual 
restriction in the amount of acoustic material that can be 
surveyed simultaneously? If this were the case the patient 
should have less difficulty if the sentence was uttered more 
quickly reducing the acoustic content of each phoneme. And the 
patient should have less difficulty with constructions made up 
of fewer phonemes or fewer words. Those constructions consisting 
of two words such as 'father's brother' or 'brother's father' 
should be easier than constructions like 'the elephant is bigger 
than the fly' but there appears to be no evidence for this. 
Furthermore, if it were simply a question of the scope of this 
simultaneous surveyability the patient would have as much 
difficulty understanding sentences which have the same length 
but which do not express complex relations between objects. But 
this is not the case. Luria points out that these patients have 
no appreciable difficulty in understanding sentences such as 
'the dog barks', 'the house burns', 'the boy hit the dog' and 
'the girl drinks tea' (Luria, 1976:196). 
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The difference between the structures the patients do understand 
and those they do not understand is not a difference in the 
quantity of acoustic material but in the complexity of the 
semantic structure. Are we then to interpret 'surveyability' as 
a power of subsuming elements under a certain complex concept? 
(which the word 'logical', in Luria's expression 'a 
logical-grammatical structure' strongly suggests, in contrast 
to the notion of a 'single simultaneous spatial scheme'). But 
this will mean that we are once again obliged to describe 
semantic aphasia as a disruption of the intellect or as a loss 
of concepts which we have seen is unacceptable. 
The syndrome remains incomprehensible for as long as we have to 
choose between the scope of a survey of acoustic images and the 
power of an act of judgement, between the passivity of intuition 
and the pure activity of the act of subsumption. It remains 
inconceivable for as long as we place both the perceiver and the 
speech in the world and establish a numerical distinction 
between the two. 
If we interpret the simultaneous spatial scheme as a 
search-light or as a cinema screen, that is, as something with 
an objectively definable width, we will have to say that the 
width of simultaneous surveyability expands and contracts with 
different sentences so that all the parts of a sentence with a 
complex semantic structure will not be surveyed simultaneously. 
This implies that the width of surveyability is measured, not in 
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terms of the actual quantity of acoustic material, but in terms 
of semantic-acoustic wholes. 
On various occasions Merleau-Ponty has referred to an analogous 
feature of the width of the visual field. In The Structure of 
Behaviour he refers to experiments reported by Koffka in 
Principles of Gestalt Psychology, which demonstrate that the 
visual field has no determinate size and that the quantity of 
space encompassed at any particular moment is related to the 
object in the world. 
"If a subject fixates a spot marked on the side of a 
screen upon which letters are projected, the objective 
distance from the fixation point to the letter which 
appears the clearest varies only slightly whether the 
subject is placed at one or two meters from the screen 
If the size of the letters on the screen is varied, 
it is observed that the objective distance from the 
fixation point to the point of clearest vision, ~nd 
consequently the objective size of the field 
encompassed by our perception increases with the 
dimension of the projected letters ... It seems then 
that the quantity of space encompassed by our 
perception and the place of the zone of clear vision in 
the phenomenal field express certain modes of 
organization of the sensory field related to the 
characteristics of the objects presented to the eye 
much more than the geometrical projection of objects on 
the retina " (Koffka, 1935:202-208). (Quoted by 
Merleau-Ponty, 1967:41-42) 
Since the width of the simultaneous surveyability changes with 
the different kinds of constructions and with the different 
lengths of the sentence, it would appear that the limitation of 
the simultaneous surveyability in the semantic aphasia is the 
effect rather than the cause of the syndrome. 
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In both the aphasic and the non-aphasic the span of simultaneous 
surveyability would be related to the length of the expression 
as that system of sounds through which a certain significance 
presents itself. It is related to significant_wholes and not to 
the stream of acoustic images, or the stream of sounds in the 
physical world. This means that the semantic features of the 
linguistic gesture play a role before there has been any act of 
interpretation or association of meanings. Vhat characterises 
the semantic aphasic is the loss of this power of being present 
to these significant wholes. The human world which the aphasic 
finds himself in is made up of linguistic gestures that have 
lost their physiognomy. They no longer "speak to him" as whole 
expressions. His attempts at constructing hypotheses is an 
attempt to introduce his own relationships between the debris of 
the disintegrated physiognomy. 
But how are we to understand this 'openness' to the expressive 
whole which underlies the perceptual faith of the non-aphasic? 
How are we to understand a certainty which lies beyond proofs 
which nevertheless depends on perception and can become 
disrupted? It is by considering the perceptual syndrome of 
efferent motor aphasia together with semantic aphasia that we 
can begin to answer these questions. 
DISTURBANCES OF THE PERCEPTION AND UNDERSTANDING OF SPEECH OF 
PATIENTS VITH EFFERENT MOTOR APHASIA2 
Luria describes the perceptual difficulties of these patients in 
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terms of a loss of "language sense." Certain words, when used in 
particular expressions, especially idiomatic expressions take on 
a different meaning from what they have when used alone. They 
have, as Luria puts it a "language sense" which differs from 
their "free meaning". The efferent motor aphasic, according to 
Luria, is unable to understand idiomatic expressions because he 
only associates the free meanings. He may for example be unable 
to understand expressions like "the train goes" or "the clock 
goes" even though he has no difficulty in understanding 11 train", 
"clock" and "goes". His failure to understand the expressions is 
due to the fact that he always associates with the word "goes" 
its free meaning, the meaning it has in non-idiomatic USP or the 
meaning it has when used alone such as in the order "go!", which 
in Russian always means to walk step by step. For some reason 
the "language sense" of goes in these expressions, vhich is 
close to "it works" or "it functions" or "it moves'', never 
occurs to him. 
"This loss of "language sense" is the basic symptom of 
the patients of this group. As a result ... they are 
unable to understand even such idiomatic expressions as 
"Poezd idet" (the train goes) or "Chasy idut" (the 
clock goes: in Russian the word chasy = clock is a 
plural noun and takes a plural form of the verb), which 
are readily and immediately understood by a person with 
an intact sense of the Russian language. Many of these 
expressions are assessed as incorrect by the patients 
of this group. The reason is that contextual or 
coherent (to use V.V. Vinogradov's terminology) word 
meanings have disintegrated, whereas the direct, or 
free, word meaning is retained (Ryabova, 1968). Since 
they receive the word idte (to go on foot, infinitive) 
only in the sense of "to walk step by step" these 
patients regard all expressions in which the word has 




to ask why 
Could it be 
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the aphasic only associates the free 
that the contextual meanings have been 
lost? Could we argue that the lesions of the inferior zones of 
the left premotor area have destroyed the neurological 
structures responsible for the association of the contextual 
meanings, but left intact those responsible for the association 
of the free meanings? Such an explanation would rely on an 
atomistic model of the brain as a collection of anatomically 
defined centres. As we will see below models like this have been 
found to be unacceptable Furthermore, as Luria points out, under 
certain circumstances, "with additional stimuli" and supporting 
aids the patient's difficulties can be overcome and the 
contextual meanings can be recovered (1976:209). 
Luria attempts to account for the phenomenon by suggesting that 
the free meanings are more firmly established. It is generally 
accepted that any disruption of neurological processes affects 
the recall of less firmly established concepts more severely 
than it affects the recall of others. But it would be difficult 
to argue that the meanings of 'go', in the expressions "the 
train goes" or "the clock goes" are less firmly established i.e. 
are less habitual or more specialized, less in common usage or 
acquired later in life, than the free meaning viz. to walk step 
by step. 
Vhat the example of the idiomatic expression brings to our 
attention is the fact that generally the meaning of a sentence 
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cannot be inferred directly from the meanings of its words since 
the meanings taken up by the words are often determined by the 
meaning of the sentence as a whole. Psychological and linguistic 
theories which attempt to describe the way in which a sentence 
is decoded generally take this peculiarity into account. The 
Frazier-Kaplan 'Context-Construction hypothesis' for example, 
claims that the comprehension process involves formulating 
hypotheses about the meaning of the sentence, while the sentence 
is being perceived. These hypotheses guide the comprehension of 
the latter parts of the sentence which in turn make possible the 
testing of the hypothesis. Understanding a sentence involves a 
continuous process whereby the 'sensory input' is "being matched 
or mismatched with the output of an ongoing hypothesis refining 
process" (Rieber, 1976:16). 
In terms of this approach, efferent motor aphasia would appear 
to be the result of a break down of this testing or matching 
process. The patient associates free meanings with certain words 
and yet, in spite of the fact that this results in the sentence 
being meaningless or "incorrect", he does not attempt to try out 
any other meanings. There is therefore a kind of obsessive 
association of the free meaning, or as Luria puts it an "inert 
fixation on the direct meaning of the verbal elements" 
(1976:209). How are we to account for this obsession? There is 
nothing in the patient's overall behaviour to suggest that he is 
genuinely obsessive, that the syndrome is only symbolic, hiding 
a deeper psychological problem. 
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If the obsession does not affect the personality of the patient 
as a whole but only his decoding of speech, are we to argue that 
the hypothesis-producing and testing functions are carried out 
by 'another mind', one which could become disrupted without 
affecting the general personality of the patient? Interpreting 
the hypothesis-producing function as the act of another mind, 





the Frazier-Kaplan theory was meant to resolve, for now 
have to explain how the perceiver himself becomes aware 
understands the solutions produced by this other mind. 
direct communication of minds is ruled out from the 
start, the mind producing hypotheses would have to express 
itself in symbols of some sort, but it is difficult to explain 
why these internal symbols would be any easier to understand 
than the original perceived speech. 
An alternative would be to argue that the conclusion produced by 
the decoding process, the meaning of the sentence, is caused 
to appear in consciousness through some neurological activity 
without relying on symbols. But in such a case there would be no 
sense of having heard what was said. For the patient, thoughts 
would seem to come to him from nowhere and listening to someone 
speak, as we have seen above, would be like listening to someone 
speaking to us in a dream. Since the patient is not himself 
obsessive it seems unlikely that he would remain committed to an 
idea which simply occurred to him and which was not consciously 






manifests no other forms of obsessive 
his fixation on the free meanings of words 
cannot be located in an unconscious mind, we will have to find 
the disruption below the level of thought; we will have to find 
it at the level of perception provided that perception is taken 
as that power of opening up to sound already pregnant with a 
meaning. The patient's obsessive fixation on the free meaning is 
not due to a conscious or unconscious association of the 
meaning, but due to the fact that the free meaning embedded in 
the sound of the word is as undeniably present to him as is the 
sound. The word does not await his acts of association or 
judgement. 
the speech 
The meaning is imposed on him and he is possessed by 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:180). The patient's obsessive 
fixation is due to the fact that in his perceptual experience he 
is more sure that he encounters 'iduut (they go) - meaning -
to-walk-step-by-step' than he is sure that he encounters 
'iduut' as a series of phonemes. 
Since there is no distinction between the intellectual powers of 
the aphasic and the non-aphasic, if the non-aphasic has access 
to the correct meaning of the idiomatic expression or the 
complex construction it cannot be because he possesses a 
superior intellectual power enabling him 
appropriate hypotheses. It must be because 
signification without the intervention of a 
to produce the 
he can grasp the 
single thought 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:180). If the non-aphasic is not fixated on 
the free meaning, it is not because the free meaning was found 
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to miss-match the sensory imput, to be incompatible with the 
rest of the sentence. It is because the expression he encounters 
does not contain the 'word' 'iduut - meaning - to-walk-step-by-
step' 'Iduut' as it appears in 'they walk' and iduut in "the 
clock goes" are for him incomparable, just as are the lozenge 
shaped figures found in monocular perception and the "squares-
seen-from-an-angle" found in binocular perception. 
It is only for the linguist who attempts to hear the expression 
as a stream of words or sounds, that the same word or the same 
collection of sounds appears in both expressions. it is 
therefore only for the linguist that the same word can have a 
free meaning and a contextual meaning. 
Vhat we need to describe is this opening onto the speech of 
others which in the aphasic has been disrupted. Ve need to 
explain why the patient does not have access to the expression 
as a whole and we need to account for that to which he does have 
access. 
Here, against Luria's advice, we need to introduce a notion of 
simultaneous survey, although in a modified form. 3 Ve will 
attempt to show that both the syndromes of semantic aphasia and 
efferent motor aphasia are due to a disruption of a mode of 
being open to speech which resembles the access to the world 
Merleau-Ponty referred to as a perceptual synthesis, an opening 
onto significant wholes, but an opening which is neither 
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'simultaneous' nor a 'survey'. 
If it is true that 'iduut' when used in the idiomatic 
expression is incomparable with 'iduut' when used alone, then 
we must accept that the perceived expression cannot be cut up 
into pieces or individual words as can a tape recording made of 
the expression. If the expression cannot be cut up into parts it 
is because the part, even on the level of perception, is what it 
is because the idiomatic phrase as a whole manifests itself 
through each of its words. The kind of access which is brought 
out in a reflection on the phenomena of semantic and efferent 
motor aphasia is what Herleau-Ponty referred to (not 
unambiguously) as 'perceptual synthesis' and later in The 
Visible and the Invisible as 'metamorphosis'. 
"It is not a synthesis; it is a metamorphosis by 
which the appearances are instantaneously stripped of a 
value they owed merely to the absence of a true 
perception. Thus in perception we witness the miracle 
of a totality that surpasses what one thinks to be its 
conditions or its parts .•. " (1968:8) 
In our reflections on binocular perception we have seen how 
through the metamorphosis two monocular floating pre-things, the 
images, disappear into the concrete object as into their 
daylight truth. Ye have seen that the three dimensional object 
encountered manifests itself, through its sides. The perceived 
three dimensional cube is a 'whole' and the sides cannot be 
isolated from the whole as can the lozenge-shaped figures from 
the mosaic pattern. The speech act I perceive takes place in 
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time and the metamorphosis here would imply an integration of 
the various moments in my perception into one act of grasping so 
that there is no need to fit the "successively arriving auditory 
stimuli into a single simultaneous scheme" (Luria, 1976:196), 
just as in binocular perception there is no need to bring 
together and present to an inner eye the two monocular images. 
Ve have seen that it is literally the same thing to use two 
fingers or two eyes as one organ of grasping and to perceive one 
marble (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:205). It is literally the same thing 
for a sequence of moments in my perception of the speech act to 
be integrated into one opening throughout time and to perceive 
one indivisible expression. 
is "literally the same thing" is to say that To say that it 
speech-perception does not present me with an object or contents 
consciousness. The unity or wholism of the expression, and 
its semantic structure are not audible and the subject 
for 
hence 
does not survey an object. As in the metamorphosis of binocular 
perception I am thrown beyond myself into the world. The 
synthesis of my perceiving body is not the effect of an act of 
consciousness. I am in the world and in time. My relationship 
with the expression demands the contradiction of a view from the 
inside and a view from the outside, so that I am related to 
something or open to something without it existing as an object 
for me. 
It is because the synthesis of the perceiving body in its 
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exploratory behaviour is indistinguishable from the unity of the 
object that the scope of simultaneous survey is related to the 
quantity of acoustic material which is synthesized through the 
expression of its unitary semantic structure. 
"The identity of the thing through perceptual 
experience is only another aspect of the identity of 
one's own body throughout exploratory movements; thus 
they are the same in kind as each other." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:185) 
Vhat is disrupted in the aphasic is this being-beyond-oneself in 
relation to the expressive whole, which is translated on the one 
hand as a loss of the synthesis of the perceiving body and on 
the other as a loss of the physiognomy of the expression as a 
whole. 
The miracle of the metamorphosis is that it opens me up to an 
irreducible whole without leaving the realm of the sensuous and 
temporal and ascending to a realm of thoughts. Unlike the 
subsumption of elements under a concept, the metamorphosis does 
not destroy the sensuous and temporal aspect of the expression. 
If the meaning of the expression were produced by me in an 
hypothesis it would come into being instantaneously. Even though 
the expressive whole to which perception gives me access is not 
divisible into parts, nevertheless it is not a-temporal, it 
'spans' time. 
"The idea would 
Gestalt is not 
be free, intemporal, aspatial. "'he 
a spatio-temporal individual, it is 
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ready to integrate itself into a constellation that 
spans space and time - but it is not free in regard to 
space and time, it is not aspatial, atemporal, it only 
escapes the time and space conceived as a series of 
events in themselves .•. " (Herleau-Ponty, 1968:205). 
The experience I have of hearing and understanding someone speak 
is not like those experiences we have in dreams where the 
meaning the other expresses occurs to us in an instantaneous 
flash, the meaning I encounter is created in time. 
SENSORY APHASIA 
In sensory aphasia, which "arises in lesions of the superior 
zones of the left temporal region ('Wernicke's area)" (Luria, 
1976:106), the disruption of the ability to understand speech at 
first appears to be due simply to a disturbance of the acoustic 
image, or, as Luria puts it, due to a disturbance of 'phonemic 
hearing'. The patient is unable to understand speech because he 
is unable to distinguish the phonemes which make up the words. 
More typically, these patients have lost the ability to 
distinguish between 'oppositional' phonemes i.e. phonemes that 
differ in the characteristics of voiced - unvoiced (b-p, d-t), 
hard soft (1-1', t-t'), and so on (Luria, 1976:106). The 
result is that they are unable to distinguish between words such 
as "bachka" and "pochka", "dochka" and "tochka", "zalo" and 
"salo" etc. Vhen such a patient is asked, for example, to point 
to his eye (glaz), he responds by repeating "glash ... glas ... 
263 
glaz gaz" (Luria, 1976:186). The patient substitutes words 
which are acoustically similar i.e. he provides "literal 
paraphasias" which for Luria is proof that the primary disorder 
is "sensory in nature" (1976:107). 
Vhat is particularly interesting however, is that these 'literal 
paraphasias' usually occur together with 'verbal paraphasias' 
(Luria, 1976:185). In a verbal paraphasia the patient 
substitutes for a given word one which has a common semantic 
feature. Vhen asked for example to repeat the word 'dog', the 
patient replies with the word 'cat'. For the word violin he 
substitutes the word 'maestro', for 'concert' he substitutes 
'show' etc. 
As a vivid illustration of sensory aphasia and these two forms 
of paraphasia, I quote Luria's summary of the difficulties of a 
patient whom he refers to as patient Mark. 
"All the difficulties found in tests of word 
understanding could be divided into two clearly defined 
classes. 
First, the patient could not pick out significant 
phonemic characteristics sufficiently clearly, he 
easily replaced one such characteristic by another, 
repeated a word received by ear incorrectly and 
produced literal paraphasias [for example, instead of 
"nos" (nose) he would say "nosh ... nozh .. "or instead 
or "plecho" (shoulder) he would say "pliso" 
plyasho", and he was unable to understand the precise 
meaning of spoken names simply as a result of the 
impreciseness of their acoustic composition. Second, 
often when the patient could not repeat a word given to 
him correctly ... he replaced it by another word in the 
same semantic category (verbal paraphasia); in response 
to the instruction to point to the nose - he said: 
"Point to the tongue?" and carried out the modified 
instruction, or 
"Do you mean 
1976:190-191) 
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when asked to point to a lamp he said: 
point to the window?" ..• " (Luria, 
Vhen asked to point to his elbow (lokot') the patient replied, 
"Point to my nose II when asked to point to the blackboard 
(doska), the patient replied "cupboard (shkaf)?" and pointed to 
the cupboard. 
Vhat we need to understand is the relation between these two 
forms of paraphasia and why patients which exhibit the one form 
are always equally likely to exhibit the other. Luria persists 
in arguing that the basis of the aphasia is sensory, that it is 
due to a disturbance of the acoustic image, and that the two 
paraphasias reflect different degrees of the severity of the 
syndrome. Vhile literal paraphasia results from the failure to 
distinguish between oppositional phonemes (1976:106), verbal 
paraphasias result from the inability to distinguish even those 
phonemes that are completely different. 
"In patients with more severe disturbances of this type 
not even widely distant phonemes can be distinguished 
and the phenomenon known as "alienation of word 
meaning" arises" (1976:107). 
This explanation cannot be reconciled with the facts. If we 
begin by assuming the existence of the real world we will be 
obliged to place the speaker and his audience in this world 
separated from each other by their bodies and the space between 
them. Conceived as two consciousnesses existing parallel to each 
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other each confined to his own thinking, each would be able to 
infer the internal life of the other through the interpretation 
of signs. Speech could traverse the space between them only as 
sound waves, which could play its role by striking the eardrums 
and producing acoustic images or sensations. The perceiver 
understands speech only by associating in some or other way the 
appropriate concepts with these images. Vhatever theory of 
decoding speech we adopt, it will always be possible, at least 
theoretically, to distinguish between acoustic images produced 
by speech as a physical reality in the world, and the meaning, 




bounds of such a naturalistic approach, verbal 
would imply a precise acoustic image. The fact that 
substituted for the word 'nos' (nose) a word like 
mouth or tongue, i.e. a word semantically related to nos, and 
not a word like fork or spoon, implies that in some way he must 
have heard clearly that the word was nos and not nosh 
(knife). Yet his literal paraphasia showed that he was unable to 
distinguish between nos, nosh and nozh. Similarly, his 
literal paraphasia showed that he was unable to distinguish 
between 'd' and 't', yet in his verbal paraphasia he substituted 
for the word doska (blackboard), words with semantic relations 
to doska, such as cupboard, and not words with semantic 
relations to toska (grief or anguish), which implies that he 
must have distinguished between doska and toska and therefore 
between 'd' and 't'. 
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Are we to argue that sensory aphasia is due to an unconscious 
decision to 
unconscious 
Are we to 
understands 
semantically 
misperceive or misunderstand the word, an 
decision to exhibit the symptoms of sensory aphasia? 
say that the patient unconsciously perceives and 
the word correctly but that only acoustically and 





in the patient's behaviour to suggest that his 
to perceive and understand speech is only symbolic and 
hides a deeper psychological disturbance. Luria 
patient Mark as "fully orientated" and his behaviour 
as "adequate to the circumstances" (1976:109). 
Furthermore, 
paraphasias 
idea of the 
a closer examination of the patient's verbal 
suggests that he does not have "in his mind" a clear 
object he substitutes. If the word 'nos' (nose) is 
given to him he has neither a distinct image of the word 
'tongue' nor does he possess the clear idea 'tongue'. We should 
note that the patient's replies, as he makes the verbal 
paraphasias, always end with a question mark. Everything points 
to the fact that the patient has a general or rough idea of the 
meaning. The patient appears to have an access to the semantic 
category rather than to the specific meaning of a word which 
belongs to that category. The actual word he utters in his 
verbal paraphasia should be seen as an attempt to circumscribe 
or exemplify this vague or imprecise meaning. This is brought 
out clearly in another test in which the patient is required to 
state the meaning of a given word. 
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"meduza" (jellyfish) 
"··· something living, but what it is I don't know 
"mamont" (mammoth) 
II 
" I can see quite well that this is something 
living, but what I don't recall ..• of course- a 
whale (rit) ... a large whale!" 
"ledokol" (icebreaker) 
"led aa ... it is .•. an airplane (samolet) .•. no 
a fish (ryba) ... rybit ... oh yes ... I remember! 
-atomic! -it breaks up •.• " 
"grib" (mushroom) 
"This is something close, must be an apple .•. no •.. 
something else, it grows in the forest ... " 
"Dirizher" (Conductor of an orchestra) 
" Dirizher ... nothing like it here ••. it is music 
II 
"Sekretar'" (secretary) 
"Vhat can this be? something to do with time ••. 
telephone!"" (Luria, 1976:192) 
The nature of the patient's responses indicate that the verbal 
paraphasias are not due to having in mind the wrong 
signification, but due to having no specific signification at 
all. The patient encounters a vague or general signification, or 
he is directed towards a meaning which he grasps only loosely or 
ambiguously. If I can have such an opening onto such a vague 
meaning without a precise perception of the sound of the word, 
we will have to reject the traditional assumption that for the 
speaker the relation between the meaning and the sound of the 
word is based on a convention. If the sound were an arbitrary 
sign linked to the meaning through a convention the reference 
would be all or nothing. If the disruption of the perceived 
sound implied a blurring of the meaning, we would have to reject 
any external relation between sign and meaning and accept that 
speech 'sings' or delineates its signification. The relation 
between the sound and its meaning must be similar to the 
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relation between the sounds of the sonata and its musical 
meaning. In some way the meaning must be embedded or 'pregnant' 
in the sounds themselves so that it will be impossible to 
establish a numerical distinction between the two. Speech 
pregnant with its meaning must be accepted as an irreducible 
phenomenon so that any loss in clarity of the sound is a loss of 
semantic precision. 
This implies that in the perception and understanding of speech 
there is no pure sound or pure acoustic image. The meaning 
announces itself through the sounds just as the cube announces 
itself through its sides or the true colour of an object 
announces itself through its variations. Just as the white of a 
paper lying in the shade is not simply gray and cannot be 
compared with the white of the paper lying in the sun, and 
consequently cannot be classified in the black/white range of 
colours, so the sounds used in speech cannot be compared purely 
as sounds and cannot be classified as the basic sound units of a 
language, i.e. there can be no science of phonetics. 
The Notion of the Phoneme. 
In 'Sound and Meaning', Jakobson explains why it has been 
impossible to erect a pure science of acoustic phonetics, why it 
has been impossible to identify and list in any given language 
the basic units of sound, the phonemes, from which all its words 
are synthesised. Yhile we do not accept his solution, he reveals 
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some interesting aspects of linguistic 'sound' which argue 
against the notion of an acoustic image, and which re-inforce 
our interpretation of the phenomenon of verbal paraphasia. 
If we wished to develop a pure science of acoustic phonetics we 
would have to classify the fundamental sound elements of a 
language through an objective observation of the actual sounds 
used by a native speaker of the language. Since each sound 
produced by a speaker can be decomposed into an innumerable 
variety of other sounds which in turn can be further decomposed, 
it is impossible to tell how this stream of sounds should be 
grouped into the fundamental units and it is also impossible to 
tell which groups of sounds are the actual basic phonemes. 
"Vhen, as is always the case, two sounds show both 
similarities and dissimilarities, acoustics, having no 
intrinsic criteria for distinguishing what is 
significant from what is not, has no way of knowing 
whether it is the similarity or the dissimilarity which 
is crucial in any given case. It cannot tell whether it 
is a case of two variants of one sound or of two 
different sounds." (Jakobson, 1978:19) 
Jakobson suggests that the only possible solution to this 
problem is to consider the basic elements of language, the 
phonemes, not as sounds, but as phonological roles. The 
essential role of the phoneme is to differentiate words 
according to their meaning. He points out that the pair e 
(closed) and E (open) have a differentiating function in French, 
differentiating between words like de(de) "dice" and dais (de) 
"canopy". In French they are therefore two different phonemes. 
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Yhile both sounds occur in Russian and Czech they do not have 
such a differentiating function. In Russian for example whether 
an e (closed) or an E (open) is used depends on whether the 
vowel precedes a palatalised consonant or not. 
"Sounds which have a differentiating value, those 
sounds which are able to distinguish words, have been 
given a special name in linguistics. They are called 
phonemes. Thus in Russian closed e and open E are only 
two variants of one and the same phoneme; they are 
called combinatory variants, because they depend solely 
on the combination of sounds: before palatalised 
consonants the vowel e is closed and in other 
combinations it is open. 
In Czech also closed e and open E are unable to 
differentiate between the meanings of words. Here again 
they are but two variants of one and the same phoneme, 
but the distribution of the two variants is quite 
different from in Russian. In a s~yle that we might 
·call neutral, Czech uses an open e, whereas in an 
affected style - but more particularly in vulgar style, 
in gutter language - a closed e can be heard. Yhereas 
in Russian the two vowels are combinatory variants, 
which vary with the phonic context of the phoneme in 
question, in Czech they function as stylistic variants! 
the vocative pepikul ("Joe!" and simply "fellow") 
becomes pepiku! in speech which is more free and easy. 
Yhile open E and closed e are both pronounced in 
Russian and in Czech - in the former varying with the 
neighbouring sounds, in the latter varying with the 
style of speech - it is nevertheless difficult for both 
Russians and Czech to use the open E and the closed e 
of French correctly as different phonemes - or even to 
notice this difference without effort in pairs of 
words, like le dais and le de or le lait (le) milk' and 
le le (le) 'width'. This is explained by the fact that 
in these two Slavic languages the difference between 
these two vowels cannot mark the distinction between 
the meanings of words." (Jakobson, 1978:29/9) 
Jakobson has thus proposed a functional definition of the 
phoneme. The question of what a phoneme is for a speaking 
individual he dismisses as being beyond the scope of linguistics 
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and as a return to a form of "psychologism". He decries the way 
in which discussions about the essence of the phoneme have 
merely repeated the famous philosophical debates between the 
nominalists and the realists, between the adepts of psychologism 
and those of antipsychologism. Nevertheless the functional 
definition which he himself proposes is clearly a return to the 
formalist approach of the intellectualist tradition. His 
approach would cut linguistics off from neurolinguistics, 
psycholinguistics and ultimately from all linguistic phenomena. 
The real problem with the functional definition is that it does 
not do away with "outmoded psychological entities", it simply 
refuses to speak about them. It may well be that the phoneme 
needs to be understood in terms of the function it performs. 
Nevertheless the question remains: what characteristics do 
auditory sensations need in order to function as phonemes, in 
order, for example, to distinguish between words like 'dais' and 
'de'? 
Certainly the attempt to get away from 'outmoded' psychological 
entities is a good one but it has been pursued only at the 
expense of ceasing to deal with actual language as it is used 
and perceived, and of concentrating on entities which are never 
encountered. 
Vhat we need to understand is how it is possible that the Czech 




of distinguishing between manners of speaking in Czech, 
when it is a question of distinguishing between two 
French words. Are we to argue that his perceptual acuity changes 
from one situation to another, that he is sensitive to the 
difference between e and E only when it indicates a difference 
in manners of speaking and that this sensitivity disappears when 
the difference distinguishes between two French words? Are we to 
look for some psychological mechanism which would account for 
the raising and lowering of nerve thresholds? Or are we to say 
that in both cases the Czech hears the distinction but he is 
unable to discriminate between dais and de because he ignores 
the distinction believing that it only indicates a difference in 
manners of speaking? If it were simply a question of not being 
aware of the role that the distinction between e and E can play 
in French, he should have equal difficulty distinguishing 
between la table and les tables, as long as he does not 
realize that the distinction between a and e can distinguish 
between the singular and the plural. Furthermore the difficulty 
he has in distinguishing between dais and de should disappear as 
soon as the role of the distinction between E and e has been 
explained to him. But this is clearly not the case. 
If the Czech maintains that he can hear a difference between 
what appears to us to be pepiku and pepiku, and that he is 
unable to hear any difference between dais and de, we need to 
take him at his word. If it is a mistake to argue for a 
changing acoustic sensitivity, it is equally a mistake to insist 
273 
that the Czech hears the distinction between e and e and then to 
invent a psychological mechanism which would explain why he is 
unaware of what he hears. Such an argument would be unfaithful 
to the phenomenon and would be invoked simply to defend the 
prejudice of the acoustic image and ultimately the realist 
notion of the world. 
"To actualize these justifications ahead of time in the 
form of 'latent content' or 'unconscious knowing' is to 
postulate that nothing is accessible to consciousness 
which is not present to it in the form of 
representation or content." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:173) 
Clearly the Czech lacks neither sense data nor the concepts 
under which they must be subsumed. His difficulties only begin 
to make sense if we can reject the notion of an acoustic image 
and accept that "pepiku spoken-in-a-casual-way" is an 
irreducible phenomenon, so that the Czech can distinguish 
between pepiku spoken in a formal and a casual fashion without 
being able to distinguish between e and e. 
In free and spontaneous perception objects spread out in depth 
do not have any definite apparent size. A man ten meters from me 
appears neither smaller nor the same size as when he stands 
directly in front of me. Ve have argued that "the same man seen 
from further away" is an irreducible phenomenon. If I am asked 
what size he appears to have I can answer only by closing one 
eye and holding up my thumb. In this way I can attempt to see 
him as if he were an object floating next to my thumb. The 
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apparent size of the man we said, is an artificial creation of 
this procedure and does not enter consciously or unconsciously 
into normal perception. It is the linguist who attempts to hear 
all speech as if it expressed nothing, as if it were a stream of 
meaningless sounds. In this way he is able to reduce "pepiku -
spoken-in-a-casual-way" to pepiku. But such a pure acoustic 
object is an artificial creation and does not enter either 
consciously or unconsciously into the Czech's perception of 
speech. Once the significance expressed in the use of e rather 
than E is withdrawn from the word, the word at its most 
primitive and irreducible level has been changed. 
"But clearly, when the word loses its meaning, it is 
modified down to its sensible aspect, it is emptied." 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:193) 
It is the linguist who treats speech as one of the objects in 
the world and it is the linguist for whom it is inexplicable 
that the Czech should be able to distinguish between pepiku 
and "pepiku-spoken-in-a-casual-manner" and yet be unable to 
distinguish between dais and de. 
Yhat the example of pepiku and the phenomenon of verbal 
paraphasia in sensory aphasia teaches us is that to perceive and 
understand a word "it is not necessary the I have an auditory 
perception of the articulated sounds II (Herleau-Ponty, 
1973:19). Yhat is necessary is that I encounter the word as an 
irreducible physiognomy. 
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" it is possible to perceive a smile, or even a 
sentiment in this smile, without the colours and the 
lines which "compose" the face, as one says, being 
present to consciousness or given in an 
unconsciousness." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:166) 
"But child psychology precisely proposes the enigma of 
a linguistic consciousness and a consciousness of 
others which is almost pure and which is prior to that 
of sonorous and visual phenomena." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1967:171) 
Vhat the Czech hears is the sonorous but porous envelope of a 
certain attitude or manner. The particular sound of pepiku is 
nothing but a certain manner of being among the others, 'overtly 
revealed' (Merleau-Ponty, 196.:229). Vhat the Russian-speaking 
non-aphasic hears is not nos as a pure sound, but nos as the 
sonorous envelope of an intention directed towards some aspect 
of a nose. 
"For a child, language which is understood or simply 
sketched, the appearance of a face or that of a 
use-object, must from the beginning be the sonorous, 
motor or visual envelope of a significative intention 
coming from the another." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:170) 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETVEEN THE VORD AND ITS MEANING 
The notion of speech being the sonorous envelope of an intention 
or the notion that speech sings or delineates its meaning, 
implies that the relation between the word and its meaning is 
not an external relation based on a convention. It implies that 
the word is not arbitrary but that it literally expresses the 
essence of the object it refers to (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:187). 
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"On several occasions, we have questioned the view that 
language is tied to what it signifies only by habit and 
convention. The relation is much closer and much more 
distant." (Herleau-Ponty, 1973:115) 
According to Jakobson, Benveniste argues that the concept is 
like the soul of the acoustic image. 
"The most profound of modern French linguists, Emile 
Benveniste, in his article 'Nature du signe 
linguistique' which appeared in the first volume of 
Acta Linguistica (1939), says in opposition to Saussure 
that 'the connection between the signifier and the 
signified is not arbitrary; on the contrary it is 
necessary. From the point of view of the French 
language the signified 'boeuf' is inevitably tantamount 
to the signifier, the phonic group b-o-f. 'The two have 
been imprinted on my mind together', Benveniste 
stresses; 'they are mutually evocative in all 
circumstances. There is between them such an intimate 
symbiosis that the concept "boeuf" is like the soul of 
the acoustic image 'b-o-f'." (Jakobson, 1978:111) 
The traditional argument for the arbitrary nature of the word 
and for the purely external relation between the sign and its 
meaning, points to the fact that in different languages 
completely different words are used to represent the same or a 
similar idea, or that sometimes similar-sounding words are used 
to represent entirely different ideas. The German word 'ab' for 
example, which as a pure sound, is virtually indistinguishable 
from the English word 'up', in fact means 'down'. This would 
seem to imply that the word is arbitrary and the relation 
between the word and its meaning is based on some or other form 
of a convention, and that any impression we may have that the 
word 'literally express the essence of the thing' needs to be 
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explained in terms of psychological mechanisms, such as the 





argument assumes what it claims to prove. The argument 
assuming that we can compare English and German words 
sounds and that we can recognize that the 'same' word 
to refer to opposite directions. To assume that the 
words of a language can be scrutinized and compared as if they 
were real objects in the world is to assume that it is always 
possible to establish a numerical distinction between the word 
and the object it refers to, i.e. it is to assume that there can 
only be an external relation between the word and its meaning. 
Ve are not arguing that there is some natural or real relation 
between the two such as we have in onomatopoeia. Ve are arguing 
that we cannot begin by placing language in the world as one of 
its objects, just as we cannot begin by placing all acts of 
consciousness in the world. It could be, and this is what we 
will attempt to demonstrate, that our authentic experience of 
reality, is an experience of reality existing 'for us', and that 
the meaning and being of language is already implied in this 
experience of being a 'we subject'. If I wish to reflect on the 
phenomenon of language and the phenomenon of 'another language', 
I must begin by putting into parentheses my idea of the real 
existence of the world and hence of language as a real system of 
codes, and I must return to that moment in which a foreign 
language, like German, becomes for me a language in the same 
sense that English is for me a language. 4 If I witness a 
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conversation in a language I do not understand, I could infer 
that these individuals are expressing themselves, and that these 
words are for them what English words are for me. But this is an 
inference I make, it is not an experience of the foreign 
language as a language. This experience I can have only when the 
foreign language that I am learning to speak ceases to be a game 
of sounds made according to rules, and becomes a way of 
thinking, a way of reaching for myself and for others a certain 
signification. An unbiased reflection on this experience would 
reveal that it is not the experience of the same word referring 
to different objects. The sounds used in speech are never simply 
sounds but the sound of a certain word, and the sound would 
not be the same if the word did not have the specific meaning it 
has, just as the blue of the carpet would never be the same blue 
were it not a woolly blue (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:313) (See above 
page 22/3). 
It may well be that in the early stages of learning to speak 
German the English-speaking student has certain difficulties as 
he attempts to use or understand words like 'ab'. Perhaps he 
needs to remind himself that the word means the opposite of what 
it sounds like. But at some stage he finds that he no longer 
needs to decode the word in this way and that it has begun to 
sound appropriate, that it has begun to sound like 'down'. But 
how does this change take place and what could be meant by 
saying that a word sounds like down? Are we to say that when the 
student hears 'ab' there is an unconscious translation through 
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which the word 'down' is associated and presented to an 
'internal hearing'? But the student does not have the impression 
that 'ab' has begun to sound like the English word 'down', but 
that it has begun to sound like what it means. But what does it 
mean to say that 'ab' sounds like what it means, or sounds 
appropriate? The word is not appropriate in the sense that 
onomatopoeia are appropriate. Vords like 'bang', 'squeak' or 
'plop' imitate in some way the sound of the event they refer to, 
but in what sense does the direction 'down' make a sound which 
the word could imitate? It has become as natural to use the word 
'ab' to indicate 'down' as it is to kiss in love or shout in 
anger. But how does this change take place and what could be 
meant by saying that the word 'ab' is natural. Are we to argue 
that this natural sound of the word is due to its being 
continuously associated with the concept? But the association of 
concepts cannot explain this sound of the word because if a word 
like 'ab' is repeated over and over, it ceases to 'sound like 
down', begins to sound strange and even absurd, even though I 
still know what it means and can still associate the correct 
concept. 
In his description of patients suffering from colour word 
amnesia, Herleau-Ponty points out that for the patient the names 
of colours have become useless and emptied, even though he may 
have retained the ability to associate the correct concepts. 
"The patient suffering 
name is given, and 
corresponding sample, 
expected something to 
useless the him, it 
from amnesia, to whom a colour 
who is asked to choose a 
repeats the name as if he 
come of it. But the name is now 






absurd, as are for us names which we go on 
for too long a time. Patients for whom words 
their meaning sometimes retain in the highest 
ability to associate ideas." (1962:193) 
The association of concepts has nothing to do with the sound the 
word has for me, because the latter can be destroyed without 
affecting the former. Yhat has been destroyed in repeating the 
word, is its 'physiognomy', is the sound pregnant with its 
meaning. It is only once the true physiognomies of 'up' and 'ab' 
have been destroyed that they can be said to sound similar. Yhat 
sensory aphasia and the example of pepiku teaches us is that 
these artificial creations do not play any role in the 
perception of speech. Repeating the word over and over again 
enables us to hear the word as a pure sound. It is therefore as 
a pure sound that it is for us strange and absurd, as are the 
paintings of the surrealist artists. 
"In adults, ordinary reality is a human reality and 
when use-objects-a glove, a shoe - with their human 
mark are placed among natural objects and are 
contemplated as things for the first time, or when 
events on the street - a crown gathering, an accident 
are seen through the panes of a window, which shuts out 
their sound, and are brought to the condition of a pure 
spectacle and invested with a sort of eternity, we have 
the impression of acceding to another world, to a 
surreality, because the involvement which binds us to 
the human world is broken for the first time, because a 
nature "in itself" (en soi) is allowed to show through. 
Here again, a mode of esthetic perception which appears 
absurd to so many adults should not for this reason be 
made part of a primitive perception." (Herleau-Ponty, 
1967:167) 
To anyone who speaks English and German fluently 'ab' and 'up' 
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are neither the same nor are they different, they are 
incomparable. This is true to such an extent that he may well be 
surprised to discover how similar their phonetic representations 
are. As pure sounds 'ab' and 'up' are virtually 
indistinguishable to anyone who has not been trained in acoustic 
phonetics, yet the similar sound is hardly over noticed. Yhat is 
it then that is heard when he hears ab and up? Yhat is it that 
is destroyed when the word is repeated over and over? Ye have 
suggested that it is sound pregnant with its meaning, that sound 
can "literally express the essence" of the object, that the 
meaning inhabits the word. But it should be clear that this can 
be no more than a 'verbal solution'. 
If, as we have said the real world is without mind, how can we 
conceive of a synthesis of real sound and meaning? For as long 
as meaning is conceived as a self-subsistant and self-conscious 
thought, i.e. as a cogitatum, and sound as an object in the 
world, the notion of sound pregnant with a meaning is 
inconceivable. There is no way that a significance can come to 
dwell in physical sound and here Cartesianism is right 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:351). 
"The meaning of the gesture is not contained in it like 
some physical or physiological phenomenon. The meaning 
of the word is not contained in the word as a sound." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:193) 
Here again, the example of pepiku suggest the direction in which 
we should search. Speaking about the perception of an angry or 
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threatening gesture, Merleau-Ponty says, "The gesture does not 
make me think of anger, it is anger itself" (1962:184). 
Similarly if 'pepiku spoken in a casual fashion' is an 
irreducible phenomenon then the use of e as opposed to E does 
not make the Czech think of casualness; it is casualness 
itself, or it is itself a casual manner of relating to others. 
Pepiku and pepiku do not represent two ways of relating to 
one's audience. Like the kiss or the caress they delineate the 
relationship itself. The Czech 'understands' pepiku, just as I 
'understand' the kiss or the caress, i.e. without any acts of 
thought marginal to the gesture itself. 
Let us suppose for instance that under certain conditions the 
use of the casual form of speaking insults or embarrasses one's 
audience. Since the Czech doesn't discriminate between E and e, 
there must be a "blind" recognition of the insult. The insulting 
gesture must be "given" as the pole of his desires and fears, 
before the long work of interpretation which would arrive at the 
meaning of the gesture as a conclusion drawn from the perception 
of phonemes (Merleau-Ponty, 1967: 72/3). To insult someone is to 
affect him in some way. It is to bring about, through speech, a 
situation in which he is insulted. It would certainly be absurd 
to suggest that the insult could have an effect in terms of its 
physical properties as a sound. Yet we also know that there is 
no interpretation of signs. Ye must therefor imagine a concrete 
relation between speaker and perceiver, one which is not built 
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on the epistemological act of perception and interpretation of 
signs. Because the natural attitude makes a radical distinction 
between the thoughts and feelings of the individual and the 
social or public state of affairs, the champions of the natural 
attitude still have to explain how this insult is perceived and 
understood. The phenomenon of pepiku obliges us to accept the 
fact that the 
indistinguishable 
Czech's perception of the word is 
from his situation in the world as an insulted 
person, it demands therefore the contradiction of immanence and 
transcendence. There is no answer to the question as to how the 
Czech experiences or knows that he is insulted other than saying 
that his being-for-himself and his being-for-others are not two 
juxtaposed perspectives but engage each other like gears. 
There is therefore an existential relation between the perceiver 
and the speech he perceives. His understanding of the other is 
not an act of thought but a synchronizing change of existence 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:183/4). 
To perceive the insult it is not necessary for the Czech to have 
an acoustic image of the open e in pepiku, it is sufficient that 
he is drawn into this world in which he exists as an insulted 
being (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:19). The Czech in this instant 
perceives with his social being; and this perception is not 
reducible to acoustic images or acts of thought but to modes of 
co-existence, modes of being for others and for himself. It is 






himself seen from the outside, 
world (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:134). The 
perceiver is caught up in what he perceives (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968:139). The roles between him and the perceived are reversed. 
If we insist on asking how he perceives or comes to be aware 
of the fact that he is insulted the phenomenon of pepiku becomes 
incomprehensible. 
this belief which 
for 
If we insist on trying to find reasons for 
he has that he has been insulted, we will be 
what Merleau-Ponty calls 'perceptual faith' a substituting 
belief, which 
judgements and 
like any other 
perceptions. 
belief, is based on reasons, or 
Since the Czech does not 
discriminate between e and E it is clear that in his perception 
the conclusion comes before the reasons (Merleau-Ponty, 
1968:50), and it is because he first of all finds himself in the 
insulted situation that he perceives the insult in the speech. 
The certainty he has of being insulted does not rest on the 
certainty of his thought that he has been insulted, on the 
contrary, the whole certainty of his belief, is owed to the fact 
that he is insulted, of which he is quite sure because it is his 
mode of being, the ground of all beliefs and certainties 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:382). 
Of course the Czech is still able to distinguish between the two 
modes of speaking even when the gestures are not directed at him 
but at some third party. But if I reflect on this consciousness 
of the insult which is directed towards another I find that I am 
not a pure disinterested observer. I am involved and drawn into 
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a situation such that the insulting gesture is not an object for 
me but the access to a state of affairs in which I find myself. 
In his description of the experience of reading a great author 
like Stendhal Merleau-Ponty brings out the existential relation 
between the reader and the author. The events and characters in 
the story are not intelligible because I can subsume everything 
Stendhal reveals about them under certain concepts. On the 
contrary, Stendhal draws me beyond my own realm of 
interpretations into his world to such an extent that he teaches 
me the concepts with which I understand. 
"Before I read Stendhal, I know what a rogue is. Thus I 
can understand what he means when he says that Rossi 
the revenue man is a rogue. But when Rossi the rogue 
begins to live, it is no longer he who is a rogue: it 
is a rogue who is the revenue man Rossi ... Common 
words and familiar events, like jealousy or a duel, 
which at first immerse us in everyone's world, suddenly 
function as emissaries from Stendhal's world ... The 
relations between the reader and the book are like 
those loves in which one partner initially dominates 
because he is more proud or more temperamental, and 
then the situation changes and the other, more wise and 
more silent, rules. The expressive moment occurs when 
the relationship reverses itself, where the book takes 
possession of the reader." (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:12/15) 
But 'for whom' does the book take possession of the reader? 
Clearly the experience of reading Stendhal is for Merleau-Ponty, 
one of being thrown beyond the for-itself into a world, it is an 
experience which demands the contradiction of immanence and 
transcendence. The reader is 'for-and-in-himself' drawn into 
this world. Intelligibility is not self-possession but the 
never-ending turning about each other of from the inside and 
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from the outside. If words are intelligible, if sound can be 
pregnant with its own meaning, it is because they too have this 
power of drawing me into a world and making me exist in a 
certain way. Intelligibility must be understood in terms of 
existence. But in what sense could we say that words like 'ab' 
nos (nose) and doska (blackboard) draw me into a world. How are 
we to imagine an existential relation here? In what sense do 
words have this power before they are interpreted and given a 
meaning? 
Herleau-Ponty refers to an experiment which provides us with a 
vivid illustration of this power, of the non-intellectual, 
existential access to the signification of the word. 
If a word is shown to a subject for too short a time 
for him to be able to read it, the word 'warm' for 
example, induces a kind of experience of warmth which 
surrounds him with something in the nature of a 
meaningful halo. The word 'hard' produces a sort of 
stiffening of the back and neck, and only in a 
secondary way does it project itself into the visual or 
auditory field and assume the appearance of a sign or a 
word. Before becoming the symbol of a concept it is 
first of all an event which grips my body, and this 
grip circumscribes the area of significance to which it 
has reference. One subject states that on presentation 
of the word 'damp' (feucht), he experiences, in 
addition to a feeling of dampness and coldness, a whole 
rearrangement of the body image, as if the inside of 
the body came to the periphery, and as if the reality 
of the body, until then concentrated into the arms and 
legs, were in search of a new balance of its parts. The 
word is then indistinguishable from the attitude which 
it induces, and it is only when its presence is 
prolonged that it appears in the guise of an external 
image, and its meaning as a thought." (Herleau-Ponty, 
1962:235) 
The 'meaning' embedded in the sound is not reducible to a 
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thought and there is no question here of the sounds producing in 
me the appropriate ideas or thoughts of warmth or hardness. Nor 
on the other hand do the sounds produce in me feelings and 
sensations of warmth or hardness. 
"It is not a matter of reducing the significance of the 
word 'warm' to sensations of warmth by empiricist 
standards. For the warmth which I feel when I read the 
word 'warm' is not an actual warmth. It is simply my 
body which prepares itself for heat and which, so to 
speak, roughs out its outline." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:236) 
The experiment allows us to get behind this 'guise' and 
capture our most primitive experience of the word, before it has 
been re-constituted as an object in the physical world separable 
from its meaning which is reconstituted as a thought. Our 
original experience of the word is an experience of an 
irreducible physiognomy, which like any physiognomy cannot be 
embraced in an act of consciousness but which can be the pole of 
a certain form of behaviour directed towards it. 
"Vords have a physiognomy because we adopt towards 
them, as towards each person, a certain form of 
behaviour which makes its complete appearance the 
moment each word is given." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:235/6) 
Vhen Merleau-Ponty speaks about a "stiffening of the back and 
neck", the "rearrangement of the body image" and the search for 
"a new balance of its parts", he is not referring to events in 
the real world but to 'last relationships' to the word. 
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"Vhether it is a question of perceiving words or more 
generally objects, there is a certain bodily attitude, 
a specific kind of dynamic tension which is necessary 
to give structure to the image." (1962:236) 
Being a last relation to the word there can be no numerical 
distinction between the bodily attitude and this word. It is 
certainly inconceivable that consciousness could embrace in 
thought a synthesis of sound and meaning, but the experiment 
suggests that my most original relationship to this irreducible 
synthesis is a bodily attitude. The word 'and' its meaning are 
therefore not objects. The meaning is not an idea and it is not 
a question of finding an idea embedded in sound. Ve have seen in 
our analysis of grasping and the perception of depth how a 
bodily attitude situates me in space and establishes a relation, 
not with images or ideas of depth but with depth itself. Ve must 
concede to words a power of putting us in the presence of 
their signification, in the case of a word like 'damp', a 
power of bringing about for us a quasi presence of dampness. 
The phenomenon demands a new mode of being present. The dampness 
is not present to me as a de facto dampness, nor on the other 
hand is it simply the idea of dampness. In this power of the 
word to reach out towards something like 'dampness' we have an 
original relationship which is not reducible to anything else. 
If the word 'damp' is experienced as appropriate or 'natural' 
it's because neither the word nor this dampness are expressly 
posited (Herleau-Ponty, 1862:182) neither are objects for 
consciousness. Learning to 'hear' in the full sense of 'hear', 
is comparable to acquiring a new 'organ ~f grasping', or a new 
way of being towards 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:146). 
of learning new languages 
being in the world by 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:143). 
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a "fresh core of significance" 
Our power of learning a language and 
expresses our power of dilating our 
appropriating fresh instruments 
Perhaps one of the most interesting forms of aphasia which 
reveals this power of the word to open up to its signification 
before any act of interpretation, and which therefore 
illuminates the problem of sensory aphasia, is the syndrome of 
colour name amnesia. 
COLOUR NAME AMNESIA 
In "Uber Farbennamen Amnesie" (1925) Gelb and Goldstein 
described a form of aphasia which they called 'Colour-name 
Amnesia'. Yhen presented with a coloured chip these patients 
were unable to recall the name of the colour and on being given 
the name of a colour they were unable to point to, or select 
from a pile of coloured chips, the appropriate chip. They were 
however capable of sorting chips of the same colour into one 
pile. This they did, not by recognising 'at a glance' all those 
which were the same colour, but through a painstaking process of 
comparing each chip either with a given standard chip or with 
the previously sorted chip. The patient could sort, for example, 
the red chips into one pile not because he recognised all the 
red chips as red, but because he recognised that they resembled 
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each other or resembled a certain given red chip. This is 
evident from the nature of the mistakes he made. If for example 
while sorting out blue chips into a pile the patient dealt with 
a chip which was pale blue, he very often went on adding to the 
same pile 'pale' green, 'pale' pink etc., showing that it was 
the resemblance of the chips rather than an identification of 
their colours which guided the selection process. 
The nature of the patient's mistakes suggests that he sees chips 
as being similar to each other without recognising the 
similarity as a similarity of colour. His experience of 
similarity is not articulated into a similarity of colour or a 
similarity of degree of paleness or of saturation. This why he 
appears to be changing from one principle of classification to 
another. Vhile the patient is not blind to the colour red, he is 
unable to see a specific colour as an example of red. rather 
than seeing it as exemplifying a certain level of saturation or 
paleness. It is because he is unable to see red as red that he 
is unable to "see all the reds at a glance". Gelb and Goldstein 
suggest that we can get some idea of the aphasic's experience by 
passively glancing at the pile of chips without looking for 
anything in particular. They describe the experience as follows: 
" the heap seems unstable, shifting, and we observe 
an incessant alteration in it, a kind of contest 
between several possible groupings of colours according 
to different points of view." (Geld & Goldstein, 
1924:151/2, quoted by Merleau-Ponty, 1962:191) 
They argue that the patient is unable to "see all the reds at a 
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glance" because they are unable to adopt a "principle of 
classification" (1924:150). 
But what does it mean to adopt a principle of classification? 
How are we to account for the difference between the experience 
of "seeing all the reds at a glance" and the experience of the 
pile of chips as "unstable and shifting". 
It is clear that the syndrome cannot be understood as a 
blindness to colours or as a deterioration of sense data. The 
patient recognises that pale blue and dark blue are similar 
which means that he cannot be blind to the colour blue. 
Vhen I change from passively glancing at the heap of chips to a 
deliberate attempt to pick out all the reds, the heap ceases to 
be unstable and I see all the reds at a glance, which means that 
in some way all the chips which can be classified as red, stand 
out against the background of all the other colours. But how are 
all the reds made to "stand out"? Could the reds be made to 
stand out by changing them in some way? 
It is common practice in the preparation of slides for a 
microscope to identify the areas containing starch and protein 
with the use of certain dyes. Our ability to see all the blues 
at a glance will enable us to see at a glance all those areas 
containing starch. But how could we bring out all the reds by 
changing them to some other colour? If we changed the red chips 
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to some other colour why would this new colour stand out if the 
original reds did not? Clearly if some colours can be made to 
stand out against others this cannot be due to their particular 
'qualia'. 
If the patient recognizes the similarity between two chips but 
is unaware of whether it is a similarity of colour or of 
paleness or saturation; if he perceives red but not as an 
instance of red, i.e. if he is unable to perceive red as red, it 
is tempting to argue that he has lost the concept or idea of the 
colour red. This would imply that he is unable to name a 
coloured chip because he is unable to classify the colour under 
the concept of the colour red. This would mean that seeing red 
as red or seeing all the reds at a glance, are not perceptual 
experiences, but a certain way of thinking about what is seen. 
Aphasics and non-aphasics would have the same perceptual 
experiences, aphasics would simply be unable to subsume what 
they see under the appropriate concept. But Gelb and Goldstein 
have shown quite clearly that 'concepts' or ideas have not been 
affected. Vhen confronted with a coloured chip these patients 
are often able to rediscover the name of the colour through a 
process of association. Faced for example with a red chip they 
might recall some object of the same colour, for example 
strawberries. And since they know that strawberries are red they 
are able to name the colour of the chip (Gelb & Goldstein, 
1924:177). 
Clearly they have lost neither the sensation of red nor the 
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concept of the colour red. "All the reds at a glance", just like 
"red as red", must be a gestalt, it must manifest an 
intelligibility in the colours themselves, an intelligibility 
that I do not constitute but which I discover as 'already 
there'. I see all the reds at a glance because the heap of chips 
presents itself to me with a physiognomy. If I now change my 
orientation and attempt to pick out all the blue chips, there 
will be a regrouping of the colours such that I will see all the 
blues at a glance. This takes place without the reds or the 
blues changing in terms of their qualia. The red, even in its 
sensuous appearance, is the role it plays in the configuration. 
If all the reds can stand out against a background of the other 
colours, it's because the colours are not positive entities. 
Each colour is what it is through all the others and the 
particular 
chips is 
role it plays in the gestalt. It is as if the heap of 
pervaded by a 'colour-question' to which red is the 
The red that I perceive is thus not a chunk of answer. 
indivisible being (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:132), but an 'answer'. It 
is what it is by virtue of its relations with the other colours. 
Its being red and its standing out are inseparable. There is 
therefore no necessity to group or to classify all the reds as 
reds, because the reds I perceive are nothing but the sensuous 
presence of this grouping I see their belonging to each 
other, and their not belonging to the remaining colours. 




to understand is the relationship between this 
activity of sorting out all the red chips and the 
'all the reds at a glance'. It is generally 
accepted that our interests, needs or tendencies have an effect 
on our visual field. But the relationship between our 
orientation and our visual field is usually taken to be an 
external one. My interests or needs are held to focus my 
attention onto certain data which otherwise would have gone 
unnoticed, or it is held that my interests or needs lead me to 
interpret what I see in a particular way. 5 But we have seen 
above, that 'all the reds at a glance' cannot be accounted for 
in terms of sensuous data, nor can it be explained in terms of a 
mode of interpreting the visual givens. Ye cannot therefore 
argue that the goal-directed activity of sorting the red chips 
has had some effect, either on the visual data or on my 
interpretation of them. 
Ye have seen above that consciousness is not an 'I think' but an 
'I can' and that my eye is for me a certain power of reaching 
and grasping objects. The depth of my visual field or the 
distance of objects from me is what distinguishes a loose and 
approximate grip on the object from a complete grip which is 
proximity. Similarly, we have seen that the spatial orientation 
of an object, whether it is upright or inverted, is defined in 
terms of the nature of the grip that my body has on it. Neither 
my experience of depth nor my experience of spatial orientation 
can be reduced to sense data or to judgements. It now appears 
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that 'all the reds at a glance' is a measure of the grip that my 
sorting activity has on the pile of chips. Ve have said that its 
'standing out' and its being red are inseparable, now we are 
saying that its standing out is not a content for consciousness, 
neither a visual data nor a judgement, it exists 'for' the 
sorting hand. It is inserted into this sorting act. The only way 
of paying attention to 'all the reds at a glance' is by not 
paying attention to it and by throwing oneself into the sorting 
activity. Vhat we have in 'all the reds at a glance' is 
something to which we could not be closer than by sorting 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968:131). The sorting activity must be an 
original relation to 'all the reds at a glance' it must be 
impossible to establish a numerical distinction between the act 
of sorting and the experience of 'all the reds at a glance'. If 
it were possible to make this distinction it would be possible 
to objectify both the sorting act and 'all the reds at a 
glance', and we have seen that this is impossible. 
Vhat Merleau-Ponty has said of the relation between the football 
player and the football field we can say of the relation between 
the sorting subject and the pile of chips (1967:168/9). 
For the subject who sorts out the red chips, the pile of chips 
is not an 'object'. It is pervaded with lines of force, those 
demarcating the boundaries between groups of reds and the 
remaining colours. It is articulated into sectors containing the 
red chips, which call for a certain mode of sorting movement. 
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The particular gestalt of 'all the reds at a glance' initiate 
and guide the sorting action without being an object for 
consciousness. An unbiased reflection on the gestalt will not be 
a return to the interiority of a perceiving or thinking subject, 
but to the sorting act in the world. My sorting gesture is 
inseparable from the gestalt (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:205). 'All the 
reds at a glance' is characterised by a system of internal 
relations between the colours. Each colour is what it is through 
all the others, it is its role in this configuration. But 
clearly such a system of internal relations could not be 
encountered by a subject whose only mode of relating to the 
world was the relationship cogito-cogitatum. If a subject is to 
encounter this system of internal relations of mutual 
determining of one by the other, it could not exist as a 
contemplating consciousness, it would have to 'participate' in 
these relationships between colours, it would have to begin to 
relate to colours as colours relate to each other. Ve can say of 
my experience of 'all the reds at a glance', what Merleau-Ponty 
has said of the experience of the solidity of objects, 
"I experience their solidity from within insofar as I 
am among them and insofar as they communicate through 
me as a sentient thing." (1968:114) 
Just as the football player becomes one with the field and feels 
the direction of the goal as immediately as the vertical and 
horizontal planes of his own body, so the subject which sorts 
chips, becomes one with the configuration and feels the 
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relationships between colours, which we call 'all the reds at a 
glance' just as immediately as he feels his gestures from 
within. 
Similarly, the experience of the act of naming the colour of the 
red chip and the experience of 'red as an example of red' are 
indistinguishable. 
The phenomenon of the influence of language on perception and of 
perception on language-use has been studied by both linguists 
and psychologists. Vygotsky and Levine for example have shown 
that the impairment of object perception at an early age 
prevents the normal development of speech processes. 
"Abnormal child psychology is familiar with the fact, 
stated originally by Vygotski (1934), that in children 
who from an early age have defective visual gnosis and 
who, consequently, have defects in precise visual 
analysis and synthesis of objects they see, speech does 
not develop . properly and the process of naming objects 
is affected from the other end by inadequate 
preparedness of the necessary categorization of objects 
to be named on the basis of their visual perception." 
(Luria, 1976:358) 
There is on the other hand also considerable evidence showing 
the effect of language on perception. 
"More recently L S Tsvetkova and her collaborators 
discovered the remarkable fact that patients with 
lesions of the left parieto-occipital cortex (the 
so-called speech centre) and with a syndrome of 
amnestic aphasia (difficulty in naming objects) have a 
marked disturbance of visual gnosis: such patients 
cannot complete a drawing started by the experimenter 
(for example if the experimenter draws the body of an 
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animal they cannot add the distinguishing features to 
make it .into a "cock" or "duck" or "hare" etc). Such 
patients characteristically exhibit serious defects if 
they are asked to describe stylised drawings and to 
state whether they represent a hare or a cat, a cock or 
a goose." (Luria, 1976:358) 
Luria attempts to account for the role of the word in 
perception of objects by invoking the classical argument of 




attention onto specific features of the object or that it 
influences the way in which we think about the object. In both 
cases the word can have this effect because it places the object 
in a network of semantic connections. 
"As has often been stated in psychological and 
psycholinguistic literature a word not only stands 
for a particular object, but also includes it in a 
complex system of associations and relations and makes 
it a unique multidimensional semantic matrix; it 
thereby analyses and generalizes the object it denotes. 
This function of analysis of the essence of an object, 
the identification of its significant features and its 
inclusion in the appropriate system is made possible 
because of the morphological structure of the word, 
each part of which (root, suffix, inflection) performs 
a strictly definite function, picks out the most 
important cue, relates the object to other objects, 
places it in a certain category assigns it its 
appropriate meaning. For instance, the Russian word 
"chernil'nitsa (inkstand) ... Its root "chern" (black) 
distinguishes its color from other possible colors ... 
the suffix "il" places this object in the category of a 
tool or material ... " (1976:359) 
As with those suffering from colour word amnesia, there is no 
evidence to suggest that amnestic aphasics have lost concepts. 
The loss of the ability to name objects accompanies various 
forms of aphasia but in particular conduction or central aphasia 
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and, as we will see below, it is clear that there has been no 
loss of concepts here and that the patients' intellectual powers 
are perfectly intact. If the loss of the word brings about a 
disturbance of visual gnosis we must find a closer relation 
between the word and perception, one which does not depend on 
concepts or ideas. 
As with the goal-directed activity of sorting chips, the act of 
naming is immediately "reflected" in the perceptual field, 
polarizing it or placing its seal upon it (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:131). Red as red, cannot be objectified or reduced to 
visual givens; it is the goal of the naming act. Vhat there is 
then is not a colour first identical with itself which would 
offer itself to a seer, but something we could not be closer to 
than by naming it (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:131). Naming is therefore 
an original relation to its object, on the same footing as 
perception. In that it opens up a field of the nameable and the 
sayable it makes itself a gaze of the mind, an intuitus mentis 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968:154/5). 
"As has often been said, for the child the thing is not 
known until it is named, the name is the essence of the 
thing and resides in it on the same footing as its 
colour and its form." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:177/8) 
To name the object is to have grasped or delineated is essence, 
to have literally expressed its emotional essence. To lose the 
word or to lose the ability to name the object or the colour is 
to lose the ability to be orientated towards its essence or, in 
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the case of the colour, to be orientated towards "red as red". 
The essence cannot be embraced in an act of a pure 
consciousness. 
"Yhat is this eternally true that no one possesses? 
Yhat is this thing expressed which lies beyond all 
expression, and, if we have the right to posit it, why 
is it our constant concern to arrive at a more precise 
expression?" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:394) 
Yhat Merleau-Ponty has said about the eye we can say of the 
naming act and of speech. The naming act is a certain power of 
making contact with things. Yhen I speak, the movement of my 
organs of phonation is not the movement of objects in space, it 
is progress towards reality (1962:279). 
To learn to use the word and to learn to 'hear' the word, is to 
acquire a new organ of grasping or being in the world. It is to 
dilate one's being-in-the-world by appropriating fresh 
instruments (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:143). 
Perhaps it will be replied that since neither sorting nor naming 
acts can be performed in the dark or while the subject is 
blindfolded, these acts are not originating but depend on and 
are guided by visual givens, so that this relationship between 
the word and the objects takes place within the psyche. But this 
argument fails to recognize the synthesis of the body in its 
exploratory movements. 
Ye have seen in the perception of depth how through a 
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metamorphosis the perceiver of two monocular images can be 
thrown into the world itself, a world which surrounds him and 
from within which he perceives. Closing one eye will once again 
reintroduce an image of the world. To argue that this implies 
that three dimensional perception is a private phenomenon is to 
deny the possibility of the metamorphosis, it is to be 
unfaithful to the experience of depth and focussing and 
ultimately to deny the possibility of any experience of a 
transcendent world. It is through the synthesis of the body and 
my various sense organs that I am thrown into the world itself. 
"Let us say rather ... that the life of consciousness-
cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life -
is subtended by an 'intentional arc' which projects 
round about us our past, our future, our human setting, 
our physical, ideological and moral situation, or 
rather which results in our being situated in all these 
respects. It is this intentional arc which brings about 
the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of 
sensibility and motility." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:136) 
If it is true that I can 'see' the woolly blue of the carpet 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:313), the hardness and brittleness of 
glass, the springiness of steel, the softness of shavings 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:229), if the thing would not have its 
colour had it not also its shape, tactile properties and its 
odour (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:319) if it is the yellow of the lemon 
that is sour (Sartre, 1969:186) then it is clear that in the 
power of vision the senses of touch, taste and odour have been 
raised to a higher level where they too can reach the object at 
a distance. 
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As with the metamorphosis of the monocular images, in the power 
of speech the visual, tactile and olfactory senses are 
sublimated to a higher level so that the object that speech 
opens up to is not reducible to any sense data, and through 
speech they can penetrate the object, being no longer confined 
to its outer covering and confined to encountering an actually 
existent object. But this also means that the power of speech 
can be disrupted if any of my sensory fields are disrupted. The 
fact that I am unable to name or sort objects in the dark 
doesn't allow us to infer that speech does not make possible an 
original relation with the world or that speech presupposes a 
visual field and is the handmaid of consciousness. The fact that 
I cease to experience depth as soon as I close my left eye does 
not allow us to infer that the left eye is responsible for the 
perception of depth. Just because I am unable to see depth in 
the dark does not mean that depth is a visual content and that I 
do not encounter depth itself. 
If we can no longer accept an experience of the colours which 
would precede the sorting and naming acts, if vision is not our 
primary opening onto the world of colours, what is it that 
guides the hand to the appropriate chip, on the basis of what do 
we call one chip red and the other blue? 6 
In their own way the sorting and naming acts are prospective. 
From the beginning the naming act is already at its goal it 
already has 'in hand', the red as red. It is as if the speaking 
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body is taken possession of by this 'about to be expressed 
essence'. There is a secret alliance between 'red as red' and 
the naming act such that neither exists without the other. My 
naming act takes it up as it needs to be taken, in accordance 
with its own internal structure, as though my speech were in a 
relation of pre-established harmony with it, so that one cannot 
say whether it is the naming act which subtends the colour or 
whether the colour elicits the naming by a remote attraction. To 
name a colour is to aim at the colour through speech. It is to 
allow oneself to respond to its (the colour's) call which is 
made uoon my speech independently of any representation. The 
naming act is therefore not the handmaid of consciousness. In 
order that I may be able to name the colour, the colour must 
first of all exist for my speaking body. 'Red as red' no longer 
exists for the speaking body of the colour name amnestic, and 
this is what causes him to be unable to recall the name of the 
colour (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:139). 
It is as though the naming act was formed in the heart of the 
'red as red', while in the case of the amnestic the word can 
only be discovered through the explicit association of ideas. 
Since he knows that strawberries are red, and can see that the 
chip presented to him is the same colour as that of 
strawberries, he can infer that the chip is red. There is then 
in the case of the non-aphasic, a direct relationship between 
the colour physiognomy and the act of naming. The peculiar 
roundabout way through which the aphasic attempts to overcome 
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his deficiency, reminds us of Schneider's inability to draw from 
a given model. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that because Schneider's world has lost its 
physiognomy, he cannot draw from the model (nachzeichnen), he 
can only draw from the idea or formula of the object vrhich he 
must first discover. 
"The world in its entirety no longer suggests any 
meaning to him and conversely the meanings which occur 
to him are not embodied any longer in the given world. 
Ve shall say, in a word, that the world no longer has 
any physiognomy for him. This is what reveals 
(enables us to understand) the nature of the 
peculiarities seen in his drawing(s). Schneider never 
draws from the model (nachzeichnen); perception is not 
carried directly into movement. Vith his left hand he 
feels the object, recognizes certain characteristics (a 
corner, a right angle), formulates his discovery and 
finally draws without any model a figure corresponding 
to the verbal formula. 
The translation of percept into movement is effected 
via the express meanings of language, whereas the 
normal subject penetrates into the object by 
perception, assimilating its structure into his 
substance, and through this body the object directly 
regulates his movements." (1962:132) 
The way in which Schneider draws resembles the way in which the 
colour word amnestic manages to arrive at the name of the 
colour. For the non-aphasic, the colour elicits its name by a 
'remote attraction', or regulates his pronouncing act directly. 
Finally, let us return to this informal meaning embedded in the 
sound of the word. Vhat is it that the non-aphasic 'hears' in 
the command, 'pick out all the reds', that the aphasic doesn't 
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hear? Vhat is it that I begin to hear in the word 'ab' which 
makes it so different to the word 'up'? Vhat is it that was 
experienced when the words damp, hard and warm were flashed on a 
screen so quickly that the subject was unable to read it? Vhat 
is it that the sensory aphasic who responds with verbal 
paraphasias 'hears' even though he is unable to hear the word as 
a sign distinguishable from other signs? Vhat is it that he 
hears in the word nos (nose) which leads him to reply with words 
like tongue or mouth, when it is clear that as a sound he is 
unable to distinguish between nos and nosh (knife)? 
Merleau-Ponty describes how the patient with colour name amnesia 
attempts to hear something in the word. 
"The patient suffering from amnesia, to whom a colour 
name is given, and who is asked to choose a 
corresponding sample, repeats the name as if he 
expected something to come of it. But the name is 
useless to him, it tells him nothing more, it is 
alien and absurd, as are for us names which we go on 
repeating far too long a time." (1962:193) 
Ve have seen that the patient has not lost the concept of the 
colour, he has not lost say the idea of the colour red, 
consequently, if the name is useless, alien or absurd, this has 
nothing to do with a loss of the concept. The command, 'pick out 
all the reds' has for him a certain meaning, but it is only an 
intellectual meaning. 7 Vhat it lacks is a 'perceptual- motor 
meaning'. The command does not communicate anything to him as a 
perceiving, sorting subject. For the non-aphasic the word brings 
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about a certain structure in his environment, a physiognomy in 
the pile of coloured chips. 
But 
"The phonetic 'gesture' brings about, both for the 
speaking subject and for his hearers, a certain 
structural co-ordination of experience, a certain 
modulation of existence, exactly as a pattern of my 
bodily behaviour endows the objects around me with a 
certain significance both for me and for others." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:193) 
"The meaning of a gesture thus 'understood' is not 
behind it, it is intermingled with the structure of the 
world outlined by the gesture, and which I take up on 
my own account." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:186) 
as we have seen this structure of the world, this 
significance with which the object is endowed, is not an object 
or a content, that I could survey or possess like visual 
contents or ideas. My experience of 'red as red' is the 
paradoxical experience of being thrown beyond experience into 
the world, where I discover myself as a naming and sorting 
subject. As a naming speaking subject I am essentially amongst 
others. To name the colour of the chip is to address myself to 
others, and the 'red as red' that this act subtends, is 
essentially there for all those who speak this language. To 
speak the word or hear the word in the full sense of speak and 
hear, is to encounter a world and an object that is not mine, 
but which belongs to the anonymous community which speaks this 
language, or to a world which exists 'for us', without this 'for 
us' being 'for me'. We cannot be consciousnesses existing in 
parallel because my experience of 'red as red' is not 
numerically distinguishable from the experience the other has. 
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It is not as if each of us is confined to his own private 
representation of the same colour. 
"It is said that the colours, tactile reliefs given to 
the other, are for me an absolute mystery, forever 
inaccessible. This is not completely true; for me to 
have not an idea, an image, nor a representation, but 
as it were the immanent experience of them, it suffices 
that I look at a landscape, that I speak of it with 
someone. Then, through the concordant operation of his 
body and my own, what I see passes into him, this 
individual green of the meadow under my eyes invades 
his vision without quitting my own, I recognize in my 
green his green, as the customs officer recognizes 
suddenly in a traveller the man whose description he 
had been given. There is here no problem of the alter 
ego because it is not I who sees, not he who sees, 
because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us 
" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968:142) 
But the concordant operation of his body and my own in speech is 
not simply a way of getting the other to see what I see. It is 
not simply a way of verifying my perception. Finding and using 
the word or the expression allows me to have an access to a 
world existing 'for us'. In the experience of 'red as red', we 
witness the power of language in transporting the I into the 
other's perspective (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:19). Speech raises and 
sublimates my experience of the world to the point that it 
ceases to be my experience, so that I merge with the 
perspective the other has, or I merge with the anonymous 
perspective of the speaking community. The paradox is that it is 
in my experience that I am led beyond my experience. The unity 
of Paul's world and my world is not simply an idea of unity. The 
world he perceives and the world I perceive do not become the 
same world through an inspection of the mind. Like the unity of 
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the object in three dimensional perception, the unity of our 
world 
the 
is experienced or lived. In passing from my experience to 
experience of the world with others, I am not simply aware 
that both of us now sees the same object, I am aware that we are 
progressing towards the object itself and finally enjoying its 
concrete presence (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:233). It is our constant 
concern to find the precise word or expression (Herleau-Ponty, 
1962:394) because, just as in individual binocular perception, 
the object elicits the co-operative activity of my eyes so that 
it can take up its existence for me as a concrete object, so the 
word and the expression make possible a certain concordant 
operation of my speech and that of another, through which the 
object reveals its concrete essence and transcendent existence 
which is essentially and only something 'for us'. 
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APHASIAS AFFECTING THE PRODUCTION OF SPEECH 
The basic prejudice compromising traditional accounts of the 
perception and understanding of speech viz, the concept of an 
acoustic image, has its counterpart in traditional theories 
about the production of speech. Like any other process in the 
world and in time, the expressive act is taken to be 
decomposable into its basic elements. The basic elements here 
are taken to be muscular activities producing sounds, the 
so-called articulemes. The task of the theory is to explain how 
these articulemes are ordered so that the speaker produces 
recognizable words and a correct grammar. In some theories this 
order is traced back to certain neurological structures, certain 
pre-established nerve circuits found in the speech centre in the 
left cerebral hemisphere. In other theories the vis a tergo of 
this ordered activity is taken to be the mind, which consciously 
(or unconsciously) executes the articulemes so as to conform to 
a 'verbal image'. Luria appears to belong to yet a third group 
of theorists who accept that in most speech there is some 
combination of the effect of pre-established pathways and 
conscious or voluntary control. This means that any disruption 
of the production of speech can be traced back to a loss of 
nervous tissue responsible for the ordered act, or, to a 
disruption of those elements necessary for the conscious 
execution, such as kinesthetic information about the speech 
organs, verbal images and the intellectual powers of the 
speaker. 
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TRANSCORTICAL MOTOR APHASIA 
In our reflections on transcortical motor aphasia and in 
particular the new information that Luria has brought to light 
concerning the syndrome, we wish to show that there is no need 
of a vis a tergo to account for the order in speech because 
the most elementary act is not the articuleme but the 
'meaningful expression' . Since the orator's speech is his 
thought, neither the nervous system nor the speech act itself, 
can be conceived as a physical process divisible into smaller 
parts. 
Patients are classified as transcortical motor aphasics when 
they are able to repeat words given to them by the examiner, 
name objects and understand speech addressed to them but are 
unable to produce fluent narrative speech. The earliest attempts 
to account for this form of aphasia were based on the 'regional' 
concept of the brain, or the so-called Lichtheim model. The 
various functions of the brain were understood to be carried out 
by corresponding 'regions' or parts. Damage to any one region 
could leave other regions intact. Sensory aphasia, for example 
was seen to be due to the disruption of the 'sensory centre' or 
centre for sensory (e.g. acoustic) images. These patients were 
able to speak and name objects but they were unable to 
understand speech addressed to them. Motor aphasia, or Broca's 
aphasia was held to be due to a destruction of the centre for 
motor images. These patients were able to understand speech 
addressed to them, but were unable to express themselves, name 
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objects or repeat words. Transcortical motor aphasia, and 
conduction aphasia were explained in terms of a disruption of 
the fibres connecting these centres. In the ~ase of 
transcortical motor aphasia the connections between the 
so-called "centre for concepts" and the "motor centre" have been 
destroyed while the connections between the "sensory centre" and 
the "motor centre" remains intact. This is held to explain why 
these patients are able to repeat words given to them without 
being able to translate their own concepts into speech. 
Having pointed out that the notion of a "centre for concepts" is 







the classical picture, transcortical motor 
certain difficulties in repeating words and 
them, and argues that the nature of these 
difficulties affords us a new way of understanding transcortical 
motor aphasia. 
The patient Luria refers to as Grish, exhibits the traditional 
symptoms of transcortical motor aphasia. He is able to repeat 
single words given to him but all spontaneous narrative speech 
has been lost. In addition to the above symptoms however, Luria 
shows that Grish also has great difficulties in repeating a 
series of two or three isolated words or letters. Instead of 
repeating the letters given to him, he repeated letters which 
had been used earlier in the test. Luria refers to this 
phenomenon as "pathological inertia of previous stereotypes". 
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This inertia of previous stereotypes became particularly evident 
when the patient was asked to repeat pairs of sounds. Giving the 
patient's response below that of the examiner Luria quotes the 
result of a typical experiment. 
"b k k - s k - s 1 - p n - d 
b - k b - k k - s k - w k - d 
b - 1 
p - z 
Clearly the mistakes arising in this case have nothing 
to do with the difficulty of differentiation between 
similar (oppositional) phonemes, but they express the 
pathological inertia of a previous stereotype." (Luria, 
1976:304) 
Luria explains the phenomenon of pathological inertia by 
referring to neurophysiological conditions necessary for the 
performance of an expressive act. 
"The successful performance of the process of choice of 
the verbal composition of the expression I have 
described (spontaneous expression) and the inhibition 
of all irrelevant associations naturally can take place 
only under certain neurophysiological conditions. The 
first of these conditions is adequate selectivity of 
the nervous processes, whereby a structure of 
excitation, once it has arisen, inhibits all 
simultaneously arising irrelevant associations, so that 
dominance of that structure and the planned character 
of the corresponding selective connections are ensured. 
The second condition, closely connected with the first, 
is adequate mobility (or plasticity) of the nervous 
processes, by which modern neurophysiology implied the 
easy inhibition of connections once formed and the 
switching from the previous connections to new ones so 
that it is possible to switch relatively easily from 
one excitation structure to the next. 
Both these conditions may be absent in pathological 
states of the brain." (Luria, 1976:288) 
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Luria believes that the absence of these conditions lies at the 
basis of the disruption of the patient's narrative speech. The 
patient is unable to speak spontaneously because the 
neurological connections set up for the pronunciation of the 
first words are not easily inhibited making the pronunciation of 
the remaining words impossible. 
"At the same time it will be clear that the process of 
narrative speech presents particularly high demands on 
the ease of inhibition of the previous components of 
the expression and on the smooth switching to new 
components. Even slight disturbances of this mobility 
of the nervous processes and the appearance of 
pathological inertia, leading to "freezing" of past 
stereotypes, may prove fatal to the narration of a 
spontaneous expression although it is not reflected in 
the repetition of isolated sounds and words, especially 
if they are included in different contexts and 
separated from each other by considerable pauses." 
(Luria, 1976:289) 
Vhat is clear from Grish's overall behaviour is that this lack 
of 'plasticity' and 'selectivity' are not forms of intellectual 
impairment and that the transcortical motor aphasic does not 
suffer from a loss of memory or from the loss of an ability to 
represent images to himself. 
In a series of experiments in which the patient is required to 
recall pairs of pictures rather than pairs of sounds or isolated 
words, Luria has shown that the patient's memory and "power of 




patients is shown two pictures (a cup and a bear) 
are then turned over and placed on his left side; 
then shown two other pictures (a dress and a 
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pear) and these are also turned over and placed on the 
patient's right side. Next, 15 pictures are spread out 
before him, including duplicates of both pairs shown to 
him previously. The experimenter then points to the 
upturned pictures on his left side and asks him to find 
them among the set of 15. The test is then repeated 
with the second pair of pictures on his right side. 
In both cases the patient can perform this test easily: 
no signs of interfering inhibition or pathological 
inertia are observed. 
The observations thus show that the disturbance of 
recalling a group of words are based in this case (of 
the transcortical motor aphasic) not on general defects 
of memory, such as the weakness of traces or ease of 
their inhibition, but on special defects, the principle 
factor of which is the pathological inertia of 
established stereotypes affecting mainly the motor and 
speech spheres." (Luria, 1976:318/9) 
Yith this notion of a pathological inertia of established 
stereotypes affecting the motor aspect of speech articulation, 
Luria believes he is able to account for transcortical motor 
aphasia. Nevertheless, earlier in his discussion of Grish's 
difficulties, he points out that while Grish had difficulties 
repeating pairs of isolated words or sounds he had no difficulty 
repeating "combinations of words which form a single semantic 
group such as "communal feeding", "production cooperative", 
"harsh winter", "rising sun", "mad dog", "snowy winter"" (Luria, 
1976:304). He explains this peculiarity by arguing that the 
unity of the semantic structure makes the two words "components 
of a single verbal action". 
" the repetition of simple word combinations such as 
"snezhnaya zima (snowy winter)", "sladkoe yabloko 
(sweet apple)", "proizvodstvennyi kooperativ 
(industrial cooperative)" and so on - or phrases such 
as "devochka plachet (the girl is crying)" and 
"mal'chik spit (the boy is asleep)" presented no 
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difficulty to the patient: the unity of the semantic 
structure, making the two words components of a single 
verbal action, in this case abolished the difficulties 
which occurred in the reproduction of a series of 
isolated semantic units." (Luria, 1976:307/8) 
But how are we to understand this effect that the semantic 
structure has on the articulatory process? Vithin the confines 
of the natural attitude 'semantic structure' would at best 
belong to the realm of thought. How could it exert a 
co-ordinating effect on a series of muscular acts? In what sense 
do the two words become components of a single verbal act? 
Could Luria be suggesting that "snowy winter" is easier to 
remember than "snow window" because the former is one idea 
while the latter is two? But this would suggest that Grish's 
difficulties stem from a weakening of his memory which 
contradicts the results of Luria's test. Nor can we appeal to 
the breakdown of a power of 'representation', which would enable 
the speaker to represent to himself the words he is to 
pronounce. Vhy would the words "snowy winter" be any easier to 
represent to oneself than "snow - window"? 
If the 'unity of the semantic structure' of the speech act is 
to explain why the problems of selectivity and mobility of the 
aphasic brain are avoided, 'semantic structure', could not be an 
idea in the mind of the speaker. If 'semantic structure' were 
equivalent to an idea, the process through which this idea 
became translated into an articulatory activity would still 
presuppose setting up the necessary nerve connections for that 
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activity and hence would still be affected by the loss of 
mobility and selectivity of the aphasic's brain. 
If the semantic structure of the speech act is not an idea in 
the mind of the speaker could it be a 'meaning' which a 
linguistic community attaches to the speech act? But in what way 
could this attachment of meaning affect the motor process of 
pronunciation and overcome the aphasic's loss of mobility and 
selectivity? Vithin the bounds of the natural attitude 'semantic 
structures' could only play a role in the actual pronunciation 
of speech, in an indirect sense. 
For example, if a group of words is meaningful, or has a single 
semantic structure, it implies that the group is often used in 




to articulate this group become more or less permanent 
entire process becomes a reflex. If the ability of the 
inhibit its connections and to switch to new ones is 
not presupposed in the articulation of expressions like 
'industrial co-operative' or 'snowy winter', it implies that 
these 'single verbal acts', through repeated use, have become 
automatic i.e. each is controlled by a single, pre-established 
nerve pathway. 
This interpretation seems highly unlikely. There are many groups 
of words which do not form a semantic unity and yet they often 
occur in sequence in every day speech. If it were a question of 
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habitual sequences of words then at least sections of Grish's 
speech, used as habitually as say "industrial co-operative", 
should be fluent. But it is the transcortical motor aphasic 
which has lost all fluent narrative speech and who has retained 
the ability to name objects and repeat words, i.e. they are the 
patients who have lost the functions which are in common usage. 
If 'a single verbal act' was no more than a sequence of words 
often used together it seems highly unlikely that Luria would 
not have detected these combinations. A brief extract of the 
patient's speech and Luria's summary shows clearly that even 
habitual combinations of words have not been preserved. 
"How are you? 'fine' Tell me what you did this 
morning? 'This morning' (silence). Vhat does your 
family consist of? 'Well now .• my mother ... that is 
with my mother ... mo ... mother (gives up)' 
The patient's spontaneous speech was thus 
disintegrated and all he could do was to 
question echolalically and produce a few 






Furthermore if the unity of the verbal act was determined by 
actual usage we should be able to discover differences between 
patients depending on their own habitual use of combinations of 
words. The fact the Luria says quite clearly that it is the 
unity of the semantic structure which makes the two words 
components of a single verbal act, indicates that in every case, 
it was the semantic element which made the difference and not 
usage. 




then with the remaining alternative and that is to 
at face value and to recognise that his own 
the nature of aphasic and normal speech cannot 
always be contained within the traditional scientific parameters 
within which he presents his work. "Snowy winter" is a "single 
verbal act", while "snow-window" is not, because in the former 
the two words form a single semantic group. This means that the 
pronunciation of snowy and of winter no longer take place as two 
distinguishable articulatory events - they have become enveloped 
into one indivisible verbal action, which means that the speech 
act cannot be seen as a physical event, because any physical 
event is always decomposable into its constituent parts. Luria's 
distinction between single and multiple in his use of the 
expression, 'single verbal act' only makes sense in this 
context, if we can overcome the traditional separation of motor 
and semantic. 
If we cannot account for the pronunciation of 'snowy winter' in 
terms of pre-established nerve pathways, how can we explain the 
fact that a meaningful expression is easier or requires less 
mobility and selectivity of the brain, than a meaningless 
combination of words, like snow: winter, when, from a purely 
motor point of view, they are equally complex. The phenomenon 
seems to suggest that what is simple and what is complex for the 
brain cannot be defined in purely physical terms. Ye must take 
into account experience of the speaker. 
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"The living physiology of the nervous system can only 
be understood by starting from phenomenal givens." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1967:88) 
For the speaker, to utter 'snowy winter' is to grasp in speech 
one indivisible idea, it is to perform one act. This is not 
simply a subjective impression that would hide a real complex 
system of neurological and muscular acts, the phenomenal given, 
or what speaking is for the speaker, is inseparable from the act 
and 'explains' the co-ordination of neurological and muscular 
activity. Ve can no longer draw an absolute distinction between 
the conscious life in which the agent directs himself towards a 
signification and a material, neuro-physiological realm governed 
by causal relations, the two existing parallel to each other. 
"Since this structure of behaviour and the cerebral 
functioning which supports it can only be conceived in 
terms borrowed from the perceived world, this latter no 
longer appears as an order of phenomena parallel to the 
order of physiological phenomena but as one which is 
richer than it." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:92/3) 
As we have seen, Husserl credits Descartes with being the first 
philosopher to have caught a glimpse of the transcendental ego. 
Vhen Descartes concludes that "I think therefore I am" is 
indubitable, he recognizes that he is not simply revealing some 
facet of his psychological or neurological make up. The 
conclusion does not follow because the neurological connections 
are of such a nature that the thought of himself thinking 
inevitably causes the thought of himself existing to arise. If 
the conclusion 'I am' follows indubitably, then there can be 
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no explanation for its emergence, no account from the outside. 
Ve can accept the indubitability of the conclusion only by 
taking up Descartes 
the only account we 
position from the inside, and from within, 
can give of the emergence is that I think 
the conclusion follows, because it does. As the transcendental 
ego I am the one for whom there is no numerical distinction 
between 'I think P.Q' and 'P.Q'. If for the orator his speech is 
his thought, then similarly there can be no causal explanation 
for the co-ordination of articulemes and hence of the 
neurological processes involved in the execution of the 
articulemes. There can be no extrinsic source of order, neither 
a pre-established network of nerve connections nor a mental act 
which would control the activities. 11 the senteuce of a 
speaker must be organized all by itself ••. 11 (Merleau-Ponty, 







so that a particular expressive act takes 
speaker grasps in his speech a certain 
signification, and he grasps this signification because it is 
something to be grasped. 
The pronunciation of 'snowy winter' is one verbal act because it 
grasps one indivisible signification. The unity of the semantic 
structure makes the two words components of a single verbal 
action because it is literally the same thing to grasp one 
signification and to use the pronunciation of the two words as 
one single act of grasping. 
II the signification is what comes to seal, to close, 
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the multiplicity of 
linguistic means of 
into one sole act, as the 
aesthesiological body." 







vision comes to 
(Merleau-Ponty, 
In the speech of the other, as in my own speech we have the 
paradox of immanence and transcendence. Unlike Descartes cogito, 
speech is accessible to others and is 'dependent' on its 
materials, the speech organs and the neurological structures so 
that if these are damaged in any way speech becomes disrupted. 
Nevertheless, in the speech act these materials merge, to form 
one act of grasping, to form an interior in the world, a point 
of view, that is, something we can only encounter by giving up 
the position of a disinterested observer, and by allowing 
ourselves to be drawn into this point of view. It is thus not 
possible to 'explain' the speech act or to describe these 
materials purely from the outside. 
" science has not been able to construct 
"central sectors" of behaviour from the outside 





If the living physiology of the nervous system can only be 
understood by starting from phenomenal givens, it is because the 
speech act is the paradoxical synthesis of 'from the inside' and 
'from the outside', because s~;)e~ch is a last relation to its 
object. 
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TELEGRAPHIC SPEECH AND AGRAMMATISM 
One of the most widespread syndromes in aphasia is the syndrome 
of 'telegraphic speech'. It is either fundamental to or 
accompanies most other forms of motor aphasia. As rhe name 
suggests, the patient tends to omit articles, prepositions, 
adverbs, adjectives and even verbs. His speech has lost all 
melodic fluency and he gives the impression of reciting words 
one after the other. Patients who speak languages which are 
highly inflected, where the grammatical forms of words take the 
place of prepositions, articles etc., exhibit what :i_s often 
referred to as 'agrammatism'. These patients use incorrect noun 
cases, and incorrect verb conjugations. There is a strong 
tendency to put all nouns in the nominative case and all verbs 
in the infinitive form. 
The most characteristic feature of the patients of this 
group was that they could easily repeat single words 
and name single objects; however, when instructed to 
repeat elementary coherent sentences, they began to 
have appreciable difficulty: the predicative (verbal) 
part of the sentence either was omitted or was 
displaced by the nominative (substantive) part of the 
sentence: the latter took precedence and was repeated 
first of all. Frequently the form of both the verbal 
and the nominative components of the sentence to be 
repeated was distorted and the patient began to recite 
the words as from a dictionary, so that the repetitive 
speech lost its fluent character. For instance, when 
attempting to repeat the phrase "Mal'chick (the boy) 
udaril (hit) sobaku (the dog), these patients repeated 
it as: "Mal'chik ... Sobaka (dog, nominative case)" or 
"Mal'chik ... Sobaku (dog, accusative case) •.. Udarit' 
(to hit, infinitive)" and the coherent sentence was 
broken up into a chain of isolated, syntactically 
disconnected words ... 
Investigations 
are severe the 
have shown that 
speech contains 
if these disturbances 
several times fewer 
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verbs than normal speech, and there is a correspond"ng 
increase in the number of substantives. In precisely 
the same way the number of nouns given in indirect 
cases falls sharply, and the number of nominative forms 
rises correspondingly." (Luria, 1976:73/6) 
Luria describes the syndrome of a typical agrammatic aphasic, 
Colonel Vin, as follows: 
"He was able to utter single words either imitatively 
or spontaneously but he was totally unable to utter 
phrases or sentences. He was even unable to repeat 
short sentences spoken by the therapist. Thus, while he 
had no difficulty repeating the word "polden" (noon), 
he was unable to repeat the short sentence. "Byl den" 
(It was day): he was only able to repeat the word "den" 
(day). The patient's spontaneous statements consisted 
of single words in the nominative case"··· wounded! 
medal commission ... overcoat ... boots." By 
this he wished to indicate that he wanted his overcoat 
and boots brought in order that he might go to the 
commission which awards military medals. There was no 
hint whatsoever of sentence structure in his speech." 
(1970:448) 
Macdonald and Critchley in 'Aphasiology (using the expression 
telegrammatism instead of telegraphic) suggests that telegraphic 
speech and agrammatism are not two different syndromes but the 
same syndrome as it appears in agglutinative languages and in 
highly inflected languages respectively. 
"Agrammatism is naturally a more important features in 
Aphasiacs whose natural language comprises one of rhe 
highly inflected tongues, and in such the defect ~ay 
entail considerable errors in the employment of 
prefixes and suffices ••. Telegrammatism is a feature 
of Aphasic speech in the case of agglutinative rather 
than inflected tongues. The resulting diction or script 
is tense and abrupt, reminiscent of the poverty of 
language utilized in concocting telegrams." (Macdonald 
Critchley, 1970:16) 
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Luria's description of the agrammatic aphasic quoted above not 
only shows that the patient uses fewer verbs than normal, but 
also, that when verbs are used there is a tendency to use them 
in the infinitive form. Later, in his discussion of telegraphic 
features of transcortical motor aphasia, he reveals that there 
is also a tendency to use the passive form (1976:353). 
How are we to account for these forms of motor aphasia? Vhy is 
there a tendency for the telegraphic aphasic to 'leave out' 
prepositions, adverbs, adjectives and even verbs and why does 
the agrammatic aphasic tend to use nouns in the nominative case 
and verbs in the infinitive or the passive form? 
Here again, from Luria's description of these patients, it is 
clear that we cannot account for these syndromes in terms of a 
disturbance of intelligence (1976:73). Are we then to say that a 
certain set of nerve circuits or reflexes have been destroyed? 
But it would be difficult to explain why certain reflexes have 
been destroyed and not others. Vhy for example have those 
reflexes involved in the articulation of the nominative noun 
cases, and of the infinitive and passive forms of the verbs been 
better preserved than others? 
In the penultimate chapter of 'Basic Problems of 
Neurolinguistics', in a discussion of the agrammatic speech of 
transcortical motor aphasics, Luria indicates the direction in 
which an answer to this problem can be found without developing 
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his insight or exploring its implications. 
"As an example I can cite those cases in which a word 
denoting an intermediate action (for example, udarit' 
to strike something or somebody) and requiring an 
object (for example, to strike a dog) loses its 
complex intermediate structure in patients with these 
disturbances and is converted into a word which has 
lost these potential connections and which does not 
require syntagmatic connections with another word 
(udarit'sya - the passive form, to be struck). Facts of 
this type could provide new ways of analysis of the 
internal mechanisms of disintegration of syntactic 
structures and could lead to the development of that 
"telegraphic style" which is such an exceptionally 
interesting phenomenon for the analysis of the internal 
mechanisms of syntactic structures." (Luria, 1976:353) 
This approach seems to be more fruitful. Vhat characterises the 
nominative case and the infinitive and passive forms of the verb 
is that they can be used alone. The accusative and dative cases 
for example as well as the transitive verbs all presuppose other 
parts of speech. But clearly such notions as "can be used alone" 
or "does not require syntagmatic connections with another word", 
cannot be applied to the speech act as a motor activity, but 
only as an expressive activity. 
How does the fact that these forms can be used alone account 
for their appearance in the aphasic's speech? Luria would seem 
to imply that in some way the agrammatic aphasic deliberately 
chooses specific grammatical forms so that his speech will 
appear to be a string of individual words and not a coherent 
sentence expressing one idea, and that the telegraphic aphasic 
deliberately leaves out the small words for the same reason. Are 
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we then to regard the aphasia as merely symbolic? Are we to say 
that the disruption of the speech expresses some deeper 
disturbance, one which has no necessary relation to speech? 
Speech does not disintegrate as a mechanical process, nor does 
its disintegration simply reflect the disintegration of the 
mind. Speech is itself a manner of relating oneself to a world. 
It is that paradoxical synthesis of immanence and transcendence 
which we have seen in the grasping gesture and in particular in 
binocular perception. As we have argued above, it is literally 
the same thing to use the pronunciation of two words as one act 
of grasping and to be directed towards one significatinn. Vhat 
agrammatism and telegraphic speech demonstrate is that it is 
literally the same thing to use the correct grammatical forms or 
the correct 'small words', and to use the entire collection of 
words in the expression as one act of grasping. The grammatical 
forms and the small words are neither automatically, nor 
consciously and voluntarily executed. From the point of view of 
the speaker (and of his audience) they do not exist as objects. 
Like the lozenge shaped figures of monocular perception they are 
the distorted projection of the unity of the expression, of the 
Gestalt of the speech act. Similarly the aphasic's use of the 
nominative forms of the nouns and the infinitives and gerunds of 
the verbs, and the loss of the small words is neither automatic 
nor deliberate. If through the disruption of the synthesis of 
the speaking body it becomes impossible to use various words as 
one act of grasping, then each word becomes an individual act of 
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grasping. The nominative forms of the nouns and the infinitives 
and gerunds of the verbs are for the speaker and his audience 
nothing but the synthesis of the articulemes into an act which 
resembles that particular form of grasping which we have in the 
act of naming. 
Ye could describe agrammatism and telegraphic speech by saying 
that the significations of whole expressions no longer exist for 
the speaking body, even though they may be present to 
consciousness. Ultimately however it is impossible to say 
whether he is unable to use the words as one act of grasping 
because there is for his speaking no signification of a whole 
expression, or whether there is no signification of a whole 
expression because he is unable to use the various words as one 
act of grasping. 
CONDUCTION APHASIA 
The 'conduction' (or central) aphasic retains the ability to 
understand speech addressed to him and his spontaneous 
expressive speech is relatively intact. By contrast the ability 
to repeat words, sounds and sentences on demand is severely 
disrupted. In the cases cited by both Goldstein and Luria, 
patients were unable to repeat words which they themselves had 
used in spontaneous speech (Luria, 1976:265). 
"The striking thing, however, 
relatively good conversational 
was that despite this 
speech, he showed a 
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complete inability to name objects and to repeat on 
command either letters, words or sentences. Although he 
might have just used a particular word or sentence in 
spontaneous speech, he was totally unable to repeat it 
on demand a moment later. Yhen asked to recite the 
numbers from one to ten, or the letters of the 
alphabet, or the days of the week, he could do so only 
if the first few were given to him. Then, if asked to 
repeat one of the symbols, he was unable to do so 
unless he recited the whole series. Thus if after 
counting from one to ten, he was asked to repeat the 
number seven, he could do so only by counting 
consecutively from one to seven. Often in his attempt 
to repeat a given word, he would utter the other words, 
which were related as to their contents to the given 
word. Thus when asked to say "God" he could not do so, 
but would say "Himmel" for children he would say family 
etc. 
He could not name even the most familiar objects, 
although he was usually able to demonstrate or explain 
the use of an object which was shown to him, and 
sometimes uttered the correct word in the course of his 
explanations. Yhen asked immediately afterwards to 
repeat the word, however, he could never do so." 
(Goldstein, 1948:280) 
For those who believe that the expressive act is made up of 
elementary acts, such as the pronunciation of sounds or words 
conduction aphasia presents the paradoxical picture of a 
disruption that affects the simple or elementary forms of speech 
without affecting the complex forms of spontaneous narrative 
speech (Luria, 1976:239). 
Conduction aphasia was at first explained in terms of the 
Lichtheim model and as its' name suggests, was considered to be 
a disruption of the 'conducting' pathways between the sensory 
and the motor centres, while the pathways between these centres 
and the 'centre for concepts' were maintained. This was held to 
account for the fact that conduction aphasics were able to 
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express what they thought (centre for concepts - motor centre), 
understand whatever was heard (sensory centre centre for 
concepts), but they were unable to pronounce what they heard 
(sensory centre - motor centre). 
Beside the fact that such 'centres for concepts' are 
neurologically unacceptable (Luria, 
aphasics exhibit other difficulties 
1976:290), conduction 
which could not be 
reconciled with the Lichtheim model. Generally, they show great 
difficulties in naming objects, which according to the Lichtheim 
model would presuppose a breakdown of the pathways betueen the 
'centre for concepts' and the 'motor centres', which in turn 
would render the fluent narrative speech of conduction aphasics, 
inexplicable. Neurophysiologists, were forced to consider in 
what way repetitive speech and naming objects were similar. 
Kurt Goldstein had seemed to provide an answer, but his 
explanation was of a completely different kind. He pointed out, 
that from a psychological point of view, the repetition of 
single words was not the most elementary kind of speech 
activity. In the normal speaking process what is referred to as 
'concrete speech', ideas are formulated as wholes into 
expressions or sentences. The utterance of individual sounds, 
words or names, referred to as 'abstract speech', requires the 
speaker to disengage himself from the normal speaking process 
and pronounce the words in an artificial situation. Conduction 
aphasia was seen as a loss of this ability to disengage oneself 
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from the normal speaking process, to become reflective about the 
speaking process itself. It was seen as due to a disruption of 
what Goldstein called 'categorial behaviour' which was made 
possible by a certain intellectual power which was called 
'abstract attitude'. 
The idea of a disturbance of 'abstract attitude' was taken 
further by linguists 
conduction aphasia 
insufficiency. 
like Pierre Marie who ultimately regarded 
as a special form of intellectual 
But this intellectualistic solution had its own difficulties. 
The most important was that it could quite easily be shown that 
beside their linguistic difficulties, conduction aphasics showed 
no sign of intellectual disruption (Luria, 1976:242). If 
'abstract attitude' was to explain 'abstract speech' or 
repetitive speech it would have to be an 'intelligence' of the 
speaking body itself and for as long as the speaking body 
was regarded simply as a system of muscles, organs and nerve 
circuits, this was inconceivable. For as long as neurolinguists 
remained attached to the metaphysics of consciousness and 
substance, the fundamental categories of the natural attitude, 
conduction aphasia would remain inexplicable. 
Luria's attempt to account for conduction aphasia expresses the 
need to surpass the either/or situation of an explanation in 
terms of a disruption of thought or a disruption of nerve 
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circuits. He accepts Goldstein's distinction between abstract 
and concrete speech. For Luria, the importance of Goldstein's 
contribution, lay in directing attention to what the t~.ro kinds 
of speech are for the speaker. For the speaker concrete speech 
is the formulation or the expression of a certain idea in 
speech, while abstract speech is the reproduction of a group of 
sounds or a group of words, as an end in itself. Because of his 
basic commitment to the natural attitude, Luria confuses this 
phenomenal dimension with the psychological, which ultimately 
compromises his attempt to understand the distinction between 
abstract and concrete speech and to account for conduction 
aphasia. 
"Recent Soviet psychological and neuropsychological 
investigations have shown convincingly that a change in 
the goal of the task to be performed inevitably leads 
to a significant change in the psychological structure 
of any form of activity and, in some cases to equally 
significant changes in the neurophysiological systems 
responsible for its performance. 
This fundamental proposition applies in full to the 
processes of speech. In speech communication the main 
task is the transmission of information or, in other 
words, the fulfillment of a certain motive or the 
expression of a certain thought is thus the purpose and 
the basic activity, while the formulation of this 
thought as speech is the means of carrying out this 
activity, or its executive operation. Naturally, most 
attention in this activity is concentrated on the 
matter of thought in the speaker's consciousness, 
whereas the process of verbal formulation, like all 
executive operations, may be carried out automatically 
and unconsciously by a person able to speak well. 
The psychological structure of the process of 
repetition of sounds, words or sentences is completely 
different. In these cases the purpose, and consequently 
the object of the speaker's activity is to reproduce 
groups of sounds with the aid of the appropriate 
articulations. During the repetition of syllables or 
meaningless combinations of sounds this process does 
not depend on meaningful components and it occurs in 
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the pure artificial form, in the repetition of words or 
sentences it can rest on organized meaningful units; 
however the object of the speaker's conscious activity 
is still the processes of acoustic and articular 
analysis although dependence on meaningful 
organization begins to play a subsidiary role" 
(1976:242/3). " the reproduction of such a group of 
articulated sounds is a conscious, voluntary act 
requiring the selection of the proper phonemes and 
articulemes, and is by no means an automatized 
component of speech activity or an executive operation, 
as it is during a dialogical exchange of communications 
or during spontaneous narration." (1976:245) 
It seems to us extremely unlikely that Luria would ultimately 
wish to account for abstract speech in terms of reflex 
mechanisms or pre-determined nerve pathways. In the first 
instance there is little ambiguity in the mentalistic terms he 
uses, e.g. 'a conscious voluntary act' and secondly because of 
his understanding of voluntary acts in general. Luria claims 
that the two fundamental conditions of all voluntary movements 
are the afferent and kinesthetic basis and the afferent or 
kinetic organization. Since kinesthesis is invariably understood 
in terms of internal sensations, Luria's kinesthetic base 
implies an agent who can recognize the sensations and can direct 
his motor activity accordingly. The executive articulatory 
activities, which are involved in the pronunciation of 
meaningful concrete utterances, having often been performed in 
normal conversations, have become habitual, i.e. a network of 
conditioned reflexes have been set up enabling the articulatory 
performances to take place 'automatically'. By contrast those 
activities involved in the repetition of meaningless sounds and 
isolated words, being unusual activities, require a voluntary 
act of consciousness whereby the correct phonemes are identified 
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of abstract set "but a disturbance affecting 
conscious distinction of the necessary 
acoustic-articulatory complexes" (Luria, 1976:245). 
If in concrete speech the patient can depend on 'meaningful 
components', it means simply that he can make use of certain 
pre-established nerve pathways which of their own would bring 
about the execution of the concrete speech. 
Luria's distinction between abstract and concrete speech like 
Goldstein's distinction between Zeigen and Greifen comes 
down to the distinction between the mental and the 




the dualism of 
1962:122). But for as long as we remain 
consciousness and body we will have to 
explain how consciousness or a content of consciousness could 
influence nerve endings. Within the bounds of the natural 
attitude there could be no account of how an immaterial, non 
extended substance could effect real physical processes. There 
could be no account of how the mind, once it had chosen a 
representation of the movement it wished to execute could cause 
precisely that movement in the body (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:139). 
Merleau-Ponty argues that 
explanation in terms of 
it is impossible to set limits to an 
factual connections between nerve 
pathways (1976:122/3). If we are to account for concrete speech 
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in terms of pre-established nerve pathways, we will have adopted 
the objective point of view, taking speech to be one of the 
processes in the world. But from this point of view, abstract 
speech is also a real process in the world, which means that it 
would also have to be 'explained' from the outside, in terms of 
muscular movements and nerve connections. 
Furthermore Luria's description of normal spontaneous speech 
accords very little with our experience of speaking. Certainly 
it is true that if one speaks a language fluently one doesn't 
require the complex mental processes which those learning to 
speak the language may have to master, but speaking fluently can 
hardly be described as an automatic and unconscious activity. 
Luria's account would seem to suggest that as the speaker 
concentrates on "the matter of thought", the movements of 
tongue, lungs, lips etc, occur on their own, in the same way 
that my foot moves when I am tapped below the knee. Ve can say 
of Luria's account of speech what Merleau-Ponty says of Liep-
mann's account of voluntary movement. Luria destroys the 
essential unity of the speech act by dividing it up into an act 
of consciousness, which concentrates on "the matter of thought", 
and a sequence of automatisms, through which the actual speech 
is carried out automatically. "The problem can be solved only 
provided that we cease to draw a distinction between the body as 
a mechanism in itself and consciousness as being for itself", 
(1962:139) which means that we will have to accept that speech 
is itself a certain manner of directing oneself to a signifi-
cation, i.e. that speech can be a last relation to its world. 
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Luria maintains that the loss of abstract speech in conduction 
aphasia could be due to a variety of disruptions. Those forms of 
conduction aphasia which are due to a loss of short term memory, 
should he argues, be classified as forms of "acoustico-mnestic 
aphasia" (1976:246); those due to a loss of the ability to 
identify the phonemes in the words and sentences to be repeated, 
Luria associates with sensory aphasia, while conduction aphasia 
due to an inability to execute chosen articulemes, he regards as 
a form of oral apraxia, which he believes is due to a disruption 
of the 'kinesthetic base' and is therefore comparable to what he 
calls afferent or kinesthetic aphasia (1976:245). 
CONDUCTION APHASIA AS A FORM OF KINESTHETIC APHASIA 
As we have seen, for Luria, all voluntary acts presuppose a 
'kinesthetic base'. In order to execute a desired act the 
subject needs to be aware of the muscular processes as they are 
carried out. Nerve endings in these muscles provide the subject 
with the so-called kinesthetic sensations which enable him to 
infer the degree to which the muscles of the organ are 
contracted or extended. In this way he is informed at all times 
about the progress of any activity and the position of all of 
his organs and limbs. The important question here is how we 
distinguish one kinesthetic sensation from another. How, for 
example, do I know that certain sensations are sensations of my 
left arm rather than of my right arm, or that certain sensations 
signify that the forearm is flexed rather than extended? Clearly 
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I can tell where any part of my body is, or whether a limb is 
flexed or extended without actually looking at it. In the case 
of my 'speaking body', how do I distinguish between the 
kinesthetic sensations produced when my tongue is in the 
position required for the production of 'e', and when it is in 
the position required for the production 'e'? 
The traditional answer is that 
distinguish the kinesthetic 
I am able 
sensations 
to interpret and 
through their 
associations with other sensations. I know for example that I 
have flexed my forearm rather than extended it, because the 
kinesthetic sensations produced by the nerves in the flexor 
muscles, are associated with a network of other sensations, for 
example, the visual sensations I may have seeing the forearm in 
a flexed position. The system of kinesthetic sensations and 
their associations is called the body image, since it enables me 
to represent to myself the exact location of every local 
stimulus and the exact position of my limbs. Since the 
associations of the various sensations become established 
through their being repeatedly presented together, the body 
image is held to become established gradually through childhood, 
as the tactile, kinesthetic and visual sensations become 
associated and are able to evoke each other. This is held to 
explain why the dexterity and articulatory precision improve as 
the child develops (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:98/9). 
Kinesthetic (or afferent motor) aphasia appears to be due to a 
337 
breakdown of the speaking body image. Patients are unable to 
articulate the sounds they desire because the kinesthetic 
sensations are no longer distinguishable and the patient is 
unable to distinguish the various articulatory positions. 
"The disturbance of differentiations among similar 
articulatory positions is one of the most 
characteristic symptoms of this form of motor aphasia. 
Thus patients with afferent motor aphasia have special 
difficulties in articulating the sounds they want, 
i.e., in differentiating them from other sounds. Often 
such a patient will attempt to distinguish the 
articulatory positions for different sounds by feeling 
his own tongue and lips with his fingers as he 
pronounces them; he attempts to memorise the positions 
which produce appropriate sounds. Very often he will 
begin to use a mirror so as to be able to see the 
position of his lips and tongue. He attempts to use 
these visual images for mastering the desired 
articulations. Discovery of the appropriate positions 
of lips and tongue turns out to be the primary obstacle 
to recovery of speech by such patients." (Luria, 
1970:153) 
The phenomenon would seem to suggest that by feeling his own 
tongue with his fingers, or by looking at the position of his 
tongue and lips in a mirror, the patient attempts to compensate 
for the weakness of his kinesthetic information. 
In milder cases of kinesthetic aphasia where the disruption of 
this kinesthetic information has not been sufficiently severe, 
the patient only has difficulties in distinguishing between 
articulemes such as 1 and d, m and n, b and p, i.e. between 
articulemes which differ in only one feature. 
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"In milder cases this picture [of kinesthetic aphasia] 
is manifest only as the equally probable uttering of 
closely similar articulemes such as "1" - "d" - "n" or 
"m" "b" "p" (dentolinguals in the first case and 
labials in the second case), that differ acoustically 
but differ articulatorily in only one feature; for this 
reason the patient begins to confuse these articulemes 
easily and may pronounce "stol" as "slot" or "snot", 
and "rhalat" as "rhanat" or "rhadat". In patients with 
more extensive lesions the system of contrasts is 
disturbed between less similar phonemes and the 
articulatory contrasts, which differ in their position 
and the method of their formation, begin to be revealed 
particularly clearly, the patients very easily confuse 
plosives, fricatives, the front, middle, and back 
linguals, close, half-close, half-open and open vowels, 
hard and soft consonants, and so on." (Luria, 1976:101) 
If, as Luria proposes, certain forms of conduction aphasia can 
be explained as forms of kinesthetic aphasia, and if we cannot 
account for concrete speech simply as a reflex action, the 
question will be how the body image could be sufficiently 
established and the articulatory contrasts sufficient for the 
execution of concrete speech but not for abstract speech? 8 
The phenomenon suggests that the primary and fundamental 
differentiation in the speaking body image is not a 
differentiation based on physical differences between 
meaningless articulemes, but between meaningful expressive acts. 
Articulemes are primarily distinguishable from one ano':her not 
because one is a dentolingual and the other a labial. They are 
distinguishable because of the roles they play in expressive 
acts, and expressive acts are distinguishable for me because of 
the difference in the significations which they grasp or reveal. 
The possession of the speaking body which enables us to execute 
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abstract speech, to distinguish between dentolinguals and 
labials etc., is a sophisticated power, related to play acting, 
which is not presupposed in ordinary or authentic speech and 
which can be destroyed without seriously affecting ordinary 
spontaneous narrative speech. 
Using Merleau-Ponty's reflections on the 'body image' we can 
show that in authentic speech I do not possess my speech organs 





a signification, as an organ for grasping a 'world' 
and for others. We can show that the expression, 
signification with my speech" must be taken quite 
that it is not simply a description of a subjective 
impression which would hide an actual state of affairs in which 
I grasp the signification in a mental act while my speech is 
carried out automatically (as Luria has suggested (1976:245)). 
The body with which I speak is the incarnation of a last 
relation to its world, it is nothing but a potentiality for a 
certain signification (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:106). My possession 
of my speech organs is indistinguishable from a certain opening 
onto the signification to be grasped. As such, the speaking body 
ceases to be an object, 'fades out before what is expressed' 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:401) and its ability to make distinctions, 
its articulatory precision does not rest on any attribute it has 
as an object, but is indistinguishable from the nature of the 
signification to be grasped (see above pages 208/11). 
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In the chapter of the Phenomenology of Perception, "The 
spatiality of One's own Body and Motility" (1962:98/147), 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the body image as it is experienced 
and as the notion of a body image has been used in recent 
accounts of behaviour and behaviour disorders is not simply a 
sum of its parts in the way that a picture is a collection of 
its parts. The body image is a 'whole' which works 'downwards' 
to its parts. The 'whole' is a comprehensive bodily purpose and 
each part, such as each limb or organ is experienced in terms of 
the role it plays in this purpose. My left hand, for example, is 
not for me a collection of tactile and kinesthetic sensations, 
associated with other visual and tactile sensations, enabling me 
to identify them as sensations of the left hand. As I am about 
to grasp some object my hand is experienced as a certain 
potentiality of grasping, i.e. it is experienced in terms of its 
role in my project. The rest of my body, instead of being "an 
assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space", will be 'implied' in 
the grasping action, swallowed up in this gesture and effort, 
their positions and postures will be experienced in terms of the 
potentials or powers they contribute in the grasping gesture. 
Being the left hand for me, is not an attribute it has because 
of its position in external space. Left and right are for me 
primarily my sides of awkwardness and dexterity, they 'express' 
modalities of a practical relation to a task. 
"For the auger, right and left are the sources of the 
lawful and the forbidden, just as for me my right hand 
and my left are respectively the incarnations of my 
skill and my awkwardness." (Merleau-Ponty, 1967:285) 
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Since the experience I have of my hand is that of a power of 
grasping rather than an anatomical entity, sensorium and 
motorium are indistinguishable. 
Merleau-Ponty cites the example of Allocheiria where the patient 
feels in his right hand stimuli applied to his left hand. Vithin 
the bounds of the traditional theory of the body image, 
allocheiria would presuppose that each sensation of rhe left 
hand, of its own, became disconnected with its normal 
associations, and became associated with those visual and 
tactile sensations normally connected with the corresponding 
sensation of the right hand. In this way each sensation of the 
left hand could become mistaken for a sensation of the right 
hand. But how could we account for the syndrome in terms of such 
an enormous number of chance associations and disassociations? 
The syndrome becomes intelligible if we accept that the 
spatiality of the body, its left and right, work downward from 
the project to its parts, so that the left hand originating in 
the bodily project could become for me, at one stroke, my right 
hand. 
" in order that the body image may elucidate 
allocheiria, it is not enough that each sensation of 
the left hand should take its place among generic 
images of all parts of the body acting in association 
to form around it, as it were, a superimposed outline 
of the body; these associations must be constantly 
subject to a single law, the spatiality of the body 
must work downwards from the whole to the parts, the 
left hand and its position must be implied in a 
comprehensive bodily purpose and it must originate in 
that purpose, so that it may at one stroke not only be 
superimposed or brought down on to the right hand, but 
actually become the right hand." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:99) 
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My experience of my right arm for example cannot be an 
experience of kinesthetic sensations, for as long as these are 
understood as private data, as internal representations of 
events in the muscles of the arm. I must experience my arm as a 
certain power in the world. Merleau-Ponty argues that my 
experience of my limbs has no physiological foundation, only 
an existential one, only my purposeful projection towards the 
world. 9 
In the case of the phantom limb the patient continues to feel 
the presence of a limb that has been lost, and may continuously 
attempt to use the limb. This shows that the body image does not 
always correspond with the actual body and that the kinesthetic 
sensations do not necessarily have physiological counterparts. 
In The Structure of Behaviour, Merleau-Ponty had discussed the 
way in which an insect, in the performance of an instinctive 
act, substituted a sound leg for one which had been cut off. If 
the leg is merely tied however no such substitution takes place. 
"The tied limb is not replaced by a free one because it 
continues to count in the insect's scheme of things, 
and because the current of activity which flows towards 
the world still passes through it." (1967:78) 
The patient will continue to experience the presence of the 
phantom limb for as long as it continues to count in his 
being-in-the-world, for as long as the project which he 
embodies continues to pass through it into the world, for as 
long as it is an originating relationship with the world. The 
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anosognosic on the other hand, who systematically ignores his 
paralysed right hand, who holds out his left hand when asked for 
the right hand does so, not because of a genuine anaesthesia or 
an absence of sensations. The patient continues to describe his 
paralysed arm as 'a long cold snake' and he is sufficiently 
aware of his arm and its position to enable him to ignore it as 
systematically as he does. He ignores his right arm, holds out 
his left hand when asked for his right, because of a general 
rearrangement of his body image, because the left hand no longer 
originates in his body project. The distinction between a left 
and a right hand no longer has any genuine sense for him. His 
paralysed limb no longer counts for him, because his existence 
does not pass through it into the world, in other words, the 
comprehensive bodily purpose, which is existence, working 
downwards to its parts, no longer works downwards through to his 
right hand. His right hand is never taken up into his original 
relation with the world. 
"The fact that the paralysed limb of the anosognosic no 
longer counts in the subject's body image, is accounted 
for by the body image's being neither the mere copy nor 
even the global awareness of the existing parts of the 
body, and by its active integration of these latter 
only in proportion to their value to the organism's 
projects." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:100) 
My limbs are not for me juxtaposed in external or geometric 
space. They are not experienced as above, below, to the left or 
the right of each other. The experience of my arm for example, 
of the angle between upper and forearm will be implied in the 
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experience of my hand as its grasps an object. The experience of 
my arm, shoulder and trunk are not other experiences, 
numerically distinct from that of my grasping hand, but are its 
depth. 
If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both 
hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of my 
body trails behind them like the tail of a comet. It is 
not that I am unaware of the whereabouts of my 
shoulders or back, but these are simply swallowed up in 
the position of my hands, and my whole posture can be 
read so to speak in the pressure they exert on the 
table." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:100) 
It is of course possible for me to maintain roughly the same 
pressure on the table with a different combination of postures. 
I could for example straighten my back and provided I 
simultaneously bent my elbows I would not affect the pressure 
exerted to any noticeable degree. To say that my whole posture 
can be read in this pressure, implies that certain combinations 
will be experienced as equivalent even though they may differ 
substantially from each other in objective terms. This is 
because my posture and the arrangement of my limbs is not 
experienced as so many tactile and kinesthetic sensation~ spread 
out in space parts extra parts, but as originating in my project 
directed towards an object in the world. 
Clearly for Merleau-Ponty the body image is not reducible to a 
subjective experience. The pressure exerted on the table is not 
reducible to sensations of pressure. What 'swallows up' the 
shoulders and back is the pressure exerted on the table as an 
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event in the world. The comprehensive bodily purpose is not for 
me reducible to an experience. My posture and the arrangement of 
my limbs are experienced as originating in my project in the 
world, not in my experience of my project. 
If the body image was reducible to an experience it could never 
be used to explain behaviour and behaviour disorders. If the 
body image explains Allocheiria, the phantom limb and 
anosognosia, 
the subject 
images or of 
then there is no need to look behind the experience 
has of his body, for a real world of associated 
nerve fibres. The expression 'actually become the 
right hand' must be taken quite literally (Provided that 




If the left hand were only experienced as if it were 
hand, if the body image was a realm of subjective 
distinguishable from the body itself, it would still 
be necessary to explain how a stimulus applied to the left hand 
could provoke a sensation in the right hand i.e. it would be 
necessary to explain 
left hand as if it 
how the subject comes to experience his 
were his right hand. If the left hand can 
"actually become the right hand", and if this change can 
then it is clear that we need to apply 
that the irreducible body, the body we must 
explain allocheiria, 
the reduction and 
account for, must not be confused with the body studied by the 
physiologist. Like the transcendental ego this body is not 
accessible 
within so 
to the external 
that it can be 
observer, it must be taken up from 
what it is experienced as being, 
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so that a description of the body from the inside is also an 
explanation. If we say that shoulders and arms are implied 
in the gesture of leaning on the table, or are swallowed up in 
the gesture, or of we say that my existence flows through a 
particular limb we are referring to a realm which demands the 
paradox of immanence and transcendence, which is inseparably 
experience and being, where a description of experience is 
indistinguishable from an explanation. 
Vhat makes a limb count for me both as a sensory organ and as a 
motor organ are not kinesthetic sensations, but the fact that my 
being-in-the-world 'passes through' it or "works dmmwards" 
through it. If I attempt to reflect on my experience o+ having 
an arm, the movement of return into myself is complemented by a 
movement throwing me beyond myself. The more I attempt to 
confine myself to my private experience the more I discover 
myself from the outside. The more I attempt to confine myself to 
my present experience the more I am thrown beyond the present to 
the future goal of my gesture. My experience of the limb is not 
an experience but merges with my actual being in the world, 
which we have described as an 'I can'. The body image is 
therefore not an image at all and my experience of my body is 
indistinguishable from being a body in the world directed 
towards its tasks. 
" the body image is finally a way of stating that my 
body is in the world." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:101) 
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Vhen I grasp an object I do not have to guide my hand towards 
the object, for the hand I move is experienced as being, and is, 
a potentiality for grasping the object. Grasping is a last, or 
an originating relation with the world. 
" the subject, when put in front of his scissors, 
needle and familiar tasks, does not need to look for 
his hands or his fingers, because they are not objects 
to be discovered in objective space: bones, muscles and 
nerves, but potentialities already mobilized by the 
perception of scissors or needle, the central end of 
those 'intentional threads' which link him to :he 
objects given. It is never our objective body that we 
move, but our phenomenal body, and there is no mystery 
in that, since out body, as the potentiality of this or 
that part of the world, surges towards objects to be 
grasped and perceives them ... The body is no more than 
an element in the system of the subject and his world, 
and the task to be performed elicits the necessary 
movements from him by a sort of remote attraction ... ". 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:106) 
This is for Merleau-Ponty the most fundamental relation with our 
own body. The ability we have to treat the body as an object, to 
flex our limbs and to move a limb simply for the sake of moving 
it, is a sophisticated ability which takes place within the 
objective world. It is an ability that can be lost without 
destroying our concrete involvement in the world through our 
body. 
Ve are claiming that if we wish to account for conduction 
aphasia as a form of kinesthetic aphasia, Merleau-Ponty's theory 
of the body image will enable us to explain how the kinesthetic 
base of his speaking can be sufficiently refined to account for 
concrete speech but not for abstract speech. Ve will begin by 
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examining the power of the speaking body to discriminate in 
authentic speech, between articulemes and then turn to its 
ability to discriminate between grammatical forms. In both cases 
we will see that the speaking body is not an object but a 
"potentiality" for a certain world. 
Ve have already referred to the interesting phenomenon which 
Jakobson has brought to light, namely the difficulty experienced 
by Czechs and Russians to discriminate in their articulation 
between the french closed and open, e. Vhy for example does the 
Czech have no difficulty distinguishing between e and e when it 
is a question of differentiating in his speech between two 
stylistic variants of the same word, pepiku and pepiku, but is 
unable to make the same distinction when it is a question of 
indicating in his pronunciation, the difference between the 
french Words 'de'' (d ) · d' d 'd · ' (d ) i e mean1ng 1ce, an a~s e mean ng 
The ability to distinguish in pronunciation between canopy. 
closed e and open e cannot be based on the possession of 
codes and on articulatory oppositions If the 
oppositions were sufficiently clear for the 
articulatory 
articulatory 
distinction between 'pepiku' and 'pepiku' why are they not 
sufficient for distinguishing between 'de' and 'dais'? 
Clearly the use of closed e in pepiku is not a sign with which 
the Czech indicates his attitude or his feelings, for if it were 
a sign the pronunciation would presuppose the ability to 
distinguish between e and e, which we know he is unable to do. 
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Are we then to argue that his feeling casual or his intention to 
be casual has a causal effect on his speech, so that instead of 
uttering pepiku he utters pepiku? Are we to say tha~ such a 
causal effect could account for a discrimination in his speaking 
which he would not have been able to bring about voluntarily? 
But such a description of speaking would leave us with that 
bizarre account which we have argued against above. For the 
speaker, there would be a mysterious relation between his 
feelings or intentions and his speech. He would find his 
pronunciation changing as I find my leg moving when I am tapped 
below the knee. 
The difficulties faced by the Czech who attempts to discriminate 
in his pronunciation, between 'dais' and 'de', oblige us to 
accept that while speaking Czech he never distinguishes between 
the articulemes closed e and open e but only between a casual 
and a formal manner of addressing another person. 'Pepiku' in 
this casual approach must be an irreducible speech act. If it 
is an irreducible act then whatever is expressed in this manner 
of speaking cannot be an idea in the mind of the speaker while 
the speech act is executed as a real physical process. 1·Thatever 
is expressed must permeate the articulatory process itself. Any 
real physical process is reducible to its parts. The speech act 
must take place in another world where the 'status' of the 
audience can permeate 
close or gather up 
physiological linguistic 
the articulatory process and can seal, 
the multiplicity of the physical, 
means of elocution, and contract them 
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into one sole act (Herleau-Ponty, 1968:154). It is only the 
scientific linguist who attempts to adopt the point of view of 
the external observer, who is therefore unable to encounter the 
'whole', for whom the speech act is reducible to a physical 
process and for whom the distinction between the formal and the 
informal greeting can only be indicated with the distinction 
between e and e, and who consequently finds it odd that the 
Czech has difficulty making the distinction between 'dais' and 
In his use of the formal and informal manners of greeting, the 
Czech expresses some or other attribute of his audience, such as 
his status of being simply an acquaintance, a distant friend or 
being a long standing or close friend. If his speech is to be an 
irreducible whole there can be for him no distinction between 
the attribute expressed in his speech and the attribute actually 
possessed by his audience. If there were such a distinction, his 
speech would no longer be 'co-extensive with being' 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962:353), his speech would be for him, like the 
processes of the psychological ego, real physical events in the 
world. Vhat characterises authentic speech is that through his 
speech the speaker situates himself as a last subject, his 
speech 
that 
ceases to be an act in the world and becomes a mediation, 
by which and through which he moves towards a 
signification. His speech dissolves in this reference to its 
object, (Ricoeur, 1967:16) 
speech literally expresses 
or, what is the same thing, his 
this attribute or status of his 
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audience, or makes his audience exist for him in a certain way. 
Once we have accepted that pepiku pronounced in an informal 
greeting is an irreducible act we have given up the external 
observer point of view. If the Czech attempts to reflect on his 
own experience of speaking in this way he will find himself 
thrown beyond immanence, beyond private kinesthetic impressions, 
towards the "familiarity" or that special quality of his 
audience which makes this way of speaking appropriate. 
"The meaning of the gesture is not contained in it like 
some physical or physiological phenomenon. The meaning 
of the word is outlined in the structure of the world." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:193) 
"The meaning of a gesture thus 'understood' is not 
behind it, it is intermingled with the structure of the 
world outlined by the gesture, and which I take up on 
my own account." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:186) 
The ability of the Czech to distinguish between pepiku and 
pepiku does not involve an ability to distinguish between the 
articulemes e and e because it only manifests or is the 
incarnation of, modes of being-towards-others. The ability he 
has to distinguish between pepiku and pepiku has no 
physiological or psychological basis it only has an existential 
one. He will continue to be able to make the distinction for as 
long as it counts in his being-towards-others, for as long as 
his existence towards others flows through it into the world. 
Just as the distinction between the right hand and the left had 
is not made on the basis of their spatial locations but because 
they incarnate my sides of dexterity and awkwardness, so e and 
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E, and by extension all the articulatory oppositions and the 
distinctions between words are not based on the fact that some 
are labials and others are dentolinguals or combinations of 
these, they are distinguishable because of the role they play in 
the existence of the speaker in his world and amongst others, 
they are distinguishable because it is through their 
distinctions that his existence flows into the world. 
"In motor aphasia, the list of words lost and preserved 
does not correspond to their objective characteristics 
(length and complexity), but to their value from the 
subject's point of view." (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:195) 
Vhat we have tried to reveal about articulemes, conduction 
aphasia demonstrates with respect to words and grammatical 
structures. The conduction aphasic is unable to repeat sounds, 
words or name objects, yet his spontaneous narrative speech is 
relatively intact. For the speaker, spontaneous narrative speech 
must be an irreducible act, it cannot be made up of words and 
articulemes. The power of the speaking body to articulate the 
right words and the correct grammatical forms, has no 
physiological base, only ·an existential one. The articulatory 
precision and law like activity of the speaking body manifest 
the structure of the world towards which speech is directed. It 
is literally the same thing to be directed towards a certain 
aspect of the world or a certain signification, and to use the 
correct words and the correct grammar. 
Even the grammatical forms of the verb which refer to the past 
353 
present and future do not reflect an understanding of the 
temporal relations but the temporal structure of the subjects 
being-in-the-world. 
In general children acquire the ability to use tense grammar 
correctly long before they have acquired an understanding of 
temporal relations, long before they are able for example to 
indicate these relations on a linear representation of time. 
This would seem to suggest that the child has been 'cond~tioned' 
into using the grammatical forms in a certain way. Any such 
mechanistic theory of conditioning however runs up aga;_nst the 
fact that the learning process is systematic (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:142). If the child were conditioned to using the 
grammatical forms the learning process would take place 
gradually and we would find that the child begins to use the 
past present and future forms of some verbs, particularly those 
heard most frequently, before those of other verbs. Vhat 
characterises the learning process however is that it occurs 
during a relatively short period and all the verbs in the 
child's vocabulary are affected more or less simultaneously. 
In an article, "The Child's Relations with Others" (1973:109), 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the correct use of tense grammar is 
based neither on an "understanding" of time nor on conditioned 
reflexes, it has an existential basis. The use of grammatical 
forms is the incarnation of the temporal structure of the 
child's relations with others. The child begins to use the tense 
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grammar forms when his existence-with-others is dilated into 
the structure of past-present- and future. 
Merleau-Ponty quotes an article by Francois Rostand which 
describes the younger of two children who shows signs of 
jealousy when a new brother is born. His status or role in the 
family as 'the youngest' has been usurped and his jealousy is 
essentially a refusal to give up this role. By a fortunate 
coincidence a child older than all three comes to stay in the 
family. This fourth child robs the elder of the two of his 
status as the 'absolute eldest'. It is at this moment ':hat the 
younger brother overcomes his jealousy and begins to use the 
grammatical structures of past present and future. Rostand 
argues that the jealousy is overcome "thanks to the constitution 
of a scheme of past-present-future" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:110). 
Jealousy, in this child, he argues, is a rigid attachment to a 
certain present, to the situation in which he is the "latest 
born". His jealousy is overcome because with the new temporal 
structure it is possible for him to have the status of one who 
was the youngest born, and one who has the same relation to 
the new baby as his elder brother had to him. Rostand suggests 
that he has overcome his jealousy because he has replaced an 
attitude which we could describe as "my place has been taken" 
with one which could be described as II I have been the 
youngest, but I am the youngest no longer, and I will become 
the biggest" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:110) 
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'Corresponding' to this new situation is a sudden acquisition of 
the grammatical forms. Ve cannot maintain that the crisis in his 
relationships with others provided the occasion for him to grasp 
the 'idea' of time, for this again would suggest that correct 
grammatical usage presupposes an understanding of the idea of 
time. His new status is not an idea or a belief, and the 
attitude Rostand describes should not be regarded as a 
cogitatum. To be the youngest in the family is to relate to 
others and to be related to in a certain way. To relate to 
others as one who vas the youngest and who will be the 
biggest is to relate to others, to be amongst others through the 
structures of time. The grammatical forms will be in his speech 
because his being-amongst-others flows through his speech. 
There is no evidence to suggest that in authentic spontaneous 
speech the subject applies rules, or that the ordered aspect of 
his speech is brought about through automatisms. It is only in 
certain forms of abstract speech, or whenever we attempt to 
speak a language which we have not yet made our own that we are 
obliged to select words and apply grammatical rules. As we have 
seen the correct use of the grammatical forms of past present 
and future do not reflect an understanding of temporal 
relations and a knowledge of the rules, it aanifests or 
incarnates the temporal structure of the speaker's existence-
amongst-others. There is no necessity to account for the 
presence of the articulemes which make up the grammatical forms 
because for the speaker they are not real acts they are only 
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abstractions, or the silhouettes of this temporalised 
being-with-others. 
"HENCEFORTH, AS THE PARTS OF MY BODY TOGETHER COMPRISE A SYSTEM, 
SO MY BODY AND THE OTHER PERSON'S ARE ONE VHOLE ••. " 
Ve have been that conduction aphasics have difficulty not only 
in the repeating meaningless sounds but also in repeating 
meaningful words and even meaningful sentences. Demitr for 
example had no difficulty uttering meaningful sentences as parts 
of sp~1taneous narrative speech but she was unable to produce 
the same sentences in isolation. 
"The integrity of the sentence in the context of 
narration does not mean, however, that this patient 
could as easily repeat a sentence which she had only 
just so easily spoken in spontaneous narrative speech" 
(Luria, 1976:255) 
Concrete speech therefore differs from abstract speech not 
simply because it is meaningful or has a unitary semantic 
structure. Those forms of speech which present the patient with 
the least difficulty are those forms in which the patient 
attempts to 'reach' his audience, to convince him of something 
or other, to challenge him etc. Vhile those forms which are 
essentially the making of statements, even meaningful statements 
are found to be more difficult. Luria himself refers to the well 
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known case of conduction aphasia where the patient was asked to 
repeat the word "No". After many fruitless attempts the patient 
finally burst out saying, "No, doctor I just cannot say the word 
"no"" (1976:103). The outburst, we are suggesting, is not so 
much a statement about what he is unable to say, but an act of 
'surrender', a way of 'giving up' and withdrawing from the task. 
This comes out particularly clearly in an interesting experiment 
which Luria carries out, somewhat by chance, on the conduction 
aphasic which he refers to as Dimitr. 
" Having just noted the patient's severe difficulty 
with her speech and the excessive number of pauses, 
wordseekings and paraphasias, in order to make her 
speech emotional in character I said to her: 
"nevertheless your teacher was bad, she didn't work 
very hard with you and was inattentive" However this 
immediately drew from the patient a highly emotional 
and agitated response "Vell, Professor, I don't know 
how you can say that! ... my teacher was in fact very 
good and clever, and she always worked very hard with 
me, and now you talk like that! ... " This time th~re 
were no pauses while seeking words, no paraphasias in 
the patient's emotional speech. 
In sharp contrast with the fluent, intonationally 
normal narrative speech as just described above, all 
types of voluntary, motivated speech arising whenever 
the patient was forced to devote her conscious efforts 
not to the transmission of thought, but to the speech 
process itself, were severely disturbed." (Luria, 
1976:251) 
Luria misses the real difference between those forms of speech 
which are easier and those which are more difficult for the 
patient. Her speech was not supported by well exercised 
'habitual combinations', nor by the emotion he invoked in her, 
her speech was fluent and easier for her whenever in her speech 
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she attempted to persuade Luria of something or other, whenever 
she challenged him or simply tried to get him to realize 
something. 
This distinction between speech which is directed towards 
reaching someone, or which attempts to bring about a new 
situation and speech which is a way of making a statement, of 
referring to objects ideas or relations, is well recognized. It 
is always assumed however that the former is just a complex 
combination of the latter, that one reaches another brings 
about a state of affairs,by making a series of statements, 
"Men have been talking for a long time on earth, and 
yet three-quarters of what they say goes unnoticed. A 
rose, it is raining, it is fine, man is mortal. These 
are paradigms of expression for us. Ve believe 
expression is most complete when it points 
unequivocally to events, to states of objects, to ideas 
or relations, for, in these instances, expression 
leaves nothing more to be desired, contains nothing 
which it does not reveal, and thus sweeps us toward the 
object which it designates. In dialogue, narrative, 
plays on words, trust, promise, prayer, eloquence, 
literature, we possess a second-order language in which 
we do not speak of objects and ideas except to reach 
some person Yet we still insist on treating this 
language as simply a variant of the economical forms of 
making statements about some thing. Thus expression 
involves nothing more than replacing a perception or an 
idea with a conventional sign that announces, evokes, 
or abridges it." (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:3) 
Vithin the bounds of the natural attitude I could persuade or 
convince someone of something or other only by producing the 
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appropriate gestures or speech acts, which would either have 
some causal effect on his thoughts and attitudes or which would 
rely on the interpretation he gives to these acts. In either 
case my attempts to persuade or convince would still be 
reducible to the execution of certain acts. If this were the 
case however, how could it be possible for the patient to be 
able to pronounce the word "No" in "No doctor I just cannot say 
the word 'no'" and yet be unable to produce the word 'no' on its 
own? 
The phenomenon suggests that these acts of surrender, of 
challenging, persuading etc. are irreducible wholes. In these 
acts we are able to reach others without producing a series of 
statements or words. But if Dimitr's act does constitute such a 
'whole', then her speech must be inseparable from its goal. From 
the outset it must be magically at its conclusion, it can begin 
only by anticipating its end (Herleau-Ponty, 1962:104). It must 
be impossible to establish a numerical distinction between the 
act and Luria's being drawn into her world. The act must 
manifest a direct power over the internal life of her audience, 
as the 'sides' manifest the cube. Concrete speech is not made up 
of articulatory processes it is the incarnation of this 
trespassing on others. 
"I project myself into the other person, I introduce 
him into my own self. Rather then imprisoning it, 
language is like a magic machine for transporting the 
"I" into the other persons's perspective." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973:19) 
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" speech catches us indirectly, seduces us, trails 
us along, transforms us into the other and him into us, 
abolishes the limit between mine and not mine •.. " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973:145) 
Dimitr's fluent speech only appears to be made up of words and 
sentences. It is actually the vortex (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:353) 
into which the world of her audience is drawn. Her speech not 
only dissolves in its reference to a signification, but in 
reference to a signification for her and her audience. 
There is no need for verbal images or kinesthetic bases because 
she is not producing speech acts. Just as the Czech doesn't 
require the articulatory oppositions e and E, he simply has to 
exist through his speech and be directed towards others in 
certain ways, so Dimitr does not require verbal images and 
kinesthetic bases if she genuinely challenges or genuinely 
attempts to convince Luria of something or other. She would 
require these images and a kinesthetic basis only if she wished 
to pretend or act as if she was challenging or trying to 
convince. 11 This direct power of abolishing the limit between 
mine and not mine, of reaching my audience can be brought out in 
describing the stages we may go through learning to speak a 
foreign language. 
During the early stages of speaking a foreign language, 
communication appears to rely on trial and error. The student 
executes a series of articulemes which he has either learnt by 
heart or which he reads off from a book of phrases. He puts his 
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faith in his memory or in his book of phrases and hopes that his 
audience will attach certain meanings to these sounds and to 
realize what it is that he wishes to convey. Vhen the face of 
the foreigner finally lights up with a comprehending smile, 
although greatly relieved, the student is aware of how 
precarious the link is between his speech and the comprehending 
smile. The comprehension seems to come from another ~rorld to 
which he has no access. 
At a certain stage this sense of trial and error begins to 
disappear. The student begins to experience his speech as a 
power over the internal life of his audience. He finds that he 
can question, challenge or convince others of something, 
directly. There is no longer any sense of having to rely on 
the interpretive powers of the other. At this stage he finds 
that it is not necessary to consider the way in which others 
might understand his speech or how they will respond to a 
sequence of sentences. The confidence with which he speaks 
suggests that he has a direct power over others and that his 
speech is nothing but an incarnation of this direct power. 
"I speak to him as I find him, with a certainty that is 
at times prodigious. I use words and phrases he c:an 
understand or to which he can react." (Merleau-Ponty, 
1973:19) 
Vhat comes to gather up the multiplicity of linguistic means of 
the elocution and contract them into one sole act is a 
signification towards which we are directed and the 
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multiplicity of linguistic means of elocution which is 
contracted into one sole act is not just my speaking but our 
speaking {see above pages 224/5). 
"and the anomymous existence of which my body is the 
ever-renewed trace henceforth inhabits both bodies 
simultaneously." {Herleau-Ponty, 1962:354) 
The idea towards which we are swept is neither my idea nor 
his. 
"The other's words, or mine in him, do not limit 
themselves to vibrating like chords the listener's 
machinery of acquired significations or to arousing 
some reminiscence. Their flow must have the power of 
throwing me in turn toward a signification that neither 
he nor I possessed before." {Herleau-Ponty, 
1973:142) 
My speaking cannot be isolated from this sole act except as 
an abstraction. Taken on its own we will not be able to explain 
how I use just those words that my audience understands or how 
I use just the right words to aim at a signification which is 
not mine. 
" my words and those of my interlocutor are called 
forth by the state of the discussion, and they are 
inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us 
is the creator. Ye have here a dual being " 
{Herleau-Ponty, 1962:354) 12 
Ye are arguing that this "transformation" is not simply a change 
in the way the student experiences his speech and his 






his newly acquired fluency, explain how it is that he no 
needs to put his faith in his memory or the book of 
and explain the new sense of confidence that has 
the sense of trial and error. Ve are arguing that 
conduction aphasia only makes sense if we can accept that the 
body with which he learns to reach others, is the phenomenal 
speaking body, the body which is what it is experienced as 
being, so that the transformation we have described is also an 
explanation. 
In this experience I have of my body comprising with that of the 
other, one whole, and in this way being directed towards a 
signification for us, we have the paradox which overcomes the 
dilemma which compromised Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity. 
I have access to a world which is not mine (mir fremde) without 
its 'being not mine', being one of my cogitata. It is because I 
grasp a signification in speaking, and because the world of the 
other can be dovetailed into the tension that holds my speech 
act together, that there can be a signification 'for us'. 
The various forms of aphasia that we have examined have enabled 
us to take up many of the themes Merleau-Ponty developed in his 
account of perception and motility. This has enabled us not only 
to reflect on various aspects of the perception and production 
of speech, but also to argue for, or demonstrate the claims 
he has made and the evocative descriptions he has given us 
concerning speech. His reflections on language are therefore no 
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longer limited to merely a 'striking a chord'. Not only can they 
be demonstrated, but we can extend his theory to give an account 
of other aspects of language or link his reflections into a more 
systematic revelation. 
By taking up the themes developed in the account of perception 
and motility, in the realm of language we have enabled the 
meaning of these themes to emerge afresh. 
"Thus what is acquired is truly acquired only if it is 
taken up again in a fresh momentum of thought." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:130) 
On the other hand this exercise would also seem to be important 
in Neurolinguistic research. As we have seen, Luria has made 
some significant discoveries, particularly in the perceptual 
syndrome of efferent motor aphasia and in conduction aphasia. 
These discoveries seem to have been made by chance, and Luria 
seems unable to recognize their significance. What we have 
revealed about language should enable us to develop more 
profound methods of testing and classifying aphasic patients. It 
should enable us to avoid having to choose between the atomistic 
and the intellectualistic traditions without returning, as Luria 
does, to a form of dualism. Our reflections should enable us to 
refine the basic concepts Luria uses in his account of aphasic 
speech, concepts such as 'simultaneous surveyabili ty', 
'plasticity and selectivity of the brain' 'semantic unity', 
'concrete' and 'abstract' speech. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) "This patient had great difficulty in understanding 
whole semantic texts, even during supported attempts 
to analyze the meaning of the separate parts of the 
text or of the text as a whole. Be read or repeated 
individual parts of the text several times over, 
compared them with one another, altered them with 
different intonations (he was still able to do this), 
and only then was he able to suggest the meaning of 
the fragment as a whole, although he always lacked 
confidence." (Luria, 1976:200) 
2) Luria points out that no systematic investigation of the 
perceptual disturbance of these patients has yet been 
undertaken. Be says in fact, that very few authors have 
noted that these patients have any difficulty in perceiving 
and understanding complex grammatical structures. Be regards 
his own observations as preliminary and hopes that they will 
point the direction in which research should take place 
(Luria, 1967:207). Vhat Luria reveals in his observations 
enables us to pursue the notion of simultaneous 
surveyability and bring the perceptual difficulties of these 
patients in line with those of the semantic aphasic. 
3) "However, on this occasion [the examination of the 
efferent motor aphasic's understanding of speech] all 
these difficulties in understanding complex 
grammatical constructions do not arise through 
inability to convert a successive inflow of 
information into a simultaneously surveyable scheme 
(as in the lesions of the tertiary, parieto-occipital 
zones of the cortex, giving rise to semantic 
aphasia). In the cases we are now discussing these 
difficulties arise through the patient's inadequate 
activity, his inert fixation on the direct meaning of 
the verbal elements ... ". (Luria, 1976:209) 
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4) Jakobson makes the same point when he argues, quoting 
Saussure, that the relationship between the word and its 
meaning must be described from within the experience of 
speaking the language. 
"Saussure invokes the differences between languages, 
but actually the question of the arbitrary relation 
or the necessary connection between the signified and 
the signifier cannot be answered except by reference 
to a given state of a given language. Recall 
Saussure's own shrewd advice: 'It would be absurd to 
draw a panorama of the Alps from the points of view 
of several peaks of the Jura simultaneously; a 
panorama must be drawn from a single point'. And from 
the point of view of her native language, a peasant 
woman from Francophone Switzerland was right to be 
astonished: how can cheese be called Kase since 
fromage is its only natural name." (1978:112) 
5) "It has been clearly shown that animal perception is 
sensitive only to certain concrete stimulus wholes, 
the form of which is prescribed by instinct itself; 
and, rightly, a lived abstraction by means of which 
what does not correspond to the structure of the 
animal's instinct is left purely and simply outside 
its sensory field has been discussed. But the thought 
of relating the content of human perception to the 
structure of human action in the same way does not 
occur. Of course it is said that our "needs", our 
"tendencies", and our attention oriented by them make 
the objects of our actual perception emerge from the 
possible sensory field. But what is ordinarily 
implicitly understood by this is an ensemble of 
qualities colour, weight, flavor among which 
attention chooses; and it is from a mosaic of 
preconscious sensations that one tries to rejoin the 
actual content of infantile or original perception." 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1967:165) 
6) It should be clear that the discussion which follows 
parallels Merleau-Ponty's argument that Schneider's 
inability to execute abstract movement is not due to a 
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disruption of visual contents (1962:103/126). 
"The motor disturbances of cerebellar cases and those 
of psychological blindness can be co-ordinated only 
if we identify the basis of movement and vision not 
as a collection of sensible qualities but as a 
certain way of giving form or structure to our 
environment visual representation does not 
explain abstract movement, for it is itself endowed 
with the same power of throwing out a spectacle which 
is revealed in abstract movement and the act of 
pointing." (1962: 115) 
7) This phenomenon parallels Schneider's inability to execute 
abstract movements on demand. 
"The patient himself neither seeks nor finds his 
movements, but moves his body about until the 
movement comes. The order given is not meaningless to 
him, since he recognizes the inadequacy of his first 
attempts, and also since, if a fortuitous gesture 
produces the required movement, he is aware of it and 
can immediately turn his piece of good fortune to 
account. But if the order has an intellectual 
significance for him and not a motor one, it does not 
communicate anything to him as a mobile subject •.• " 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:110) 
8) This is the same question Merleau-Ponty addresses in his 
discussion of Schneider. Yhy is it that Schneider finds in 
his body "only an amorphous mass into which actual movement 
alone introduces divisions and links" (1962:110), when it is 
a question of executing abstract movements (Zeigen) but not 
when it is a question of executing concrete movements 
(Greifen)? 
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9) Certainly, as Merleau-Ponty has pointed out, the phantom 
limb disappears when the nerves from the stump to the brain 
are severed (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:77), but this does not 
prove that there can be a neurophysiological explanation for 
the experience, it demonstrates only that a mode of being in 
the world can be disrupted. Through binocular perception I 
can find myself in the world situated at a certain distance 
from the thread, but this does not imply that this being in 
the world can be explained in terms of the visual contents 
made possible by the two eyes, even though the loss of one 
eye will destroy the distance separating me from the thread. 
10) This reminds us of Schneider's ability to scratch a painful 
spot on his body to which he as unable to point. 
"The whole operation takes place in the domain of the 
phenomenal: it does not run through the objective 
world, and only the spectator, who lends his objective 
representation of the living body to the acting 
subject, can believe that the sting is perceived, that 
the hand moves in objective space, and consequently 
finds it odd that the same subject should fail in 
experiments requiring him to point things out. 
(Herleau-Ponty, 1962l106) 
11) It is interesting, to see how Schneider exploits this 
difference when he attempts to overcome his inability to 
execute abstract movements by taking the doctor's requests 
quite seriously. Vhen asked to execute the movements of a 
salute, Schneider actually salutes. Be manages to carry 
out the movement only by placing himself mentally in the 
369 
real situation in which one would salute, such that his 
whole body and the usual external marks of respect are 
involved in the act (1962:104). 
12) "Speaking is not just my own initiative, listening is 
not submitting to the initiative of the other, because 
as speaking subjects we are continuing, we are 
resuming a common effort more ancient than we, upon 
which we are grafted to one another and which is the 
manifestation of trust." (Merleau-Ponty, 1973:144) 
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